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7Abstract
This dissertation shows the relevance of political agency under conditions
of globalisation through a sub-national comparative study of labour market
reforms. The study builds upon existing literature by highlighting ‘relative
autonomy’ of political actors and dynamics in determining policy and outcome.
Such an assertion contradicts the purely structuralist interpretations of reform and
asserts that forces of globalisation can be negotiated by domestic political actors.
Based on the study of labour flexibility the dissertation argues that political
variables, specifically partisan orientation and nature of party competition,
influence the pace and direction of reforms producing sub-national variations. As
revealed governments backed by a relatively homogenous dominant support base
with business representation undertake greater labour market reforms compared to
governments with heterogeneous base. The difference in orientation to reform is
due to differences in distributive and redistributive pressures emanating from
support base.
Another important finding of this research concerns the impact of party
competition on reforms. Contrary to conventional understanding that
fragmentation impedes reforms, the case study, reveals that fragmentation in the
party system facilitates labour market reforms. The result  indicate that the impact
of political fragmentation on reform is not generic, and intermediate factors such
as configuration of electoral cleavages influence the relation.
In sum, the dissertation argues that variations in strength of interest groups
i.e. trade unions and business, the nature of party competition and configuration of
electoral groups combine to produce variation in reforms. Although such a claim
cannot undermine the increased relevance of market forces consequent upon
globalisation, theoretically, it does point out that reforms emerge in the
interrelation between economic considerations vis-à-vis political imperatives.
Public policy under conditions of globalisation is shaped not merely by economic
concerns but mirrors social trade-offs and varieties of social configuration.
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Introduction
1. Globalisation and public policy
Contemporary developments characterised under the broad rubric of
globalisation has emerged as the meta-narrative of present times with significant
implications for society, politics and economy. Globalisation as commonly
understood involves restructuring of the economy on a global scale through
deregulated markets, creation of international networks, and multi-nationalisation
of production. Naturally, such a process has led to systemic changes with
implications for policy autonomy of states (Sachs 1995). In the sphere of public
policy, the relevance of domestic socio-economic interests in policymaking has
increasingly come under question as states appear to be constrained by global
economic considerations. Friedman (1999) has famously used the metaphor of
“golden straight jacket” to signify increasing prosperity alongside limitations in state
autonomy that characterise contemporary globalisation. In policy literature, such
developments have often been framed in terms of democracy deficit in national
policymaking, domination of neoliberal capitalism, global interdependence among others
(Patnaik 2003; Aman 2004).
1.1 Globalisation and policy convergence
Public policy, an area hitherto considered the domain of national political
economy, has emerged as an important issue in the context of transformations
associated with globalisation. It is argued that under conditions of globalisation
states increasingly adopt similar policies that expand the scope of markets,
empower non-state actors and encourage economic interdependence (Strange
1996). In literature, such increasing similarity in the policies of nation states is
characterised as policy convergence.
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A survey of contemporary public policy literature reveals extensive debate
among scholars about policy convergence. According to the group of scholars
characterised as ‘structural theorists’, globalisation leads to policy convergence due to
the external environment like international economy, international regimes, and
multilateral agreements (Omae 1995; Huber 2001). The influence of external
economic and political factors on domestic policy is considered decisive under
conditions of globalisation.
A more sympathetic version holds that, intensified economic competition
characterised by mobility of capital and technological changes increase the cost of
economic closure forcing adoption of similar policies. This view known as policy
coordination attributes adoption of certain policies to either emulation of best
practices by states or competitive pressure to attract mobile capital (Mosley 2007).
Scholars like Garrett (1998b) and Downes (2004) argue that states continue to
have power over the market, and convergence is conscious political choice.
Contending the materialist (structural and coordination) hypothesis for
convergence, the World Society Approach locates the source of policy convergence in
the realm of ideas. The theory focuses on the conscious adoption of neoliberal
policies and points to the spread of certain models and ideas through ‘global
cultural and associational processes’ leading to policy consistency. Such global
ideational norms are facilitated through global scientific discourse, international
organisations, increased the role of technocrats and mimetic emulation of states
(Knill 2005).
Thus, broadly the policy literature emphasises on the role of external
economic factors such as international cycles of demand and price, conditionality in
agreements; ideational factors such as transmission of development paradigm and
political-economic considerations in limiting policy autonomy of states under conditions
16
of globalisation. Naturally, the three categories of factors remain intertwined, and
their relative importance is specific to historical and socio-political contexts.
1.2 Policy convergence or heterogeneity
Empirical evidence of convergence or transformation towards neo liberal
policies across the world, however, presents a somewhat complicated picture with
instances of convergence along with continuation of national heterogeneities.
Contradicting the arguments of convergence towards a neoliberal ideal, scholars
such as Pierson (2001) and Kong (2006) argue that despite globalisation substantial
national heterogeneity persists. They point out adoption or rejection of set of
policies is not merely conditioned by the growing internationalisation of economic
activities but also on a nation specific political, institutional and structural
framework.
Such arguments find credence in studies on the implementation of
structural adjustment and welfare state literature that highlight continued relevance
of domestic political factors in policy reforms. Haggard (1993) has noted that
economic reforms guided by World Bank, IMF and other international economic
institutions have been implemented coherently in only a minority of countries
owing to domestic pressures.
Scholars subscribing to varieties of capitalism argument emphasise the
importance of institutional linkages and legacies in explaining continued policy
heterogeneity across states. The varieties of capitalism argument attribute
difference in corporate governance, labour market, intercompany relations, labour
relations and training between the Liberal Market Economies and the Coordinated
Market Economies to institutional and political dynamics (Hall 2001; Kong 2006).
Scholars working on welfare state have also pointed out continued policy
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heterogeneity due to institutional impediments such as the electoral system,
legislature, regime type and path dependence (Pierson 2001; Nelson 1990).
Although instructive, such interpretations of continued heterogeneity are
called into question due to their relative neglect of political agency such as political
parties and socio-economic interests. Interestingly theoretical argument of both
policy heterogeneity and convergence inspite of their differences in analytical
outcome seems to agree on the marginalisation of political agency under
conditions of globalisation. A careful reading of the literature suggests that
perceptible policy differences are primarily attributed to structural and institutional
dynamics, and the role of political agency is considered marginal under the altered
circumstances.
2. Role of political agency: Analytical point of departure
This dissertation seeks to build on and contribute to the existing literature,
by evaluating the role of political factors in public policy under conditions of
globalisation. Thus, the dissertation locates itself in two broad strands of
contemporary scholarly debate.
At a generic level, this dissertation seeks to address the issue of policy
convergence-heterogeneity in the context of transitional economies through an
evaluation of political actors and processes. The interaction between political
dynamics and economic policies has remained relatively understudied in the
transitional economies, and this dissertation contributes to the literature.  Much of
the existing literature based on developed economies highlight the role of
institutions such as political framework, nature of economy, nature of business
organisations in policy variations. As such, there exists an urgent need to reassess
the role of political agency in contributing to policy transformation in transitional
economies.
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In addition, analysing the role of political variables to understand policy
transformation contributes towards the wider debate on the relation between
politics and economic policy under conditions of globalisation. There exist
literature such as Przeworski (1991) and Nayyar (1998) that emphasise on the
tensions between economic reforms and political conditions in transitional
democracies where negotiations between different social forces and interests of
political elites determine reform outcomes. As such, the attitude of domestic
political actors towards policy reform can potentially indicate the infra-national
factors of transformation. As Skocpol (1985: 120) comments ‘it makes no sense to
reduce political choices to the dictates of economic circumstances, for economic
circumstances do not command so unambiguously, not even at moments of
extraordinary crisis’ (Evans et al. 1985).
At a specific level, this dissertation contributes to the literature on politics
of labour reforms in transitional economies. The research outcome emphasising
the continued relevance of interest groups, partisan orientation and party
competition highlight political determinants of labour reform. Such an analysis
builds on the literature on labour reforms such as Horton (1994) and Cook (2007)
which look into dynamics of labour reform in transitional economies.
The adoption of comparative sub-national case study also provides insights
regarding the location of policymaking in multi-level polity. The research considers
the interaction between politics and market forces as a causal explanation and
locates the space for such interaction largely at the sub national level. Such a claim
reiterates recent literature on federalism that highlight the importance of regional
states in mediating the process of structural adjustment and institutional and
political innovations at the regional level (Sáez 2002; Sinha 2005).
In sum, the dissertation attempts to identify and evaluate the political
factors that influence policy reforms. At one, level, the research contributes to the
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literature on political variables in explaining policy heterogeneity (see for e.g.
Esping-Andersen 1996; Garrett 1998a; Korpi 2003). At another, it seeks to reassess
existing political economic arguments of reform based on the study of labour
market in a transitional economy. Such an effort contributes to the growing
literature on reforms in transitional societies such as Alesina 1991, Nelson 1991,
Harrison 1997, Cook 2006 and Deshpande 2004 among others.
3. Globalisation and Labour Reforms
In recent times, there has been an increasing trend to focus on the
interactions between product market and regulations especially in the labour
market for its consequences on employment, wages and overall growth.
Characteristics of the labour market such as bargaining coverage and employment
protection legislation have significant consequences for product market
interventions.
In the context of policy, neoliberal economics emphases on increased
deregulation to remove all “distortions” in the factors markets leading to optimal
allocation. Since labour is a factor of production, globalisation discourse
propagates increased flexibility and deregulation of labour market. Critics,
however, express concerns about the distributive aspects of free market and
oppose labour reforms towards flexibility on grounds such as welfare, social equity
and balanced growth (Chandrasekhar 2000).
Further labour market has significant ramifications for the overall economy
and serves as a key transmission mechanism of resources to the poor (Horton
1994). Naturally, labour market reform has attracted enormous academic as well as
policy attention as a crucial component of second-generation reforms.
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. The issue of labour market remains highly contested and debated. Labour
is not only a resource of production but constitutes a prominent social group
capable of political manifestation. Across the world, labour reforms towards
deregulations remain contested as the working class has potential to resist reform
(Przeworski 1993). There is a large body of literature such as Horton (1994), Rama
(1997) and Rueda (2007) that point out role of organised labour in impeding
economic reforms. As such, labour reform with significant economic and political
ramifications and inherent public character make it a matter of serious
interrogation.
The relevance of labour market in political- economic research is further
augmented by the peculiarity of the process. As a contested and challenging aspect
of economic reform, most of the labour reforms have been through stealth.
Hence, even though the extent of reform in labour markets has been low
compared to product market, labour policy transformations constitute one of the
most challenging and political dimensions of reform. A study of labour market
politics provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate the role of political factors in
determining policy and outcome under conditions of globalisation. The study of
labour reforms across Indian states reveals how reforms have progressed at a
subterranean level through administrative fiats and action (inaction) rather than
formal policy transformation.
3.1 India as a case study: politics of sub-national variation
In the context of political-economic evaluation of labour reforms, India
presents an attractive natural experiment. India has emerged as an economic power
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in the last decades distinguished by its democratic federal framework. Most of the
developing countries including India discarded the state led development approach
and adopted market led model in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s primarily due to
internal policy failure and international pressure (Mukerjee 2007). Interestingly,
despite similar institutional and structural conditions, the path and extent of
reform has varied within sub-national states of India, which constitutes the case
study for this research.
The states under consideration are Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh
and West Bengal. Gujarat and Maharashtra are high growth, high per capita, high
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and comparatively more industrialised states of
India. In contrast, the states of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal are medium
growth, median per capita and moderately industrialised. The respective group of
states i.e. Gujarat, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal are remarkably
similar in economic structure such as in terms of size of the economy, in terms
industrial contribution, composition of industries and economic integration as
revealed through FDI inflows.
Being provinces of India, these states have similar institutional structures
such as organisation of bureaucracy, broad contours of labour laws, electoral and
political system and level of socio-economic development. The state centred
developmental model pursued after independence enhanced such institutional
similarity. Despite such structural (economic) and institutional similarities across
the states, the labour market outcome appear to diverge. According to the index of
labour market flexibility based on policy (regulations) and market outcome (wage
share, proportion of contractual labour) there exist substantial variation across sub-
national states. Analysis reveals that Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat have a
comparatively flexible labour market than Maharashtra and West Bengal. Existing
research on comparative labour market flexibility by Shyam Sundar (2008) and
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Aghion (2008) also endorse such an evaluation of West Bengal and Maharashtra as
relatively of employee friendly state while Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh as pro
employer state.
Existing literature on reforms explains such variation through ideological
nature of regimes and power of trade unions. However, such explanations fall
short on scrutiny. Although political ideology and interest groups explain the
extent of labour flexibility across West Bengal, and Gujarat (in West Bengal until
recently an alliance of left parties was in power while in Gujarat, the centre right BJP in is
power), they fail to explain labour flexibility across Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra
(in former the political contest is between centrist Congress party and Telegu Desam Party while
in latter alliance of Congress-NCP and BJP-Shiv Sena constitute main parties).
Similarly, strength of organised interests such as trade unions also cannot
account for the variations across the selected cases. Extent of trade unionisation is
relatively higher in Andhra Pradesh than Maharashtra, but flexibility appears higher
in the former. Thus, accounting for political party in power and relative strength of
interest groups (trade unions) labour market flexibility in the states, present us with
an incomplete explanation of labour market variation.
This research argues that variations in labour market policy and outcome
exhibited across sub-national states is not merely due to variations in political
agencies such as trade unions, business organisations and political party but also
their dynamic inter-relation. In this research, policy is conceived as the outcome of
a process of bargaining, negotiations and trade-off between relevant socio-
economic interests within specific political context. The analysis is based on both
quantitative and qualitative data, supplemented by empirical and theoretical
literature.
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4. Policy reform and political agency
Policy is primarily the prerogative of the government and policy reform
may be viewed as a change in the set of beliefs and interests of governments
determined by the relative costs of the policy alternatives. Theoretically, policy
decisions by governments are guided by external compulsions, intra-governmental
dynamics and agenda of party in power. Since the research builds on sub-national
comparison, the broader exogenous concerns, institutional and structural features
of government such as regulations remain largely similar, and any perceptible
difference can be attributed to the party in power.
Notably the role of political parties’ towards economic policies has been a
key theme in political economic analysis. Partisan differences in orientation to
reforms emphasises on the interrelation between economic policy and the
ideological-material interests of governing political party. The conventional relation
between political parties and economic-social policies derived from literature
reveals two broad strands of arguments, namely instrumental and ideological
arguments.
Among the main socio-economic interests that have an interest in labour
policy and outcome are businesses and trade unions. Trade unions by the very
logic of their existence seek to protect and increase wages, work conditions and
social benefits for workers. Trade unions use their collective status to scuttle or
extract compensation for reforms that have implications for wage, employment
and job security.
Like labour, business groups are a key actor as entrepreneur or business
owns the means of production and employs wage labour in the production
process. Businesses favour labour flexibility to facilitate greater managerial
prerogative in the adjustment of factors of production and greater profit
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accumulation. Hence, a large private sector increases the pressures for labour
market flexibility.
Thus, in the context of this research, interest groups such as business or
trade unions and political party emerge as crucial political economic variable in
determining labour market variations. However such an interest group analysis
suffers from inherent limitation as actors i.e. individuals, parties or businesses, may
occupy several different positions in the economic structure simultaneously leading
to conflict of interests regarding reforms. Since the orientation is likely to be
influenced by the perceived interests, any analysis must take into consideration the
constitutive process of such identity, namely prevailing political dynamics,
socialisation and political discourse.
In other words, interest based analysis is not a static zero-sum game and to
analyse the role interest groups or political parties one has to consider the wider
environment. In this context, the party system has a crucial role. The relevance of
the party system is highlighted in policy literature that argue coalition governments
lag in reforms compared to a single party dominated systems. It is argued that
fragmented party systems encourage populist policy stance, make mobilisation of
legislative support difficult and contribute to political instability (Haggard 1993).
Thus, the literature on political variables of economic reforms although
insightful suffers from limitations that necessitate further research, particularly
from the perspective of transitional economies.
5. Research Findings: reviving the political argument
Based on the dataset and comparative case study the research argues that
policy transformation i.e. policy change under conditions of globalisation remains
intractably a political process. Political dynamics and relative autonomy of political
agency influence the pace of reforms leading to sub-national variations. Specifically
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the variation in labour policy and outcome across sub-national states appear to be
a function of strength of partisan orientation of government and nature of political
competition.
As the case study suggests, the strength of organised labour movement is
partially responsible for variation in labour flexibility. Such an outcome
corroborates the inverse relationship between strength of trade union and extent
of labour market flexibility. However investigating the sources of trade union
influence brings into focus the role of trade union -political party linkage and
structure of the economy.  To put it simply, even though trade union movement
impedes labour flexibility, given the historical development of labour movement in
India, the strength of labour is largely dependent on political linkages and
patronage of the state.
Similarly, source of relative variation in business influence also appears to
emanate from linkages to party in power, more specifically the nature of business-
party interaction. States where business castes have significant representation
within government seem to proceed with greater reforms than states where
businesses do not constitute electorally relevant socio-economic group.
Thus, even though interest group dynamics appear relevant, the influence
of organised interests is contingent upon wider political dynamics particularly the
partisan orientation of government. The relevance of political parties in India,
much like many other transitional economies, is augmented due to historical
institutional developments specifically the adoption of state led strategy of
economic growth that made agencies of state crucial. Chhibber (2001) points out
that the importance of political parties is amplified in India due to relative
historical weakness of ‘associational way of life’ or civil society organisations and
the pre-eminent role of the state in ‘economic life’.
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In the particular case, political parties emerge as a crucial determinant in
shaping relative dynamics of interest groups and policy reforms. Political parties,
influence labour reforms not only through the formulation of policies when in
power but also through interrelation with other parties and contending social
interests i.e. party-business-labour.
In the context of labour reform when business classes or castes constitute
a significant constituent for party in power, the extent of reform is greater.
However, as political parties derive support from a cross section of society, the
influence of business is more effective when socio-economic support base is stable
and relatively homogenous. Conversely, if, the support base is wide and
heterogeneous, governments in spite of business representation often find it
difficult to pursue reforms due to the redistributive pressures from support base.
The divergences in the support base of parties appear to influence not only
orientation of governments across regimes, but also across states.
Such divergences in electoral support base for parties can be attributed to
ideological as well as instrumental dynamics. The support base is the outcome of
underlying cleavage structures in society as well as intervention by political parties
to construct support bases. In India, due to various historical, social, and political
reasons political mobilisation and aggregation has developed along ascriptive
identity leading to the construction of electoral support dominated by relatively
heterogeneous or homogenous groups.
The socio-economic support base is also conditioned by the wider party
system as parties do not operate in a vacuum, and the nature of party competition
affects partisan orientation. Moreover, the party system has implications for policy
reforms as prevalent literature suggests that fragmentation in the party system
impedes reforms due increasing number of decision makers (Haggard 1995;
Roubini 1989).
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Interestingly, the conclusions derived from the case study reveals that
contrary to conventional arguments, fragmentation contribute to greater reforms.
The case study reveals that increases in the effective number of parties, in fact,
facilitates labour market reforms through distinct yet interrelated factors. Firstly,
increasing number of political parties based on social cleavages such as caste and
communitarian identities marginalise the issue of labour in political discourse.
Fragmentation also enables the actual realignment of class interests within broader
society manifested through fractures in the party system. Finally, party
fragmentation has implications for the trade union movement particularly in
situations of political unionism.
6. Theoretical interventions and potential contribution
The findings of this dissertation highlight the continued relevance of
political agency and dynamics in determining policy and outcome under conditions
of globalisation. Specifically, in transitional economies, characterised by a legacy of
state intervention in the economy and weak organised interests, political dynamics,
particularly partisan orientation and party system have relatively greater influence
on economic policymaking.
Such an outcome contradicts the argument that, under conditions of
globalisation, the role of politics has become emaciated particularly in the domain
of economic policymaking. The research outcome contradicts the numerous
studies that argue global integration has emaciated the role of politics by
constricting policy autonomy of states. The case study reveals that increasing
flexibility has significant causal relation to partisan orientation or political support
for government.
The implication of such an outcome is relevant due to two interrelated
factors. Firstly, analysing the argument of policy convergence in the light of
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broader political experience, it becomes apparent that although external pressures
may be significant, the implementation and outcome of reforms is always
contingent on domestic political dynamics. Policy transformation towards
neoliberal consensus can, at best be partially attributed to global economic
structure.
Secondly, contrary to arguments of increasing irrelevance traditional
political actors such as social groups and political parties, this research argues for
continued relevance of both social groups and political parties. The dissertation is
critical of comparative studies that marginalise the role of class, group or interest
and argues that distributive conflicts between key interests groups reflected
through the political process continues to determine socio-economic policies
under globalisation (Korpi 2003). Even though, structural transformation has
meant increased space for market forces in the determination of economic
outcomes, there remains scope for politics to influence the process.
Although claim regarding political determinants of reforms has been a
consistent theme in policy research, this research is distinct as far as it identifies
specific political agencies and processes that influence labour market reforms in
India.
The dissertation through an argument of relative autonomy of political
agency reintroduces the issue of agency in the discourse of reforms. The argument
suggested acts as a bridge  between the literature that expounds the supremacy of
global economic transformations (Strange 1996) and those that doubt the effect of
globalisation on state capacity (Garrett 1998).
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1.1 Table on political agencies influencing labour reform
Trade Union Business
Organisation
Political Party
in Power
Party System
Position
on Reform
Opposed to
labour reform
Favour of labour
market flexibility
Support Base and
Economic
situation
Ideological
competition i.e.
Left, Right
Strategy Collective
Action
Influencing
Government
Influencing
Government
Policies and
Implementation
Structures Fragmented
Political
Affiliation
Fragmented or
Semi- Corporatist
Heterogeneous or
Homogenous
support
Two-party or
Bipolar Contest
Political
Outcome
Mobilisation
but politically
unsuccessful
Business-Politics
Linkage
Political discourse
Specific Support
Base
Party fragmentation
Identity politics
Fragmentation of
TU
Economic
Outcome
Declining
Investment,
Increasing Reforms
Precarious
Employment
Gradual or fast
reform
according to
party in power
Facilitating reform
7. The Chapters
The arguments discussed so far have been elaborated in the proceeding
chapters of the dissertation.
The first section Part 1 delineates the broad theoretical positions and
arguments regarding globalisation, policy convergence and labour market reforms
and presents a theoretical model to interrogate such a relation. Chapter 1 at the
outset deals with the different definitions of globalisation to elaborate the nature
and impact of such processes. This is then theoretically linked to the discussion on
public policy and questions about policy autonomy and convergence in the
perspective of globalisation. A major part of this section deals with a critical
overview of the factors and mechanisms that determine convergence. Chapter 2
deals with theoretical questions relating to labour reforms in the context of
globalisation and presents a detailed literature review on the factors that condition
labour market reforms. An important theoretical contribution in this section is the
construction of index of labour market flexibility to enable sub-national
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comparative study. The index of labour market flexibility presented provides a
measurable quantitative guide to labour market conditions at sub-national states in
India.
The second section Part 2 broadly discusses the research design and
hypotheses that drive the research. The section elaborates the sub-national
comparative model where four states are selected because of their institutional and
economic similarities but variations in labour market outcome. The comparison is
based on the logic of most like cases, where Gujarat and Maharashtra are
representative of high growth, high per capita and high FDI states while Andhra
Pradesh and West Bengal are medium growth, moderate per capita, and FDI
states. Chapter 3 elaborates the hypotheses on the four main political factors –
trade unions, business, political party, and party system, which are considered
crucial in the determination of labour policy. Although most literature emphasise
on government rather than political parties as the crucial actor in public policy, this
dissertation focuses on party and party system as the institutional structure of
government is broadly similar across the sub national states. Chapter 4 outlines in
detail the selection of particular sub-national states along with India as a valuable
and relevant case study.
In the third section Part 3, the four hypotheses are discussed in detail. The
chapters deal with the potential explanations of divergences in labour market
reforms under conditions of globalisation. Chapter 5 deals with business as a
potential explanation for variations in labour market condition and policy whereas
Chapter 6 concerns with organised labour. Chapter 7 and 8 form the core of this
research as they discuss the role of the partisan support and party system in
determining labour market policy and outcome.
The concluding Part 4 presents the conclusions and findings of the
research. The research points out that although globalisation is leading to pressures
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for policy convergence national or regional heterogeneities remain to due
institutional –political differences. Thus, there is movement towards a common
minimum but with different trajectories. The political aspect of divergence is
accounted by nature of the party system and socio-economic support base of
parties.
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Part I
Theoretical Section
33
Chapter 1
Globalisation, Public Policy and Convergence
1.  Globalisation and policy
Globalisation, as a process as well as a phenomenon, has been a subject of
intense debate particularly due to its transformative role in contemporary society,
economy and politics. Scholastic interpretations of globalisation have ranged from
simple economic integration to complex socio-economic transformation that
characteristic contemporary global interdependence. Most scholars seem to agree
that globalisation is incrementally shaping social, political and economic outcomes,
and present socio-political analysis remains incomplete complete without reference
to it. As a political economic research on politics of public policy specifically
labour policy and outcome, this dissertation begins with interrogating globalisation
as the analytical point of departure.
1.1 Defining globalisation
Any attempt to define globalisation is problematic as it encompasses a
variety of connotations and its impact has been differential over countries and
social groups. The World commission on the social dimension of globalisation, a
report commissioned by the International Labour Organisation, introduces
globalisation as a divisive subject that verges on a dialogue of the deaf
(Globalisation 2004). The debates over globalisation are reflective of the extensive
scope and contradictory impact of the process.
To proponents such as Wolf (1997) and Bhagwati (2004) globalisation is a
progressive development heralding a new age of prosperity and wellbeing for all.
Scholars such as Friedman (1999) provide ideological and socio economic
perspective of globalisation as the triumph of capitalism and free market over
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other forms of social arrangement and ideology. Thus to advocates, it is beneficial
for economic growth, promotion of political democracy and greater opportunities
for the populace.
However, to the opponents, globalisation represents increased socio
economic disparity and worldwide dominance of monopoly (Patnaik 2003).
According to the dominant leftist interpretation, globalisation is the spread of
profit maximizing capital across the world through military and ideological
apparatuses (Wallerstein 1974). Critical perspectives view globalisation as a
detrimental process such as facilitating the global exploitation of natural resources,
withdrawal of the state from the economy that serves the interest of rich and
powerful nations, cultural homogenisation among others. Based on the diverse
points of view representing manifold perceptions and existing scholarship, it is
possible to decipher some broad features of contemporary globalisation.
Globalisation has been identified with the dramatic economic and social
transformations in late 20th and early 21st century. Emphasising on the
technological revolution, Castells (1989) defines the contemporary global economy
and society as a ‘network society’ based on information and technology revolution.
Focusing solely on the economic dimension Piore and Sabel (1984) characterise
globalisation as a new stage of production organisation i.e. post fordism replacing
the earlier fordist model of mass production. Sklair (1995) considers globalisation
as the global phase of capitalism with a transnational capitalist class that requires
continually increasing production and trade with necessary political condition to
help global expansion. Scholte (2000) on the other hand, emphasises on the spatial
dimension of globalisation by pointing out the supra-territoriality or emergence of
trans-border spaces and networks of production, civil society, politics and
information.
35
A survey of the extant literature reveals that globalisation can be said to
have three broad dimensions namely, economic, socio-cultural and political-spatial.
Firstly, globalisation has a distinct economic connotation. Pascal Lamy
(2006), the director of World Trade Organization, has defined globalisation as a
historical stage of accelerated expansion of market capitalism, similar to the one
experienced in the 19th century with the industrial revolution. The focus of such
an explanation is on the increasing economic linkage between states that has
created a worldwide network of production, distribution and consumption.
Empirical evidence confirms that world trade has expanded rapidly over the past
decades and consistently outstripped world gross domestic product (GDP). The
emphasis of such a view is primarily on external economic liberalisation by states
reflected through flows of trade, foreign direct investment, and portfolio
investments (Garrett 1998b; Sikdar 2004).
Secondly, scholars argue that globalisation is increasing interconnection
between societies resulting from socio-cultural transformations. According to
Waters (2001) it is the cultural domain that is leading to globalisation of the
economy and polity. Such global integration is a function of the extent that the
economy and polity are “culturalised” in the emerging global norm. It is pointed
out that many features of contemporary nation-state systems are derived from
worldwide models propagated by “global cultural and associational processes”
which contribute to cultural and ideological standardisation (Meyer 1997).
Thirdly, globalisation has a political connotation. Keohane and Nye argue
that the process of globalisation creates a network of complex interdependence
through multiple channels of interaction guided by transnational rules and
organisations (Lechner and Boli 2008). Although nation-states remain as the major
actor, there exist several centres of power and no singular hierarchy of power or
agenda. It is argued that international treaties and organisations such as GATT,
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TRIMS and IMF have significantly restricted policy options for states. WTO rules
now form the framework of institutional interaction and constrain in varying
degrees the policy autonomy of nation states. All of these measures have
contributed to the creation of multi-channel interaction and supra national rules
and entities.
Given the expansive scope scholars like Kellner (2002) and Held (2000)
have defined globalisation as the increasing economic, political and cultural
interaction and interdependence among states. According to Kellner (2002)
globalisation is the product of technological revolution and global restructuring of
capitalism in which economic, technological, political and cultural features are
intertwined. Similarly, Held (2000) argues that globalisation manifests through
certain policies and practices such as strengthening the dominance of market
economy, constricting the role of states, expanding the influence of transnational
corporations and undermining local culture through the creation of a ‘global
culture’. Necessary to mention while globalisation is multi-faceted historical
process, it remains distinguished primarily in terms of scale of economic
interdependence (Garrett 1998; Drezner 2001).
1.2 Globalisation and public policy
An important consequence of globalisation that has emerged as crucial to
political scientists and policy makers concerns the issue of public policy. It is
argued, not without evidence that globalisation has led to systemic changes with
implications for policy making autonomy for nation states (Sklair 1995). States
increasingly appear to adopt policies that expand the scope of markets, empower
non-state actors and encourage economic interdependence (Rodrik 1997). Such
systemic transformations specifically the increasing similarities in public policy
have led to currency of the idea of policy convergence. As Sachs (1995) points out,
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globalisation is not merely the integration of the national economy with the world
economy, but also institutional harmonisation with respect to property laws, trade
rules, tax system and other regulatory arrangements.
However policy congruence or convergence under globalisation has
implications for the domestic economy and society as public policy reflects
distributive concerns within societies. Rodrik (1997) points out that globalisation
has altered the balance between business and other social groups and workers have
to bear the greater share of cost of reforms.  Similarly, Ross (2000) has pointed out
that the transnationalisation of capital has largely emaciated the bargaining power
of the labour confined within national boundaries. As such the issue of
convergence relates to questions about decision making autonomy for state actors.
2. Globalisation and convergence: theoretical debates
A survey of the literature reveals that scholars are not in agreement
regarding the relation between globalisation and public policy. Broadly there exist
three distinct viewpoints; namely hyperglobalisers, transformationalists and sceptics.
Hyperglobalist scholars like Omae (1995) and Strange (1996) argue that
globalisation undermines the state by the global market and constrains policy
autonomy of states.  They argue that powers and functions of the state are eroding
vis-à-vis global actors such as multinational corporations and inter-governmental
organizations due to increasing de-territorialisation of production and producers,
privatisation of economic activity, dominance of global market rules and rise of
ethnic cleavages. Thus, the impetus for convergence or reform may be external
such as international organisations or global trade or internal like increasing cost of
economic closure or epistemological likeness due to economic considerations.
Evidently such a view of convergence privileges economic logic and contends that
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the needs of global capital impose a neoliberal economic discipline on all
governments.
Opposed to the hyperglobalisers, the sceptics contend that globalisation
does not entail any fundamental change in the state based international system and
states retain substantial policy autonomy. Rejecting the hyperglobalist assumptions,
sceptics contend that contemporary globalisation reflects heightened levels of
interactions between predominantly national economies. Hirst and Thompson
(1996) totally reject the ‘myth’ of declining state and argue that nation states and
national economies continue to predominate in the age of ‘interdependence’.
Diverging to these two binary classifications the transformationalists argue
that globalisation heralds a new era of rapid changes that reshape existing societies
and world order, and as a process replete with contradictions there is no certain
causal relation between policy and globalisation (Scholte 1993). They argue that
unprecedented changes due to globalisation have blurred the distinction between
international and domestic, external and internal affairs. According to Rosenau
(1997: 4-5) globalisation has led to the growth of ‘intermestic’ affairs through the
expansion of political, economic and social space in which fate of societies and
communities are decided.
Interestingly despite the contending positions we can identify certain
similarities in the theoretical positions elaborated. Firstly there is considerable
normative divergence within the approaches, and none of them subscribe directly
on to traditional ideological positions. Thus within the approaches we can identify
neoliberals who welcome the triumph of individual autonomy and the market
principle, as well as the radicals or neo-Marxists for whom globalisation represents
the triumph of an oppressive global capitalism.
Secondly the approaches accept and recognise that states are increasingly
adopting similar policies under conditions of globalisation; despite the differences
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in their causal interpretation. The hyperglobalist framework recognises
homogeneity in policy due to structural and global forces that render domestic
political institutions emaciated. Similarly, the sceptics while championing the cause
of national government also, do not reject convergence hypothesis. To them
governments are not passive participants but on the contrary the primary architects
of globalisation and play a central role in the regulation and promotion of cross
border activity.
3. Policy convergence as an intermediate variable
The discussion in the previous section reveals that transformations
consequent upon globalisation have implication for public policy as states
increasingly adopt, voluntarily or otherwise, policies conforming to global norms.
Such a development in public policy has been characterised as policy convergence.
As such policy convergence constitutes an essential intermediate variable in
analysing the relation between globalisation and public policy. Convergence is
defined as any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a
certain policy (e.g. policy objectives, policy instruments, policy settings) across a
given set of political jurisdictions over a given period (Knill 2005). The idea of
policy convergence is an improvement over evaluating public policy against some
ideal prescription which is often difficult to implement and hence locate. Rather it
focuses on measuring the similarity of economic policy and outcome across
comparative cases.
According to the literature on policy convergence the sources or pressures
for convergence can be classified into three broad categories; specifically structural,
political and ideational factors. The three broad categories of sources mirror the
theoretical divisions concerning the relation between globalisation and public
policy.
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The structural theorists’ similar to the hyperglobalist argument argue that
globalisation leads to policy convergence due to the external environment that
affects political units like international economy, international regimes, and
multilateral agreements. Reforms are attributed to intensified economic
competition, mobility of capital, technological changes and changes in production
method that constrain autonomous actors such as states and limit their course of
action (Mosley 2007).
The idea of policy coordination, on the other hand, contends that states
continue to have some power over the market, and convergence is a conscious
political choice. Policy convergence is explained through increased opportunity
cost of isolation due to information revolution or similar but independent
responses of different countries to parallel problem pressure (Downes 2004).
Thus, convergence of policy is conscious policy coordination by autonomous
nation states affected by the existence of bargaining actors and monitoring
agencies.
The World Society Approach locates the source of policy convergence, not in
any structural constraint but the realm of ideas. The source of such ideational
change may be external or internal to any society. The impetus for policy
consistency is from the spread of certain models and ideas through ‘global cultural
and associational processes’. Such global ideational norms are usually facilitated
through global scientific discourse, international governmental organizations,
mimetic emulation of states and increased the role of technocrats, scientists,
academics and experts who act as a pathway to elite consensus (Knill 2005; Meyer
1997).
A critical reading of the literature reveals that policy convergence under
conditions of globalisation may originate externally or internally, and adoption of
policies may be imposed or voluntary. It is essential to clarify that such division is
41
purely analytical as in reality the dichotomy between external and internal or
imposition and a decision is often unclear. According to mainstream literature the
most apparent sources of policy convergence have been facilitation of trade and
finance in the new global economic architecture. As such, the role of international
organisations and treaty obligations is crucial in determining convergence. Similarly
within states political factors also have a role in convergence such as political-
ideological orientation of governments. Drezner (2001) has argued that policy
changes in OECD countries have occurred under the influence of ideational forces
and conscious choice of states rather than structural constraints.
The relative importance of the domestic and international factors in policy
convergence appears to be affected by structural factors such as nature of the
economy and their level of integration. Spatially, the pressure towards such policy
convergence is especially acute in countries that are straddled with foreign debt
and economic crisis reducing decision-making autonomy (Huber 1999). Similarly,
policy convergence towards neoliberal economic policy is relatively indiscernible
and unremarkable in the liberal market economies in comparison to welfare states.
Thus, the divergence regarding the potential sources and mechanisms of policy
convergence emanate from differences in economic, institutional and political
conditions that characterise nation states.
4. Policy heterogeneity: determinants of convergence
Empirical evidence of convergence across the world has varied, and
although there is movement towards some convergence in public policy, the pace
and orientation of reforms has varied across states. Kim (2000) points out that the
impact of globalisation has been dissimilar across different economies based on
structural and economic factors. That is why at odds with the argument of policy
convergence there exist literatures that doubt convergence and argue that national
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heterogeneities remain in spite of globalisation. New institutionalism goes to the
extent of challenging the general expectation of cross national convergence. It
emphasises on significant differences in national institutions and opportunity
structures and finds diverging rather than converging policy developments across
countries (Knill 2005).
Critics of policy convergence point out that globalisation originate out of
highly diverse national and regional politico-economic forces and as such
institutional differences remain. Such an assertion is endorsed by a wide range of
literature that attributes continued policy variation to institutional and political
factors. For example, the Varieties of Capitalism literature points out the distinct
differences in corporate governance, labour market, intercompany relations, labour
relations and training between the Liberal Market Economies (that adopt greater
free market policies with capital and labour market flexibility) and the Coordinated
Market Economies (that have a free market with generous social security
provisions) due to institutional comparative advantage and coordination (Hall
2001).
Similarly scholars working on the welfare state have also pointed out that
policy convergence towards neo liberal minimum has not occurred uniformly and
national specificities remain due to domestic political institutions such as the
electoral system, legislature, and regime type. Welfare state scholar Pierson (2001)
presents institutional impediments such as constitutional rigidity, electoral
compulsion and unchanging employer preference and feedback loop as
contributory to non-convergence on neo liberal policy prescriptions through path
dependence. Likewise, Esping-Andersen (1990) and Garrett (2000) emphasise on
political variables like ideology of party in government and show a general
association of greater state control, extensive labour market regulation and
economic closure with leftist parties and free market with neo liberal ideology.
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The role of partisanship has been highlighted especially in the context of
transitional economies marked by historical institutional legacy of state dominated
developmental strategy. Commenting on heterogeneity in labour reforms across
countries of Latin America between 1985 and 1998, Murillo (2005) point out
despite macroeconomic pressures for convergence, partisan policymaking remains
relevant. She points out that labor-linked parties used labor market regulation to
keep labor supporters despite the regional convergence toward labor deregulation
and partisan behavior is determined by political exigencies (Murillo, 2005: 441). As
such political parties continue to adopt sectoral policies with concentrated effects
on traditional supporters.
Thus varying degrees of convergence and policy output can be attributed
to factors like historical trajectory of development, prevalent political system,
structure of the economy, degree of openness, size of market, political and
ideological orientation of rulers and political institutional factors (Kong 2006;
Hensman 2001; Hall 2001).
4.1 Structural, Institutional and Political
The contradiction between literature on converge and heterogeneity can be
theoretically resolved if we consider the existence of intermediate variables that
mediate between forces of globalisation and policy outcome. The argument
suggested is that pressure for convergence is mediated and influenced by a variety
of structural, institutional and political factors that influence eventual policy
outcome. Such an argument is reinforced by scholarship that finds greater
convergence among states marked by similarity in institutional and cultural factors.
It is argued that converging policy developments are more likely for countries that
are similar in terms of economic, political or social structures (Knill, 2005).
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Summarising the potential factors that affect policy converge under
conditions of globalisation this dissertation identifies economic, institutional and
political particularities affecting convergence. Thus, the factors that potentially
determine the degree and extent of policy convergence have been broadly
categorised into structural, institutional and political determinants.
The structural determinants refer to the wider environment that is beyond
immediate influence or control of any particular political unit. It stands for
underlying structures and organisations that are stable in the long run and
significantly influence the constituent political units (primarily nation states). In the
context of this research,  structural factors imply structure of the international
economy, nature of integration of the economy to the global economy, structure
and organisation of the domestic economy, the position in world trade (exports
and imports) and similar economic conditions. The importance of structural
determinants is reinforced in most studies on policy convergence that suggest
liberal economies are more integrated and better equipped to respond to
constraints of globalisation (Garrett 1998a). The developing countries, on the
other hand, have much weaker bargaining capacity and convergence appear to be
the outcome of structural adjustment policy under guidance from donors and
international agencies.
Institutional determinants refer to institutions such as policy framework,
regime type, legal system, nature of party system  that are relatively stable in the
short run, but subject to greater control of domestic actors and conditions. Such
factors not only mediate change but are often objects of change. According to
Pierson (1996) the transfer and implementation of policy is significantly
constrained by the rigidity of institutions. Empirically greater degree of
convergence can be witnessed in countries characterised by high institutional
similarity.
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Finally, political determinants can be analytically distinguished as composed
of interest groups, social networks, political parties and political agents who have a
stake in public policy. These political agencies operate within the institutional and
structural constraints but can alter the same through political action. Frieden
(1996) and Rogowski (1989) have pointed out the importance of composition and
preference of social groups in explaining policy heterogeneity.  Cortázar (1998) has
emphasised on the strength of trade unions in his explanation of labour reforms
variation in South America. Theoretically, policies involving high distributional
conflicts between domestic actors will converge to a lesser degree than policies
with comparatively small re-distributional consequences due to the logic of
democracy.
5. Globalisation and political determinants of convergence
The preceding discussion on globalisation, public policy and convergence
suggests that the relation is not one of simple causality, and the outcome is
conditioned by the dynamic interplay of structural, institutional and political
factors. The extent of policy convergence or heterogeneity is determined by
various factors such as economic structure, extent of integration, nature of regime,
political framework, relative strength of interest groups, partisan orientation that
mediate a multi-layered process. To put it in other words the pressure for
convergence can emanate from external (international actors and the economy) as
well as internal (domestic actors, ideas) and the extent of convergence is
determined by the interaction of structural, institutional and political variables.
Hence, even if globalisation exerts some constraint on states, the exact nature or
content of transformation is conditioned by relevant political agencies and socio-
political institutions.
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As an endeavour in political economy, this research seeks to understand
the impact of political agency in the determination of policy convergence. The
choice of political variables is driven not merely by disciplinary orientation, but
also a necessity as interaction between politics and economics constitutes a critical
area of research. Much of the analysis on convergence or heterogeneity is based on
cross national experiences of developed economies and highlights the role of
historical institutions such as political framework, nature of economy, nature of
business organisations as being responsible for policy variations. The experiences
of economic reforms in transitional economies under globalisation and specially
the role of political actors have remained relatively understudied. This research
seeks to redress such an imbalance through an analysis of policy convergence in a
transitional economy from a political actor based perspective.
The analysis of political dynamics of policy convergence also contributes to
the literature on reforms as globalisation was heralded in transitional economies
through economic reforms. Analysing the role of political actors and variables in
policy transformation contributes towards a more comprehensive understanding
globalisation and politics. Such an exercise can potentially reflect on the domestic
constituencies of support for particular policies and provide a more nuanced
political-economic analysis.
The underlying argument for such an approach is to bring back the role of
political agency in the increasingly structural understanding of economic reform.
The choice of policy by government in a democracy is not only influenced by
structural factors and institutional dynamic but also by the constant interplay
between various relevant social interests. Public policy is shaped not merely by
economic concerns but also political processes, institutional framework and
ideational elements such as electoral considerations, political ideology, and
configuration of social interests which need to be considered in an analysis.
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In order to evaluate the influence of political actors and processes on
policy, this research looks into the specific case of labour market reforms across
sub-national states of India. The choice of labour market for study is due to the
importance of labour as a factor of production as well as a socio-political group
with the potential to resist reforms. Naturally labour reforms constitute a serious
agenda of research from the political-economic perspective.
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Chapter 2
Globalisation and Labour Market Reforms
1. Globalisation and labour market
Labour market reforms have been a contested terrain across the world
which from an analytical perspective constitutes an agenda of political research. As
Cook (2006) notes, labour reforms have been one of the most contested and
widespread aspects of economic policy changes.
The importance of labour in policy analysis stems from its unique position
as an economic factor as well as a political actor. Characteristics of the labour
market such as bargaining coverage and employment protection legislation have
significant consequences for product market interventions. The structure and
forms of labour market have implications for employment, wages and overall
growth. Further labour market has significant ramifications for the overall
economy and serves as an important transmission mechanism of resources to the
poor (Horton 1994). That is why most literature considers labour market reform as
a crucial component of second generation reforms.
Moreover, labour is not only a resource of production but constitutes a
prominent social group capable of political manifestation. Across the world, labour
reforms have been difficult to implement as working class is a powerful
constituency with potential to resist reform (Przeworski 1993). Scholars such as
Horton (1994), and Rueda (2007) that point out role of organised labour in
impeding economic reforms.
Thirdly labour market and industrial relations structure the inevitable and
recurring conflict of employment relations. In short, the labour market is the site
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of interaction between capital and labour and reflects the existing balance of power
between relevant social forces.
The importance of labour reforms in political economic analysis is
augmented by the peculiarity of the process. As a contested and challenging aspect
of reform, most labour reforms have either been stalled or ‘reform by stealth’. Even
though, the extent of reform in labour markets has been relatively low compared
to product market, labour policy transformations constitute one of the most
dynamic, challenging and political dimensions of reform. The study of labour
reforms across Indian states reveals how reforms have progressed much more at a
subterranean level through administrative fiats rather than formal policy
transformation.
Thus, labour market has significant economic and political ramifications
and provides a site for conflicts over political and economic changes under
conditions of globalisation. The inherent public character of labour reforms and
political-economic ramifications make it a matter of serious interrogation. It
provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate the role of political agencies in
determining policy and outcome under conditions of globalisation. An important
aspect of such a study is in locating the level of decision making in a multilevel
polity. Decisions regarding economic reforms in large transitional economies are
often difficult to locate as much of the reforms take place at the level of practice
rather than policy.
This chapter broadly introduces the academic debates regarding the impact
of globalisation on labour. It elaborates the debates about labour reform, without
taking any explicit value position and defines reform through the idea of flexibility.
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The chapter provides a framework of analysis through an index of labour flexibility
to measure the extent of reforms. The proposed index contributes to a more
quantifiable and comparable measure of labour conditions.
1.1 Globalisation and labour: theoretical arguments
The dynamics of policy convergence is most visible in economic matters,
and labour market constitutes a significant political-economic issue within overall
reforms. As Mazumdar (2008: 5) points out ‘the impact of economic growth is delineated
through the labour market, and any predictions about the impact on poverty and inequality must
be based on some implicit or explicit view of the structure of labour markets and their
functioning’. Similarly, Davidson (2000) has argued that the structure of the factors
market has a significant bearing on the way resources are allocated and the speed
with which the economy reacts to policy change. As such the cost and benefits of
trade reform may vary according to labour market flexibility. Moreover, labour is
not only an economic agent but also a constituent of the political society. Thus
within the broader question of domestic consequences of globalisation, labour
occupies a crucial position and the outcome of economic reforms is significantly
influenced by developments in the labour market.
According to mainstream globalisation discourse, liberal trade and
deregulation is beneficial for economic growth and welfare as it ensures optimum
resource allocation. Thus, labour market flexibility is not only desirable but also
necessary for overall growth and welfare. The conventional relation between
globalisation and labour propagated by the IMF, WB and WTO emphasises the
benefits of liberalisation by expanding export market, greater industrialisation and
lowering consumer prices (Davidson 2000). Accordingly labour as a factor of
production and a consumer in the market is claimed to benefit from flexible
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market ensuring not only effective allocation and efficient wage rate; but also from
the competitive market which brings prices down.
The impact of globalisation on labour can be disaggregated into
employment, wage, work condition and labour rights. The relationship between
trade and labour has been theoretically explained by the Hecksher-Ohlin-
Samuelson (H-O) hypothesis. The theory claims that, with free trade, capital
abundant countries will export capital intensive products and labour abundant
countries will export labour intensive goods. Derivatively, the theory predicts an
increase in demand for labour in capital intensive industries in industrialised
countries and labour intensive production in developing countries. Thus, abundant
factors of production will be utilised optimally (including labour) leading to
increasing real returns (O’Rourke 2006). The ‘factor-content approach’ similarly
associates increasing real returns to labour due change in trade pattern (Kapstein
2000).
However empirical evidence of the relation between globalisation and
labour has been at best mixed. A report on labour reforms and economic growth
in Latin America casts doubt on the negative relation between strong labour
standards and employment growth. The report argues that macroeconomic
stability is more important for job creation than institutional factors and flexibility
in labour market may reduce the competitiveness of industry due to low
compensation and little training (Tuman 2000).
Theoretically the H-O model is based on certain assumptions such as
competitive markets, full mobility of factors, inelastic supply of labour and capital,
long time scale which are difficult to fulfil in real terms. Moreover, the labour
market is not homogenous with the existence of skill difference and informal-
formal dichotomy. Also, as, Slaughter (1997) has pointed out economic theory
does not consider the impact of technology in such a trade-labour relation and
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hence fails to explain empirical evidence of decreasing price of skill intensive
production relative to unskilled labour intensive industries in advanced economies.
In this respect,  the model developed by Edwards (1988) of a small open
economy with two factors (labour and capital) and three goods (exportable,
importable, non-tradable) yields different predictions for the impact of trade on
employment and wages. According to the theory a developing country after
reducing barriers to trade, would experience a fall in demand for goods produced
in the formal sector (due to cheap imports) resulting in a drop in employment in
this sector. Employment in the exportable sector is predicted to increase while the
effect on wages in this sector depends on the assumption regarding wage rigidities.
The response of the informal sector hinges on whether it specialises in the
production of tradeable or non-tradeable commodities. The brief discussion
reveals a lack of unanimity among scholars on the impact of globalisation
understood through free trade on labour.
The sundry impact of globalisation on labour can also be identified in
issues of work conditions and labour rights. The mainstream globalisation
discourse suggests that greater trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) will lead
to greater welfare of workers and ensure their rights. Multinational corporations,
nongovernmental organisations, emulation of global standards would lead to better
work practices and conditions for workers (Bhagwati 2004). However scholars like
Drezner (2001) argue that FDI negatively affects labour rights as countries in their
effort to attract FDI relax labour laws and reduce social spending.
1.2 Globalisation and labour: empirical evidence
The divergences in theoretical assumptions are compounded by mixed
empirical evidence. In most economies although liberalisation has corresponded
with increasing employment in the export sector, it has led to reduction of
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employment in the import and non-tradeable sectors of the economy. Rama (2003)
in a large scale comparative study finds that the impact of economic reform on
economic growth and employment is positive on a long run, but in the short run it
increases unemployment. Similarly, Rodrik (1997) has found that impact of
globalisation on labour has been heterogeneous and argues less skilled workers
with lower paying jobs have ‘borne the brunt of the adjustment’ due to
internationalisation of trade and investment.
Another important aspect of labour relation concerns changes in the work
condition and employment practices. Bulk of the employment opportunities
created due to restructuring of markets and production system tend to be flexible
(irregular and casual) in nature as a means of achieving cost efficiency. The
increasing currency of flexible labour is considered a function of the changing
production process often termed as ‘post-fordist’. Such a trend has led to the
expansion of the informal economy and the progressive elimination of the formal
and informal dichotomy in the labour market (Sato 2008). Although reform
advocates propagate the idea of flexicurity (flexibility and security) whereby
workers will have the option to choose to work when they want, where they want,
to critics it is simply a ploy to make the workers more vulnerable.
In terms of work condition and rights under conditions of globalisation,
empirical evidence is also somewhat mixed. FDI inflows have been found to
improve work condition and wages for a certain category of workers while
competition for investment and trade is found to increase labour flexibility.
According to Garrett (1998b), FDI improves work condition, labour rights and
skills through transfer of best practices and technological up gradation in the
relevant sectors. However, there is also evidence of deteriorating labour conditions
due to competition for investment and pressure from MNC’s (Rodrik 1997).
Acknowledging the dual impact of globalisation on labour Mosley (2007) claims
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that FDI has a positive impact on work conditions while trade competition has a
negative impact (race to bottom) on labour rights.
Thus, liberalisation is likely to affect different economies and sectors
differently, and the relation between globalisation and labour is dependent on
factors such as composition of the domestic economy, composition of exports and
imports, institutional framework and so on. As such economic restructuring
consequent upon globalisation would involve job loss (with outsourcing, industrial
demand shift) along with job creation (with investment) with altered work
condition depending on the level and nature of economic integration. The
outcome is not purely determined by structural intricacies, or the institutional
framework and policy choice are likely to influence such a process. The importance
of public policies in determining labour market outcome brings into consideration
factors such as trade unionism, partisan orientation that significantly influence
policy choices and outcomes.
In any discussion on the relation between globalisation and labour
especially in transitional economies, Latin American countries provide valuable
case study. Examining patterns of inequality and employment in labour markets
across Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, and
Venezuela since 1980’s Tardanico (1997) points out that extent of reform in
public-sector has been uneven. The volume points out that, despite variations, all
economies are marked by a rise in precarious employment, losses in real wages,
rising levels of unemployment, and decreasing implementation of labour rights and
standards.
2. Labour market flexibility: theoretical arguments
As a theory, neoliberal economics contends that free play of market forces
results in employment of resources at the market-clearing prices that lead to both
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efficiency (as almost all resources are employed) and equity (all are rewarded according to their
marginal contribution). Regulation of the market by the state leads to deviations from
full employment of all resources. Although the necessity of some restrictions for
safeguarding the interest of labour is accepted, labour market rigidity constrains
free play of the market and is detrimental for economic growth by limiting
employment generation and wage (Fallon 1993; Besley 2004).
Interference by collective institutions (law and trade unions) in market
processes increase transaction costs and cause loss of investment, welfare and
employment. These institutions raise wages, impede adjustment of labour and
result in “inequity” by protecting the interests of “insiders”, against “outsiders”
who thus remain unemployed. Hence, in the case of labour market, trade unions
and protective labour legislations are said to be market-distorting agents, which
curtail the free operation of market forces to ensure optimal utilisation of labour.
Besley and Burgess (2004) in their study found that protective labour
legislations in India on an aggregate level had an adverse effect on industrial output
and employment generation in the manufacturing sector. Their study indicated that
laws that increase cost of labour disputes or retrenchment result in significant
decline of employment and output. Also, they also point out that inflexible labour
institutions lead to decline in investment rate and capital stocks. Similarly,
Schneider (2004) points out that most studies reveal that tax and social security
contributions paid by employers and employees and regulations are one of the
main factors behind the presence of a shadow economy which has consequences
for formal sector growth.
Critics argue that the state and its regulations are safeguards against an
impersonal market that can fail any time. Emphasising the virtues of social control,
many economists and political activists argue that labour institutions are safeguards
ensuring equity, qualitative improvement and industrial research (Wilkinson 1992).
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The advocates of regulation argue that competing firms are forced to be
enterprising and technologically advanced only when the option of reducing unit
costs by lowering wages and labour standards is barred. In fact, the absence of a
minimum floor of labour standards would inevitably lead to the syndrome of low
wage and low productivity. There is also a demand side argument for labour
regulation. Significantly protected labour expands demand in the market and thus
expands growth as well as employment. The criticism against free market is also
directed at a broader level over issues of equity and distributive justice
(Chandrasekhar 2000).
Thus, academics and policy makers appear to be divided into opposing
camps on the issue of labour market regulations and institutions. According to the
“distortionist” view, regulations impede adjustment of labour and act as obstacles to
growth and employment because of inefficient allocation of resources. The
“institutionalist” on the other hand, argue that  labour regulations fulfil  vital
redistributive  roles  in a market economy, provide  necessary insurance from
adverse market outcomes and create desirable pressures on employers to focus on
the enhancement of their labour productivity (Jha, Golder et al. 2008). Significantly
protected labour expands demand in the market and thus leads to growth as well
as employment.
2.1. Variations in labour market flexibility
Even as, scholars differ on the exact inter relation between globalisation
and labour and economic implications of policy choice remains inconclusive,
changes consequent upon globalisation appear to pressure for homogenisation of
policy on grounds of competition, economic growth and creation of employment.
At a macro level states increasingly promote employment flexibility and relaxation
57
of labour laws to facilitate the global shift towards greater market reliance inspite
of critics expressing concern.
Available evidence on contemporary labour market suggests increasing
casualisation and flexibility through sub-contracting, employment of casual
workers and shrinking space for organised labour mobilisation. Even the
International Labour Organisation report on globalisation suggests that
liberalisation has led to persistent unemployment, growth of atypical employment
or underemployment, decline in permanent employment and reduced wages and
job security for many (International Labour Office. 2004).
Interestingly despite the homogenising tendencies in labour market under
conditions of globalisation there continue to remain identifiable differences across
economies. There exist considerable literature that highlights continued
divergences in the labour market of OECD economies such as Germany and
Sweden.
Even in transitional economies such as countries of Latin America labour
market reforms have varied. Cook (2006) in a comparative study of six Latin
American countries shows that despite common pressures for flexibility labour
reform outcomes varied due to differences in legal and institutional frameworks,
trade union-political party linkage and the relative strength of labour organisations.
In elaborating the variable organised labour strength factors such as the intensity
of labour preferences, extent and nature of organisation and party link emerge as
crucial intermediate variables (Madrid 2003). Interestingly, wider political dynamics
such as electoral prospects of political party have also found a place in explanation
for regional variation. It is argued that incentives generated by political uncertainty
often lead to reforms that contradict the regional trend toward deregulation as
competition by credible challengers dissuaded politicians from adopting policies
deemed necessary to attract capital inflows (Murillo 2009).
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Thus, globalisation exerts pressure for increased flexibility in the factors
market including labour market on the argument of competition, economic growth
and creation of employment.  However the impact of globalisation when viewed at
the local level suggests significant differences due to structural, institutional and
political variables that are specific to regions. The global scope of labour reform
must not conceal the local realities of labour that make reforms distinct and
contested. The regional specificities such as nature of integration with the global
economy, nature and extent of trade, institutional factors like regulations and
political variables like reorganisation of class interests, political parties determine
labour reforms by mediating policy convergence.
3. Flexibility as a labour market condition: theoretical discussion
As the discussion in the previous sections reveal, the concept of flexibility
is central to analysis of contemporary labour market reforms. Flexibility not only
illustrates a particular normative objective but also provides an analytical category
to compare the extent of policy convergence in respect of labour market reforms.
As such, it is instructive to discuss the idea of flexibility and highlight some of the
key features as outlined in the literature.
Labour flexibility in its ideal form propagates free operation of forces of
demand and supply to ensure optimal allocation and factors that impede such
operation like regulations, trade unions are considered impediments to flexibility.
Conventionally the concept of flexible labour market includes flexible payment,
increase in productivity through change in the production process, cutback in
social benefits, differential pay scale and relaxing or altogether removing legislative
and regulatory framework. Such a labour market according to supply side
economics would be efficient and competitive through the free play of market
forces.
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The issue of labour reform gained prominence during 1960’s and 1970’s, in
the context of macroeconomic stabilisation, when focus of policy makers shifted
from general unemployment issues to efficient allocation of productive resources
(Mathur 1994). Such an ideational change was accompanied by technological
revolution that led to a gradual shift from fordist mass production to post fordist
models of customised production. According to Piore and Sabel (1984) such a
structural changes in capitalism naturally led to change in work organisation, work
method and skill profile. In the context of the developing countries,  the concept
of labour market reform and flexibility has been part of broader structural change
initiated during the 1980’s (Sarfati 1988).
The simplest definition of labour flexibility is provided by Solow (1998)
who contends that flexible labour market is ‘one that interposes no obstacle to the
frictionless matching of an unfilled job and an unemployed worker with the appropriate’.
Although Solow agrees to the necessity of some regulation, he contends that
degree of flexibility is to be measured in relation to ideal of absence of regulations
in the labour market. Hence flexibility can be viewed through presence or absence
of certain characteristics in the labour market.
Standing (1986), on the other hand, views flexibility in terms of certain
qualities like technical division of labour, the structure of jobs, work organisation
and forms of payment. He points out flexible labour practices within firms through
the shift from progressive to static jobs, narrowing job content, reduction of on
the job training, growth in casual employment, relative absence of regulations that
determine the operation of labour market.
Approaching the concept of labour market flexibility from the perspective
of company strategy Atkinson (1984) points out three main types of flexibility,
namely, numerical, functional and wage flexibility. According to Atkinson, numerical
flexibility may be classified into external and internal. While external numerical
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flexibility refers to adjustment in the number of workers employed through
relaxation of Employment Protection Legislations or employing contractual
workers; internal flexibility aims at adjustment of work time of labour through
measures such as  flexible shifts, overtime etc. Functional flexibility refers to the
extent employees can be transferred to different activities or departments. This is
achieved by measures such as employee multi-tasking, outsourcing activities.
Finally, financial or wage flexibility refers to condition in which wage levels are not
decided collectively, but according to rate-for-the-job systems, or assessment based
pay system, or individual performance wages.
Sarfati (1988) attempts a round-up of the concept of labour market
flexibility and identifies labour cost, employment security, work time and work
organisation as the four dimensions of flexibility. The presence of political and
institutional variables that impede the free adjustment of these four dimensions
indicates an inflexible labour market and vice versa.  However, such an
interpretation is limited due to lack of clarity in so far as it does not elaborate the
variables that prevent flexibility in the four dimensions.
In this context, Kong (2006) provides a comprehensive definition of
labour market flexibility. According to him a flexible labour market can be
characterised as one with flexible labour employment, performance based
remuneration, variation in intensity of work according to market, increasing
proportion of casual labour and scaling down some instruments of economic
regulation in favour of more flexibility in bargaining rights, employment security,
wage and benefits for labour. The definition emphasises on the regulatory as well
as qualitative aspects of labour market and provides unambiguous categories
against which market conditions can be evaluated at a macro level.
Despite the comprehensiveness in defining labour flexibility, Kong (2006)
fails to point out that flexibility is essentially a process to facilitate the
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accumulation of profit by capital. An important point about flexibility often
glossed over in theoretical literature is that flexibility fundamentally attempt at
numerical, process and cost flexibility for enterprises to increase accumulation.
Adjustment of labour to market signals is a part of the process which may be aided
by allocating greater decision making power to the market or even state. That is
why Harris-White (2003) has pointed out that the proper way to understand
flexibility is to comprehend the nature of accumulation in an economy. However
locating the exact nature and operation of the accumulation process requires micro
studies of the production process not amenable to macro comparative studies.
Thus at a basic level, labour market flexibility is greater decision making
power for employers, to adjust the quantity and price of labour according to
market signals. As such flexibility can be viewed as relaxing or altogether removing
legislative and regulatory framework while businesses worked towards new forms
of work organisation, employment contract and bargaining. This dissertation, given
its objective of macro comparison, considers labour market flexibility through
flexible labour employment, flexibility in remuneration and wages, relaxation in instruments of
economic regulation particularly employment, wage, industrial relation regulations and variation in
intensity and functions of labour according to market signals.
The various definitions of flexibility have an empirical basis as different
economies are characterised by different kinds of flexibility depending on
economic and political specificities. Kong (2006) has pointed out that in Japan
reforms have been more towards functional and wage flexibility while retaining the
bottom line of secure employment for a smaller number of privileged workers. In
contrast, the newly industrialising East Asian economies such as South Korea and
Taiwan have aimed at numerical flexibility in large enterprise sector of the
economy as numerical flexibility already existed in the small and medium enterprise
(SME) sectors.
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3.1 Flexibility as quantitative variable: measuring flexibility
The discussion in the previous section reveals that flexibility is both a
quantitative as well as qualitative condition. As such, any effort to evaluate or
measure flexibility is dependent on the context of study and choice of indicators. A
survey of literature on labour market flexibility reveals that diverse variables
reflecting the different aspects of labour flexibility have been used to quantify and
qualify flexibility.
A dominant approach to analysing labour market flexibility has been to
assess the labour market regulation against some ideal neoliberal prescription or
the International Labour Organisation framework of labour rights. Rama (1995)
has evaluated labour market rigidity for the Latin American countries on the basis
of qualitative classification of labour regulations. He categorised regulations with
the lower bound reflecting a position close to perfect competition and the upper
bound reflecting the greatest degree to which the regulation distorts the market.
He uses regulations such as number of ILO ratifications, annual leave with pay,
maternity leave in days, social security contribution as a percentage of wage,
government employment, minimum wage, severance pay and unionisation.
Similarly, Marquez (1998) has constructed an index of employment protection with
components of labour regulation like length of probation period, advance notice
period, cost of dismissal, reinstatement of worker and cause of dismissal.
Although instructive, such measures of flexibility suffer from inherent
weakness as they do not consider the actual operation of labour market.
Theoretically any measure of labour flexibility can be based either on the absence
of regulation or thorough evaluation of conditions that signify flexibility like wage
and employment structure. The limitation of measuring flexibility purely through
regulations is that it ignores actual operation of labour market in terms of wage
structure or casual employment.
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Further most of the measures constructed have been on the basis of
experience of OECD and developed economies with well-developed institutions
and state capacity. In contrast, most developing states are characterised by duality
of informal and formal sector and ‘restricted state capacity’ implying a gap between
regulation and their implementation. As such implementation data on labour
regulations need to be assessed to analyse the extent of flexibility. Moreover, the
differences in institutional and political setting of labour markets are manifested
differently in the wake of liberalisation or ‘withdrawal of the state’ in developed
and transitional economies.
As such, there exists a necessity to create a measure of labour market
flexibility which can be amenable to the developing economies and sub-national
comparison. The construction of such a measure is constrained by the lack of data
pertaining to wage structure, internal work practices of industry as well as
incomparability of data due to methodological and ideological differences in data
collection. For example, data on some of the indicators used to measure flexibility
such as annual leave with pay, universal minimum wages, probation period are not
readily available in most developing economies due to lack of uniform industrial
development. Thus, measures of labour market flexibility should ideally be specific
to national economies to account for the specificities in the labour market.
4. Measuring labour market flexibility: an alternative index
The index presented is constructed for the specific purpose of sub-national
comparison of labour flexibility in India. As such, availability of data and the
specific political-institutional setting has determined the choice of variables. Also,
worth noting is the fact that flexibility in India has been practiced de facto as
India’s record in enforcing labour laws has been quite dismal. As Forteza (2001)
has pointed out labour laws scenario in India is most rigid on paper but most
flexible in practice. As such data on implementation of labour laws is necessary to
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capture the extent and scope of flexibility. The proposed index of labour flexibility
thus attempts to incorporate not only regulatory aspects of labour market but also
actual operation of labour market in India.
As the discussion in the preceding section suggests, flexibility may be
classified into, internal and external dimensions. Although internal labour market
reforms have a significant bearing on flexibility and constitute an actual site of
flexible labour practice, this measure does not consider it as a component of
analysis. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, it is assumed that within a national
economy industrial work processes, job content, and wage structure develop along
similar lines across states. This is due to natural laws of economics and through
processes such as emulation of best practices, uniform industrial regulations,
similar institutional settings and other mechanisms. Secondly the scope of the
study does not warrant a micro level analysis as it focuses on the aggregate level
especially the manufacturing sector.
The specific measure of labour flexibility suggested incorporates; i) data on
casual, temporary workers, ii) evaluation of labour regulations on wage, employment, industrial
relation, work conditions and trade unionism, iii) implementation of labour laws, iv) data on
wage and wage share, v) data on closure and retrenchment. The sources for the data utilised
in the measure are primarily derived from Annual Survey of Industries; Statistics on
Closure, Retrenchment and Lay Off; Indian Labour Yearbook; National Sample Survey
Organisation and data on employment and unemployment published by
Government of India. The data on regulations and their amendments is collected
from the law books. Also, the minutes of various sessions of Indian Labour
Conference have been used to determine the position of State and Union
Governments on various labour issues. Finally, some secondary data is used for
implementation of labour laws in the various states for which due credit and
citation is provided.
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4.1 Index of labour market flexibility
Based on the theoretical framework discussed, the index of labour market
flexibility to compare and contrast sub-national labour market in India has the
following components;
1. Data on casual, temporary workers:  Casualisation of work and labour has
been one of the foremost features flexible labour markets (Ahsan 2006). A casual
or temporary worker has no job security or limited job tenure, extremely narrow
and static job content, practically no social security benefits and lower wages
compared to regular worker. Hence contractual worker represents a flexible labour
market with limited liability for employers. The dissertation considers the data on
the proportion of contractual worker to total workforce available in the Annual
Survey of Industries published by Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation, Government of India.
2. Data on Regulations: Given the federal framework of India, labour laws are
framed both by Union Government (applicable to whole of India) and the sub-
national state governments. The measure considers the key laws and their
subsequent amendments that have an impact on wage, work condition and social
security. In this index, the main laws considered are i) wage regulation: Minimum
Wages Act 1948 and Payment of Wages Act, 1937; ii) work regulation: Factories Act 1948
and Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970; iii) social security: Employees State
Insurance Act 1948 and Workman’s Compensation Act 1923; iv) industrial relation
regulation: Industrial Disputes Act 1947and Trade Union Act 1926. These laws have
been framed by the Union Government, and as such the broader framework is
similar across sub-national states. However sub-national states can modify and
amend such laws to suit their particular ends. As such amendments to labour
regulations at the sub-national level are important measures of variations. The
index classifies regulations through a careful reading into pro labour, pro employer,
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neutral and pro state. The classification of regulations adopted in this dissertation
improves and builds upon the analysis of Besley and Burgess (2004) who classify
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 into pro labour, pro employer and neutral for each
amendment. This dissertation not only considers wider set of laws but classifies
amendments into pro employer, pro-labour, pro state and neutral.
3. Data on labour law implementation:  The reform by stealth hypothesis
contends that one of the processes of backdoor reforms is through informal
deregulations and non-implementation of regulations (Jenkins 1999). Also, there
exists literature on state capacity to emphasise the importance of institutional
factors like bureaucracy in determining the success or failure of any policy (Rodrik
2007). The data on labour law implementation reflects the capacity of state to
implement policies and also partly the intention to implement labour regulations.
Data on implementation of Minimum Wages Act and Factories Act is selected for
analysis as they have the widest scope in terms of implementation. Minimum
Wages Act applies not only to specific industrial mentioned in the schedules but
set the base wage for the economy affecting both formal and informal sectors.
The Factories Act is applicable to all productive units in the formal sector of the
economy.
4. Data on wage and wage share: Flexibility in wage constitutes an integral part
of labour market flexibility. However it is difficult to get any comprehensive
measure of wage as organised sector wage is distinct according to industry and
usually more than the minimum wage.  To compound the problem data on wage
and wage structure is not readily available. As such a comparison of share of wages
to the total value, added is considered in the analysis. Wage share reflects the
relative share of labour in total value produced. A flexible labour market should be
characterised by very low or decreasing wage share.
67
5. Data on closure and retrenchment:  Data on industrial closure and
retrenchment is indicative of labour market flexibility as prevalent industrial
relations regime requires prior government permission for closure or
retrenchment. The removal of prior permission clause has been one of the main
demands of business to allow quick adjustment of labour (Ahuja 2006).  However,
the data reported in Indian Labour Yearbook is at best suggestive due to large scale
under reporting.  Shyam Sundar (2008) has pointed out that such data is hugely
under reported and in spite of restrictive provisions and union resistance
restructuring has been taking place since 1980’s.
The index suggested is complementary to the existing measure of labour
market conditions in India formulated by Shyam Sundar (2008a). He has created a
relative measure of labour market regulation based on labour judiciary, union
presence, labour strife, scheduled employment covered by Minimum Wages,
Average Minimum Wage, Inspection of Shops and establishments, Average labour
cost per manday worked and state level industrial relations. The suggested index of
labour market flexibility compliments the existing measure as it focuses on the
labour market condition rather than regulation. It is worth noting that there exist
robust correspondence between the two measures and states with higher regulation
come out to be most inflexible in analysis and vice versa.
In conclusion, it is necessary to mention that construction of any measure is
constrained by the availability of data. In the contest of labour particularly in India,
the situation is difficult as data is limited and there is the problem of variation
between records of different department and levels of government. For example,
data on the number of strikes would vary in records of the State Government and
Union Government. Such differences are the outcome of different approaches to
collect data, lackadaisical attitude of officials and often suppression of data.
Comprehensive regular data on labour is available only regarding the organised
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sector and even then the scope is very limited. The ASI data covers only firms
under the Factories Acts, and noncompliance or fudged records are rampant. As
such, the index of labour market flexibility suggested is at best reflective of broader
trends and not the exact quantification of flexibility.
5. Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter reveals that, advocates of free trade urge
increased deregulation to remove all “distortions” in the factors markets leading to
optimal allocation. Consequently, since labour is a factor of production,
globalisation discourse propagates increased flexibility and deregulation of labour
market. The concept of flexibility at the theoretical level includes both qualitative
and quantitative aspects and hence subject to interpretations.
The chapter provides a comprehensive categorisation of labour market
flexibility defined through casual, temporary workers, extent of regulations,
employment flexibility, wage and wage share, closure and retrenchment. The index
of flexibility presented contains both qualitative and quantitative variables which
leaves potential for disagreement. However, in defence of such a measure, it
should be that purpose is to put forth certain indicators in a coherent manner to
quantify labour market flexibility
The theoretical overview of labour reforms in the context of globalisation,
point out two important things; firstly contrary to economic theory the outcome of
reforms across countries has not followed any unilinear trajectory of growth and
welfare. In fact, available records on condition of labour since the onset of
globalisation have been mixed if not dismal for labour (International Labour
Organisation. 1997). Such an assumption exposes the inadequacies of existing
neoliberal theory on the impact of globalisation on labour.
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Secondly the impact of globalisation on labour is consequent upon the
overall structure of the economy (organisation and composition of exports /imports,
participation in the global economy), technology of production, organisation of the
labour market (informal/formal, internal labour market), impact of multinational
enterprises,  and institutional factors (laws and regulations). The impact of
globalisation on labour and labour market is conditioned not only on the level of
economic openness but also on the precise ways in which a country participates in
global production networks as well as political institutional settings such as
regulations, trade unions (Mosley 2007).
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Chapter 3
Autonomy of politics: political agency as determinants of reform
1. Relevance of political agency
The discussion on globalisation, policy convergence and labour market
provides the theoretical framework to interrogate the relation between
globalisation and labour reforms. Policy convergence in labour market under
conditions of globalisation is determined by structural, institutional and political
factors which share a complex inter connection beyond simple causality. As Sarfati
(1988) has pointed out although there is a general move towards greater labour
market flexibility, the method of achieving flexibility varies according to the
economic, social and institutional context. Thus under conditions of globalisation
labour market policy and the outcome is influenced by political actors like trade
union, government and business; institutional factors such as laws, inter-firm
coordination, trade obligation; and structural factors like nature of economy,
informal-formal division, extent of integration.
The dissertation seeks to evaluate the impact of political factors in
determining labour market reforms. The role of political agency is a crucial issue of
research because of the relative neglect of political actors in explanation of policy
variations under conditions of globalisation. This chapter outlines the research
hypotheses regarding political factors in determining labour market reforms.
However before discussing the hypotheses in detail, it will be instructive to discuss
some of the existing theoretical arguments regarding labour market reforms.
2. Competing explanations for divergences in labour market reforms
A survey of available literature on reforms point out that although labour
relations in different states reveal a shift towards flexible, competitive and
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deregulated labour market, such a shift has been quite heterogeneous in nature
such as labour reforms in Germany, Sweden and Norway in contrast to United
Kingdom or South Korea (Pierson 2001; Kong 2006). In short, despite
homogenising pressures under conditions of globalisation there exists no unilinear
trajectory of development in the labour market.
Explanations for continued heterogeneity in the operation of labour
market have often emphasised on structural features of the economy and
institutional rigidities as being responsible for non-convergence towards neo liberal
consensus (Alvarez 1991; Hall 2001). An eminent theoretical contribution in this
regard the Varieties of Capitalism literature argues that differences in corporate
governance, labour market, intercompany relations, labour relations and training
between the Liberal Market Economies (that adopt greater free market policies
with capital and labour market flexibility) and the Coordinated Market Economies
(that have a free market with generous social security provisions) are due to
institutional comparative advantage and coordination. Hall and Soskice (2001)
argue that divergences in labour relation can be explained through the organisation
of the national economy which structure incentives for coordination of relevant
interests specifically labour and business. Thus, the organisation of economy
specifically coordination between firms appear to be explanatory variable.
Another dominant interpretation for labour market variation is the
institutional rigidities argument that is derived from the welfare state literature. It is
argued that the continuation of the welfare state and consequent labour market
rigidity in many OECD economies are primarily because of path dependence and
institutional rigidities. Economic and political institutions that characterise states
are historical products of specific socio-cultural or politico-economic dynamics and
as such diverging sets of institutions that regulate the welfare state creates hurdles
against their own alteration (Pierson 2001). Scholars such as Rogowski (1987) and
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Rodrik (1997) have also emphasised on regulations and institutions of government
as an important influence on the outcome of the reform process.
Although valuable in terms of analytical contribution, an inherent weakness
of such institutional and structural interpretations has been their relative neglect of
political agencies like socio-economic groups and political parties. There is
literature that highlights the role of political parties in government as responsible
for policy variations. Emphasising on political variables Garrett (2000) and Esping-
Andersen (1990) show a general association of greater state control, extensive
labour market regulation and economic closure with leftist parties and free market
with neo liberal ideology.
Differences in reform have also been attributed to the composition and
preference of social groups (Frieden 1996; Kong 2006) and specifically labour
market reforms to the relative strength of labour movement (Rudra 2008).
Similarly nature of the party system has emerged as a potential explanation as
countries with fragmented party system are argued to find free market reforms
challenging due to the greater number of bargaining actors or veto players
(Roubini 1989; Tsebelis 2002).
Following the classificatory scheme introduced in the previous chapter on
determinants of policy convergence, we can classify the variables of labour market
reforms into structural-historical, legal-institutional and ideological-political
variables. This dissertation focuses exclusively on ideological-political variables that
influence reforms. The political variables can be analytically distinguished as
composed of socio-economic interests with a stake in the policy such as
government and its institutions, political parties and relevant interest groups. In the
specific context of labour market, the three main political agencies are trade
unions, business and political parties that interact within specific structural-
institutional environment to influence government and public policies.
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2.1. Explanations for sub-national variation in reforms
Political agency based explanation for variation in reforms has been a
dominant theme in sub-national study. In such literature nature of party and
interest group dynamics have emerged as prominent causal variable. For example
in the literature on sub-national variations in labour market reforms in India, the
nature of party in power has been the dominant explanation. It is argued that
greater labour reforms in Gujarat is due to rightist Bharatiya Janata Party (B.J.P) in
government while in West Bengal left party government has ensured low reforms.
Some others have identified the strength of organised interests such as
labour and distinct political culture of the states as being responsible. Differences
in strength and historic presence of organised interests have been held responsible
for reform variation. Historically Maharashtra and West Bengal were under direct
colonial rule and sites of initial industrial development. Gujarat and Andhra
Pradesh came in to existence only after independence and linguistic reorganisation
of states in 1960s. Such differences in historical origin have often been held
responsible for differences in political culture accounting for variation in labour
and other social movements.
However such party based explanation appear limited due to its inability to
account for the divergences in states such as Andhra Pradesh or Maharashtra
where ideological polarity on reform issues between main parties (Congress party
and BJP-Shiv Sena in Maharashtra and Congress and Telegu Desam Party in
Andhra Pradesh) is unclear. Further programmatic differences between parties as
an explanation for variations also fail to account for state level differences between
parties such as Congress and BJP in Maharashtra and Gujarat. Gujarat is marked
by political contestation between B.J.P and centrist Congress party while
Maharashtra is characterised by political competition between Congress-NCP and
B.J.P-Shiv Sena alliance. Despite the similar nature of parties in competition,
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variations across states in reforms poses questions about simple party based
explanations. The strength of organised labour across the states does not seem to
correspond to the levels of labour flexibility in the case of Andhra Pradesh and
Maharashtra.
Thus existing political actor based explanations for reforms variation,
particularly in the case of labour market suffer from limitations which necessitate
further research.
3. Research Hypothesis: theoretical discussion
The discussion so far suggests that reform towards neo-liberal consensus is
the product of interaction between structural (economic) transformations and
domestic political dynamics. As the focus is on political determinants of labour
policy, broader institutional and structural factors influencing labour are removed
from research design through sub-national comparative study. The underlying
argument being any variations in labour market reform despite the uniformity of
structural pressures on sub-national states should be due to political factors.
Political understanding dictates that labour policy is the outcome of interactions
between relevant socio-economic interests namely labour and business with
government within specific political, economic and social setting.
In broader terms, it is argued that even though global transformations in
the economy and polity (liberalisation and internationalisation) exert significant
pressures on economies to adopt certain uniform policies, specific policy outcome
is determined by the prevalent political economy. Labour policy under similar
structural and institutional setting can be assumed to be determined by the
interaction between trade unions, business and political party in power.
In the research hypothesis, political party is considered as a variable in
place of government due to the inherent institutional similarity in the context of
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sub national states. In most political economy analysis, government features
prominently due to its central role in the formulation and implementation of
policies and reforms are viewed as a change in the set of beliefs and interests of
governments determined by the relative costs of the policy alternatives.
Theoretically the government is driven by exogenous concerns of external
compulsions, intra governmental dynamics between different departments and
agenda of party in power. Under conditions of globalisation i.e. trade competition,
capital mobility and multi nationalisation of production all governments are under
pressure to become ‘investment friendly’ to attract mobile capital and ensure
growth (Strange 1996; Esping-Anderson 1990).
In the context of sub-national states, the influence of structural
considerations and external compulsions should be somewhat uniform being
broadly conditioned by national economic conditions. In other words, difference
generated by government obligation and intra-governmental dynamics are likely to
be minimal. Similarly, administrative frameworks that have considerable impact on
the reform such as mechanisms to resolve industrial dispute and modes of
interaction between organs of government are broadly similar across the sub-
national states. Hence, it would be useful to consider political parties rather than
government to interpret differences in government attitude.
The emphasis on party does not seek to undermine the institutional
dynamics of reforms that can be unearthed through a study of government. The
role of different departments of government, especially institutional framework of
government, role of bureaucracy and judiciary in policy formulation and
implementation have been important themes in reform literature (Pierson 2001;
Tsebelis 2002). There is literature that suggests a crucial but often overlooked role
of bureaucracy in de-facto reforms through non implementation of policy (Harris-
White 2003; Ross 2000). Although pertinent and engaging themes in their own
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right, these questions are not considered due to scope of this research. The sub-
national comparative research makes their impact theoretically minimal.
Finally, a pertinent question in the context of research hypothesis concerns
the absence of culture (industrial, political, social) as an explanatory variable. There
is a growing body of literature that emphasise on cultural or normative conditions
as powerful explanatory variable in comparative analysis (Misra 2006). However, in
the dissertation culture is consciously not treated as a separate all-encompassing
explanatory variable but rather as an inherent part of the socio-political reality
reflected thorough political dynamics and political actors. Since the focus of this
research is on the role of political agencies and their consequent impact, it
considers normative and cultural values as subsidiary but not insignificant factor.
The reasons are twofold; firstly the causal arguments presented in the
dissertation would remain valid even if we considered culture as decisive in
determining the behaviour of political actors.  The fact remains that analysis based
on culture and social norms usually improve upon existing materialist analysis by
providing an explanation to existing gaps. Secondly culture or social norms are
habitual practices of groups and communities that have historical origins. Political
norms are part of the dominant culture and are generated, maintained and altered
through interactions between political actors and environment, between actors
themselves and internal characteristics of actors (Misra 2006). Thus, any effort to
analyse and understand political actors within a specific environment encompasses
cultural elements.
4. Research hypotheses
The construction of research hypothesis and overall methodology is driven
by the objectives of deciphering and analysing the role of political actors and
77
dynamics in labour market reforms. As such, relevant political actors and processes
that have an impact in the sub national context are considered in the analysis.
The principal hypotheses that guide the research are:
• Hypothesis 1. Large private sector increases the pressure for greater labour flexibility
and fewer restrictions for business
• Hypothesis 2. Strong trade union movement prevents labour market flexibility
• Hypothesis 3. Partisan orientation (support base) of government determines the extent
of policy reform.
• Hypothesis 4. Nature of party system has implications for reforms. Increasing
fragmentation and competition impedes reforms and vice versa.
Having outlined the hypotheses that will guide this research it will be
instructive to discuss in brief the different actors, their motivation and instruments
of action as outlined in prevalent literature.  The scope of this research is
essentially the formal sector particularly manufacturing sector which is under the
purview of labour laws and policies. In this dissertation, formal sector is defined as
that which has a record with the government while informal sector is unregistered.
Such a typology is convenient for research overcoming the problem of formal-
informal classification through regulation as the informal sector is also regulated
albeit by non-state mechanisms (Harris-White 2003).
4.1 Hypothesis 1. A large private sector increases labour flexibility and fewer restrictions for
business.
The strength of business groups as the explanatory variable is obvious in a
capitalist system as entrepreneur or business own the means of production and
employ wage labour in the production process. As such businesses have an
inherent interest in labour policy and seek to determine labour market outcomes
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within a particular politico-economic system. As such, the extent of economy
under the control of private companies has implications for business influence and
choice of policies.
Globalisation with its emphasis on free market has translated into greater
policy space to business through concentration of economic power, access to
policy making and threat of capital flight (Held 1999; Sinha 2007). Such power of
business over policy has often been identified as “government-business” coalition
where business is perceived as a partner of government rather than a specific social
interest group (Venkataratnam 1993; Mazumdar 2008). The Multi-National
Corporations (MNC) representing the face of global business adds a new
dimension to business-policy dynamics. Owing to the enormous economic power
MNC’s can  influence global governance structures by exerting pressure on the
policies and practices of governments in both industrial and developing countries
(Dunning 1997)
Businesses emphasise on greater labour flexibility to meet the challenges of
global competition and changing production system in the context of neoliberal
reforms. Highlighting the negative consequences of labour market institutions for
investment and growth, businesses favour dilution of existing labour laws to attain
greater flexibility. The attitude of business favouring greater flexibility can be
explained through concerns of accumulation and business decision (production)
within specific economic structure. Businesses in general favour greater decision
making prerogative which is enhanced under conditions of globalisation due to
greater competition. As such labour flexibility constitutes one of the conditions of
investment under globalisation. The Doing Business report published by World
Bank considers employment cost and ease of closure an integral part of pro-
business reforms (World Bank 2010).
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Such a business attitude towards flexibility is valid across their differences
in terms sizes, sectors and economies. Although varieties of capitalism literature
argue that response of business to labour market flexibility is not automatic but
conditioned by the norms of interaction in the market, increasing labour flexibility
in the CME’s in recent years have challenged such an argument. Moreover, the
argument suggested is based on high technology and skill based industries which
does not characterise most transitional economies. Thus, even as not all businesses
are affected in a similar manner and businesses that are threatened by liberalisation
may favour protectionism, attitude towards labour market flexibility appears to be
somewhat uniform. Businesses in general favour flexibility and a large private
sector increases the pressures for labour market flexibility.
However, the power of business to influence policy is structured by the
specific political-economic dynamics such as relative power of labour and nature of
government and its relation to business. From the perspective of particular
interest, the capacity to influence policy is determined by the extent of material
resources, extent of organisation and the degree of centralisation or fragmentation
in business unions. Materially the influence of business as an interest group
emanates from contribution towards overall G.D.P and employment generation
i.e. extent of private sector. Factors such organisation of business into association,
nature of party in government and connection to the institutions and policy
makers also affect business influence.
4.2 Hypothesis 2. A strong trade union movement impedes labour market flexibility
Trade unions (TU) as legitimate voluntary association of employees in
industrial enterprise pursue specific objectives embodying workers interests.
Discussing the role of trade unions Flanders (1970) has argued that TU’s have two
faces; firstly they focus on improving the position of their members through
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representation, bargaining, and collective determination and secondly they advance
broader objectives such as the promotion of democracy and social justice.
Trade unions by the very logic of their existence seek to protect and
increase wages, work conditions and social benefits for workers.
Garrett (2000) in a comprehensive study has found that countries with
greater unionisation of labour force tend to be significantly more protective than
countries with lesser union density. Likewise, Deshpande (2004) in their study have
found that firms with unions paid about 17 per cent more wage than those without
unions in India. Also, wage difference between unskilled and skilled workers was
significantly higher in non-unionised firms compared to firms with unions.
Naturally in neoliberal economic theory trade unions are considered as
labour market institutions that impede the free operation of market by collective
bargaining. Trade unions use their collective status to scuttle or extract
compensation for reforms that have implications for wage, employment and job
security (Horton 1991; Garrett 1998b; Downes 2004). Empirical evidence
however, reveals that the response of labour to flexibility has not been
homogeneous (Kume 1998; Kong 2006).
According to literature the response of trade union to labour market
flexibility is determined by the size and scope of trade union, the location of trade
union, and political dynamics. Developing the wage demand argument of Nelson
(1990) it can be argued that small, fragmented organised labour generates weak
pressure. When trade union is very powerful and centralised it moderates demand
as it is part of the decision making aware of greater economic costs. Only when
trade union is moderately strong at the sector or industry level they exert
aggressive pressure for achievement of demands. Anderson (2001) has found that
centralised trade union movements tend to have greater redistributive goals and
unions may accept reforms for long term overall economic benefit. Similarly,
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ideological dimension of trade unions especially regarding economic policy has an
impact on trade union behaviour. Generally, left trade unions are ideologically
opposed to economic liberalisation, whereas the response of non-left unions are
not determined by predetermined ideological imperatives.
With regard to power of trade unions, existing literature suggests that
membership; extent of centralisation of trade unions, existence of public sector,
institutional framework of industrial relations and trade union-government linkage
determines TU capacity to influence policy. Based on the arguments of
organisational theory, the capacity to influence policy is positively related to the
membership and the degree of centralisation of trade unions. This is because trade
unions derive strength from their ability to act as monopoly supplier of labour
through collective action (Banerjee 2005). Likewise, literature suggests that the
relative power of trade unions is significantly determined by prevalent economic
condition (Kume 1998). Trade unions have been found to be more assertive
during periods of economic boom and accommodative during lean periods.
In terms of structural determinant of trade union power, corollary to the
argument of a large private sector increasing the strength of business, a large public
sector is argued to augment the strength of trade unions. Heller (1984) points out
that, in less developed countries, the impact of trade union on the overall economy
operates through the public sector by the mechanism of ‘leverage effect’ on
domestic wage.
The power of labour is also significantly determined by institutional and
political dynamics. Industrial relations regulation that outlines the powers of trade
union and worker provide the basic framework of labour-business-government
interaction. Similarly political dynamics such as nature of the party in government,
level of union competition, and autonomy of union leaders from the party and
rank and file account for government–labour relation (Levitsky 1998). In the
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analysis of Egyptian labour reform,  Alesina (1997) refers to the differing ability of
trade union to influence reforms through access to decision making, nature
(corporatist, fragmented, centralised) of organisation and independence from state
and legal prerogatives.
4.3 Hypothesis 3 Partisan orientation (support base) of government determines the extent of
policy reform
Any policy by the government is outcome based on the interaction of
political party in power with distinct ideological agenda and desire of election. As
Alvarez (1991) points out government aims to further partisan interests and
preside over re-electable macroeconomic outcomes. According to literature,
partisan orientation of government has a significant role in determining policy and
outcome.  Esping-Andersen (1990), Garrett (2000) and Korpi (2003) have found
significant differences in economic and social policies between governments with
left representation and secular-conservative representation.  Similarly, Quinn and
Shapiro (2004) in their work on taxation in America also find support for
partisanship thesis i.e. ideological division between parties has an impact on public
policy.
The conventional relation between political parties and economic-social
policies derived from literature reveals two broad strands of arguments, namely
instrumental and ideological arguments. While instrumentalist logic presupposes
the electoral motive of parties as determining the social and economic agendas of
parties, the ideological argument focuses on party ideology as an explanation for
the different policies enacted by parties in power. Huber (2001) has argued that
ideology and support base of the party in government significantly influence the
orientation of reforms.
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That ideology has a crucial role in policy making is clear from the policy
and globalisation literature. Ideology has often been referred to as a causal variable
in explaining the global shift from state to market led policies (Naim 2000; Waters
2001). Political parties have definite ideological bias and government policy making
is a complex process in which often-unspoken ideologies mediate between
interests and policy (Bello 1994). Esping-Andersen (1990) has pointed out general
association of greater state control, extensive labour market regulation and
economic closure with leftist parties and free market with neo liberal ideology.
Similarly, support base of the regime has significant ramification for policy
as governments have electoral and popular concerns. There exists considerable
literature on the politics of reform which focus on domestic class configuration or
social networks. The opposition to reform literature argues that the beneficiaries of
free trade are disperse and disorganised, whereas negatively affected are
concentrated and organised. Thus, the negatively affected launch concerted effort
to halt the reform agenda (Frieden 1996; Garrett 1998). Hence the capacity of the
disaffected to become politically salient has serious ramifications for reforms. The
importance of socio-economic support base is also reflected in the literature that
views politics of reform as an exercise in political ‘blame avoidance’ (Pierson
1994). It is argued that reforms is usually attained through either a broad reform
coalition to deflect criticism and opposition or through gradual, incremental and
strategically tied packages that divide potential opponents by providing them with
selective compensation (Williamson 1994; Jenkins 1999).
Similarly welfare state literature suggests that socio-economic
configurations of party support determine the policy orientation of governments
and institutional stability. Vogel (2001) has attributed the resilience German social
welfare to the broad based nature of main political parties that contain both pro
and anti-reforms sector of business. Similarly, Esping-Andersen (1990) explains the
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survival of social security measures in the Scandinavian states through coalition
between the working class and white collar workers which proved decisive in the
politics of redistribution.
Although partisan differences in terms of left - right ideological division
and support base have been found to be correlated in most western democracies,
in transitional economies clear cut ideological difference between parties is not
present. Consequently correlation between programmatic orientation and support
base also do not conform to left –right classifications. As such in the context of
transitional economies, partisan orientation needs to be addressed both in terms of
ideological programme and interest of support base of parties.
4.4. Hypothesis 4. Nature of party system has implications for reforms. Increasing
fragmentation and competition impedes reforms and vice versa.
The nature and operation of the party system influences policy choice as an
endogenous variable affecting the operation of interest groups, partisan orientation
and prevalent political discourse. Hence, any effort to understand labour market
policies and their operation has to consider the potential relation between party
system and process under consideration.
Theoretically, the party system influences the choice of policy as political
actors do not act in isolation and react to wider political context  Broader political
system i.e. nature and extent of political competition provide the framework of
choices for policy makers and determine the nature of interaction between political
actors.
Party competition can be approached at the level of ideological polarisation
among parties and number of competing parties in the party system measured
through effective number of parties. The conventional relation between party
system and socio-economic reforms suggests that fragmentation in the party
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system prevents alteration in socio-economic policies by creating large number of
decision makers making consensus elusive. Roubini (1989) and Haggard (1995)
have argued as a party system becomes fragmented, economic reforms become
challenging as an increasing number of decision makers create policy stalemate.
That is why, one party dominant system have different policy consequences than
fragmented coalitional system characterised by greater bargaining actors. As such
states with greater levels of political fragmentation should have lower levels of
reform.
Similarly, ideological polarity is considered significant for reforms as policy
changes are most likely when there is a low level of ideological polarisation among
major parties. As Horowitz (2008) has pointed out, strong far-left ideas and other
national identity-based sources of ideological opposition to reforms have inhibiting
effects. Thus, the extent of ideological polarity between parties acts as an
important determinant of policy making or transformation in a democracy and
government are able to implement policies effectively on which there exist low
levels of difference. Similarly, Pierson (2001) points out that economic reforms
aiming at welfare retrenchment require hiding negative aspects or deflecting
criticism away from the government. Naturally such a process is affected by the
nature of opposition to economic reform.
It is necessary to note that features of party system share a relation of
complex interdependence. For example, the relevance of ideological polarity is
largely dependent on the extent of political fragmentation as ideological difference
only becomes meaningful when extent of party system fragmentation is high.
Similarly, governments under conditions of high fragmentation are more likely to
implement policies successfully if the level of ideological polarisation among major
parties is low. As such analysis of party system must incorporate broader socio-
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political dynamics such as the impact of fragmentation on social cleavages,
operation of interest groups and ideological polarity.
5. Conclusion
The elaboration of the theoretical framework makes it clear that the
dissertation attempts to contribute to the understanding of policy reform through a
political actor based approach. Implicit in the selection of hypothesis is the attempt
to analyse variations in policy and outcome through the interaction of political-
economic agents such as trade unions, businesses and political parties within
specific political and administrative framework. Such an approach build on the
existing literature in political economy of reforms by highlighting the importance
of political factors under conditions of globalisation. As Mosley and Uno (2007)
have pointed out in the labour market “domestic factors”; i.e. political institutions,
ideologies, and interest groups are responsible for variations.
The attempt to evaluate the role of political-economic actors through a
sub-national comparative study of also contributes towards development of middle
range theory (small n) of labour market reform in large transitional economies.
Such an endeavour is inspired by similar work on industrial policy and sub-national
variation by Sinha (2005) who highlights the role of the developmental state
explained through political contestation, orientation of government and regional
political economy. Thus at a specific level of policy analysis, this research provides
an analytical framework to explain the variation in labour market reforms in large
transitional economies.
Finally, although this research emphasises the importance of political
factors in determining reforms, it recognises the relevance of structural and
institutional variables in such a process. The dissertation suggests that complex
interaction of structural, institutional and political variables determine policy
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outcome. Political agency has relative autonomy under extreme global
interdependence.
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Chapter 4
Case Study: the puzzle of sub-national labour market variations
1. Research and case study
The choice of case study is critical to empirical research in social sciences
as research outcomes are largely dependent on such selection and many social
researches have been found wanting in terms of case selection. Comparative
analysis of like cases i.e. political units with similar features, but significant
variation in the object of analysis can indicate the political agencies and factors
responsible for variation. To identify the political factors that influence labour
market reforms under conditions of globalisation this research adopts a sub-
national comparative framework.
Such a comparison is ideal as sub-national states are institutionally and
structurally similar political units with variations in labour market. In other words,
the impact of globalisation, structure of the national economy and historical-
institutional factors remain fairly similar across sub-national states. In term of
actual site selection, this research builds on the experiences in India as a large
transitional economy with a federal structure.
2. Sub-national comparison as an approach
As a methodology, sub national comparative analysis has received greater
attention in recent times as limitations of large cross national studies have
increasingly been recognised. The existence of historically evolved differences
between different nations makes cross national studies analytically constrained as
classification scheme for comparison often override historical-political differences.
As Snyder (2001) points out cross national studies often suffer from incorrect ‘part
to whole’ generalisations. Also, analytically such studies mainly focus on
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institutional and structural differences at the expense of political processes and
dynamics.
Sub-national comparison also makes the process of coding relatively
simpler and facilitates understanding of spatially uneven processes through causal
inferences. In terms of pure methodological considerations sub-national
comparison allows us to increase the number of observations and variations in
case of small number of cases (King 1994). The most valuable quality of sub-
national comparative study is the ability to control some explanatory variables and
focus on specific processes and actors. As such, with a careful case selection we
can highlight the political determinants of labour reform by treating the potential
impact of broader structural and institutional variables as similar.
The adoption of sub-national comparison has been reinforced by the
recognition that theories have observable implications at many levels, and sub-
national comparison can also contribute to theoretical understanding.  Such a study
allows us to look at infra-national variations and contributes toward understanding
of regional political process obscured by the national framework of regulations.
For example, Sinha (2005) has shown the importance of regional politics and sub
national dynamics in the determination of developmental outcomes across states
of India and in the process questioned the problem of inaccurate classification of
political-economic systems based on national aggregates.
In spite of all the potential benefits of sub-national comparative study, it
remains limited in its ability to explain broader national or supra-national
processes. It must be recognised that wider national dynamics determines the
choices available before sub-national states. Regional political actors and processes
are embedded within broader political economy. However the recognition of
national political-economy does not decrease in importance the relevance of sub-
regional political actors and processes in mediating the process of reforms.
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In the case of India constitutional division of powers has granted regional
states with some degree of autonomy in framing and implementing labour policies.
As such, sub-national variations in reforms highlight the role of regional political-
economy. Contemporary research on economic reforms in large multi-level polities
has also suggested an important role for sub-national states within federal
structural (Saez 2002).
3. India as a case study
A comparative study of states with similar structural and institutional
variables and variations in labour market outcome constitutes the case study for
this dissertation. India constitutes a natural experiment as well as an important case
study as it is a large transitional economy undergoing economic transformation
with significant sub-national variations. As a site for sub-national comparative
study, India offers a number of theoretical and methodological advantages.
India is a transitional democratic economy with an impressive record of
stable political institutions. As such India can provide a successful model of
negotiated economic reform in contrast to the undemocratic reforms experience of
many East Asian countries. Also unlike Latin America, reforms in India occur in
an environment of stable democratic politics and not under conditions of dual
transitions (transformation in both political and economic regimes) that make the
process more contested.
Further economists and political scientists have often identified significant
variations in economic growth, reforms and policy innovations among the sub-
national states (Sinha 2005; Bhattacharya 2007). The inter-regional variations in
labour market outcome, economic situation and politics within the overall
framework of Indian polity favour comparative analysis. Theoretically, the choice
of sub-national Indian states as cases ensures that the macro-economic structure
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and institutional framework remain more or less constant to enable comparison
between ‘most-like’ cases.
Another important reason for selection of India has been the plethora of
academic and government publications that make research substantially easier.
India has an impressive record of collection of statistics among the developing
countries. Also, personal familiarity with the political, economic and social realities
makes contextualisation and interpretation of research significantly easy.  In this
context, it is necessary to mention that published data is primarily for the formal
sector of the economy, and there exists a large informal sector outside state
purview.
The labour markets of developing economies are characterised by duality
of formal and informal sector. While the formal sector is organised characterised
by existence labour institutions and rights, the informal sector is characterised by
lack of formal employment status. The Resolution concerning statistics of
employment in the informal sector, adopted by the Fifteenth International
Conference of Labour Statisticians (1993) describes the informal sector as
consisting of production units that typically operate at a low level of organization,
with little or no division between labour and capital and on a small scale. Labour
relations are based mostly on casual employment or personal relations rather than
contractual arrangements with formal guarantees.
According to Tendulkar (2004) less than 10 percent of the 500 million
person labour force is organised or has regular employment. Sen (2009) has found
that within the organised sector share of small and medium enterprises is around
44 percent of aggregate production and constitute 95 percent of all industrial units
in the country. Such a situation has led Jha (2008) to conclude that broadly the
Indian labour market is extremely flexible with the absence of any social security
and employment security regulation for labour.
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Importantly the issue of labour market flexibility at the macro level is
inexorably linked to the formal-informal divide in labour market as conventional
understanding suggests that the informal sector indicates de-facto labour market
flexibility. In other words, greater size of the informal sector may indicate greater
labour flexibility at the macro level and vice versa. However the analysis of labour
market flexibility in the formal sector, particularly politics of reform may be
undertaken without recourse to the informal sector due to the inherent differences
in the nature of the two labour markets.
Firstly in terms of research methodology the issue of labour market reform
towards greater flexibility pertains only to the formal sector and not to the
informal which remains ‘outside the realm of the state’. The literature on labour
reforms points out that regulatory mechanisms restrict flexibility in the formal
labour market unlike informal sector marked by the absence of such regulatory
restrictions. Since by definition the laws and policies of the state do not apply to
the informal sector, the issue of reform towards greater flexibility through
regulatory relaxation does not arise in such sector.
Further labour literature suggests significant differences between formal
and informal labour markets in terms of efficiency, wage differentials, information
asymmetry and market elasticity. Alcaraz (2009) points out that efficiency wages
literature  and job search theory elucidate the differentials in flexibility between the
two sectors. Based on the case study of Mexico he argues that while there exist a
relation between unemployment rate and wage in the informal sector, there exist
no statistical effect of unemployment on formal wages. Thus, the informal sector is
more flexible and adjusts according to market forces unlike the formal sector
where questions about flexibility are relevant.
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Thirdly in the context of labour market, the existence of informal sector is
considered an outcome of greater labour market regulation rather than the
opposite. In other words, available evidence suggests that the greater share of
informal sector is due to rigidity in the labour market or greater regulations.
Labour regulations have been argued to impact formal- informal divide in the
economy by influencing firm behaviour by increase the cost of hiring workers,
affecting the speed and cost of labour adjusting and influencing the relative
bargaining power of workers and firms (Hasan 2012). As such the share of
informal sector in the economy is a function of labour market flexibility rather
than flexibility being influenced by share of informal sector.
The point can be illustrated with the example of formal sector employment
in India which is concentrated in small and large enterprises and characterized by a
'missing middle.' (Mazumdar 2008). To explain such a size distribution  of
enterprises Hasan (2012) has identified production technologies, product market
differentiation and government policies encompassing labor market regulations as
being responsible. He points out that since labour regulations in India are
applicable to firms above the thresholds of 7, 50, and 100 workers (see discussion
on regulations in previous sections), regulations create strong incentives for firms
not to expand beyond a certain level. Empirical study of the extent of small scale
industries across sub-national states reveals that states with greater flexibility are
characterised by the prevalence of larger sized firms.
Finally, by definition the informal sector is beyond the records of the state
and consequently data is very difficult, to gather for macro-economic research.
The issue of labour market flexibility has been much contested in India
particularly since economic liberalisation. The Indian state formally signed the
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GATTS (general agreement in tariffs and trade) in 1991 signalling the end of ISI
(import substituting industrialisation) strategy and dismantling of the License-
Permit Raj system. Economic reform aimed at growth by improving economic
efficiency through removal of government control in sectors of the economy and
changes in policies such as exchange rules, tax policy, banking regulation, industrial
policy, trade policy, and infrastructural policy. In consonance with the new
economic policy changes were sought in labour laws as rigidity in the labour
market was claimed to limit competition and optimal allocation (Basu 2004).
Most of the labour laws and regulation in India are claimed to discourage
employers from recruiting workers, affect competitiveness and investment. The
existence of dual labour market in India with an organised sector (where labour
that secure employment and rights) and an unorganised sector (informal, casual
employment with no security) and unemployment is often attributed to the severity
of legal provisions in India (Basu 2003; Anant 2004; Besley 2004).  Thus, demands
for labour market reforms by amending the legal provisions have gained currency
to encourage employment and growth.
However, paradoxically in spite of two decades of reforms (second
generation) one area where deregulation and abolition of restriction did not
materialise was that of labour. As Sharma (2006) has pointed out more than 100
developing countries have reformed their labour laws in response to
competitiveness in the era of globalisation, but India remains among a select few
countries with a rigid system of labour protection. Only recently in 2001 important
changes were introduced in Trade Union Act which put 10% or 100 workers as
minimum instead of earlier 7 workers as the minimum to form a registered union.
Factories Act was amended in 2005 to allow women work in the night shifts, and
the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986 became effective in 2006
(Sato, 2008). Apart from these no significant changes in labour policy was
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accomplished despite broad reform proposals and successive pro liberalisation
governments.
In this context, the focus of labour reforms has shifted to the sub-national
states. In the constitutional scheme of things, sub-national states are empowered to
bring amendment and hold responsibility for implementation of labour regulations.
States can and often do make policy changes in areas like trade union registration,
recognition, minimum wage laws, defining or redefining limits or granting
exemptions regarding the applicability of legislations, etc. Scholars like Sharma
(2006) and Hensman (2001) have argued that labour market flexibility in India is
occurring de-facto at the subnational level. Interestingly even though governments
both at central and state level have been simplifying procedures to introduce
flexibility such a process has been variegated.
3.2 Structural-institutional framework of labour market
Before going into the specific details of the case study it will be useful to
discuss in brief the structural and institutional features of labour market in India,
both at the sub-national as well as national level.
The sub-national states, as discussed, provide scope for comparative
evaluation due to their broad structural and institutional similarities. Since the
structure and nature of capitalism has always been institutionalised largely on a
national basis, sub-national states have similar economic institutions and practices.
In terms of institutional framework, most sub-national states have largely similar
structures given the state centred developmental model where the central
government due to political (dominance of one party rule) and constitutional
superiority determined the framework. As central government with greater powers
sought to integrate the all the states in an overall plan of economic and political
development much of the institutional framework developed on a pan Indian scale
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with minor institutional innovations at the state level. As such there exist a
plethora of labour laws in India, both at the central as well as the state level.
However most of the important labour laws are central laws and sub-national
states make amendments to suit their particular specificities.
Broadly speaking the major central acts that determine labour relations can
be classified on the basis of objective and orientations into four categories; namely,
work conditions, industrial relations, social security and wage related provisions.
The work conditions and matters related to work place are mostly dealt
with by Factories Act 1884 and Trade Union Act 1926. The Factories Act 1884
lays down the conditions of work and rights of the workers. It provides minimum
conditions of work safeguards for health and safety and deals with issues of
payment of wage, overtime and work hours. It covers all factories employing 10 or
more workers with use of power and those with 20 or more workers without
power. The enforcement of the act is through the state government although the
act is central legislation. The Trade Union Act 1926 ensures the rights of workmen
to organise and collectively redress their issues. According to the act at least 10
percent of the total workforce in a unit or 100 workers (whichever is less) can form
a union and seek registration to take part in the collective bargaining negotiations
(before 2001 amendment the number required to form union was at least 7).
However, formation of a union does not guarantee the right to participate in
negotiation with the management in the absence of clear rules to decide the
bargaining agent on behalf of the workers.
Among the social security measures the major acts are Employees state
insurance act 1948 and Employees provident fund miscellaneous and provisions
act 1952. Workers in the organised sector enjoy social security such as provident
fund, gratuity, bonus and post retirement pension. However due to fiscal issues the
government has moved from 1994 from a system of defined benefits to a scheme
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of defined contribution and market return based sustainable benefit. The ESI act
1948 provides for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and
employment injury and lays down the procedure for delivery of these benefits.
In the context of wages there exist mainly two acts in India, namely, the
Minimum wages act 1948 and Payment of wages act 1936. Minimum wages act
recognises statutory minimum wages in list of activities in which unorganised
labour is employed. These lists are updated by the appropriate governments from
time to time. In order to ensure regularity, fairness and judicious modes of
payment the Payment of Wages Act 1936 ensures protection against delays in
payment, unreasonable deduction from wages and fixes the period of payment. It
applies to the entire country and covers persons employed in establishments
specified by the central and state governments.
The industrial relations framework of India constitute the main source of
contention is contemporary debates about labour flexibility. With regard to
industrial relations there are two major acts; The Contract labour (regulation and
abolition) act 1970 and Industrial disputes act 1947. Contract labour act lays down
the conditions under which contract labour can be employed, the rights and
benefits of contract worker and their abolition under certain conditions. The act is
applicable to establishments employing more than 20 workers as contract labour
and contractor with 20 or more contract workers on any day of the last 12 months.
The Industrial disputes (ID) act, 1947, is the principal legislation for resolving
conflicts at the work place, wherein the state intervenes in any dispute between
employer and employees. The objective of the act is to ensure the investigation and
settlement of industrial dispute for securing good relations between employer and
employee, between workman, prevention of illegal strikes and lockout, relief to
workers in matters of lay off, retrenchment and closure and promotion of
collective bargaining. The act stipulates that in case of any industrial dispute the
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state i.e. the Labour Commissioner becomes a mediating and conciliating party and
employers or employees are expected to inform the labour commissioner before
declaring a lock out or going on a strike. The act also lays down the institutional
framework such as works committee, conciliation officers, board of conciliation,
court of enquiry, labour court, industrial tribunal and national tribunal.
Business is especially critical of the restrictive provisions of ID Act 1946
regarding retrenchment, lay off and redundancy of workers. Chapter VB of the act
is applicable to all industrial establishments with more than 100 workers and
requires prior government permission for retrenchment. Section 25 G determines
the procedure for retrenchment with established principle of last come first go for
workers being retrenched, a month’s notice in prescribed manner and due
compensation for retrenchment.  With regard to closure, the act under VA (which
is applicable to industrial establishment employing less than 100 workers) provides
for 2 month notice from the employer to the government and due compensation
to the workers. Under VB,  (applicable to firms employing more than 100 workers)
the employer has to make application to government in prescribed form at least 90
days in advance to the intended date of closure stating the cause of closure. If the
decision of the government is not communicated within 60 days the permission
for closure would be deemed to have been granted after expiry of 60 days. The act
also refers to unfair labour practices by both employers and employees and
provides a comprehensive list of unfair labour practices and infringement in
section 21 M to discourage it.
The brief discussion reveals that labour market is extensively regulated in
the organised sector. Interestingly like many developing economies, labour
legislation in India are argued to be aspirational with limited effectiveness in the
absence of a credible enforcement mechanism.
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3.2 Divergences across sub-national states
Despite the structural and institutional similarities, significant inter-state
variations in both economic growth and reforms can be identified across India. At
first glance, the states differ in terms of growth rate and development and such
divergences appear to have been aggravated under conditions of globalisation.
Economic liberalisation has been followed by shifts in the federal framework
whereby the power of the central government has declined substantially and sub-
national states have emerged as important actors mediating the process of
adjustment and institutional change (Sáez 2002; Nayar 2007). This has led to
variations among states not only in terms of economic outcome but also policy
orientation.
In terms of economic condition almost all studies on sub-national growth
rate have observed the increasing disparity since liberalisation. Bhattacharya (2007)
points out that since 1980’s as the growth rate of India accelerated so did regional
disparity in growth rate. Based on statistical calculations they argue that SDP
growth rates show a fair degree of variation with some states recording high
growth while rest lagged behind India’s growth rate. The coefficient of variation of
SDP growth between states increased from 0.14 in 1980’s to 0.29 in the 1990’s.
Out of the 17 major state considered Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra were
high growth states, West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh were medium while Orissa,
Bihar and Assam were low growth states between 1980-2000. In terms of per
capita SDP which is a better indicator of regional disparity Goa, Gujarat,
Maharashtra, Haryana Tamil Nadu recorded higher growth rates while West
Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh were medium growth and Assam and
Bihar had the lowest growth rates.
Scholars are divided on the causes of such divergences in economic
outcomes. While some like Sen (2009) point out the role of geographical factors
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like initial resources endowments Sinha (2005) points to historical institutional
developments and state specific political dynamics as causal explanation.
In the labour market also significant variation can be witnessed among the
sub-national states. There exist literature such as Besley and Burgess (2004) and
Aghion (2008) and others that highlight variations in labour regulation across
states. Along with the divergences in labour market regional states of India have
been characterised by ‘diverse array of market governance patterns’ and regional
institutional innovations that reflected the distinct political economy of the states
(Sinha 2005, pp 17-19). Thus despite institutional and structural similarities by
virtue of their location within India, sub-national states have been marked by
economic and political differences.
The implications of such variation are twofold; firstly any comparative
analysis should strive to minimise the differences among states so as to allow
comparison of most like case and secondly sub-national variations suggest the
importance of regional factors in determining market outcomes.
4. Selection of sub-national states: cases for study
The research focuses on a small number of states which are most
similar in terms of social and economic development for comparative
case study. Such a selection is more rewarding than comparison of all
regional states as it strives to minimise state specific economic
differences that have an impact of labour market. As elaborated in the
theoretical section, the extent of convergence in the labour market
reforms is dictated by structural-historical, legal-institutional and
ideological-political variables. As labour market is affected by historical
institutional developments and economic dynamics, the selection of
cases is sought to minimise the differences in economic and struc tural
factors that may potentially influence the labour market.
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In this regard, the states of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat,
Maharashtra and West Bengal provide natural examples suited for
paired comparison due to their similarity in economic and institutional
features.
Table 4.1 Comparison of SDP and per capita SDP growth, 1980 to 2000
States SDP Growth Per Capita SDP
High Tamil Nadu Gujarat, Maharashtra,
Karnataka, Haryana,
Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Haryana,
Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra
Medium Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya
Pradesh, West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal,
Madhya Pradesh
Low Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Punjab Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Punjab
INDIA 5.66 3.54
Source: Calculations based on (Bhattacharya 2007)
The four provinces are advanced industrialised states in India employing
the most number of workers in the manufacturing sector industry (Nagaraj 2004).
Planning Commission data on rate of growth of SDP between 1980-81 to 1998-99
reveals that Maharashtra, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal have been the
high performing states (Kapila and Kapila 2002; Howell 2000).
4.2 Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Technology Cases Approved (August 1991 to
December 2005)
States/UTs 1991-2002
Aug-Dec.
2003
Jan-Dec.
2004
Jan-Dec.
2005
Jan-Dec.
Andhra Pradesh 103815.4 2362.95 10166.09 2572.05
Gujarat 107112.19 3070.75 14442.19 4384.92
Maharashtra 339397.79 12541.8 19138.36 35684.03
West Bengal 73564.59 3252.56 1154.15 2548.86
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Govt. of India
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Since liberalisation, the four states have been the recipient of significant
foreign investment with Maharashtra leading the way followed by Gujarat, Andhra
Pradesh and West Bengal. A cursory glance of the data on FDI approval reveals
Maharashtra and Gujarat have attracted greater share of investments compared to
West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. Although the data on approval may not
correctly indicate the extent of exact investment, it provides some indication about
the general trend.
At a more specific level, the economic condition and structures in Gujarat
and Maharashtra have significant similarities while Andhra Pradesh and West
Bengal are somewhat alike. Broadly using the standard parameters of economic
comparison, namely economic growth rate and contribution of the secondary
sector to state SDP, Gujarat and Maharashtra are high growth and high investment
states while Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal are medium growth and moderate
investment states. Such a classification is endorsed by the data on growth rate and
sectoral division of SDP across states.
The table derived from data on State Domestic product in Bhattacharya
(2007) suggests that states can be classified into high, medium and low based on
the contribution of industrial sector to State Domestic Product.
Table 4.3 Classification in terms of industrial contribution to SDP, 1980-2000
State 1980-81 1990-91 1999-2000
High Maharashtra, Tamil
Nadu, Gujarat,
Gujarat, Maharashtra,
Tamil Nadu
Gujarat, Maharashtra.
Tamil Nadu,
Medium Andhra Pradesh, Bihar,
Kerala, West Bengal,
Andhra Pradesh,
West Bengal
Bihar, West Bengal,
Andhra Pradesh
Low Orissa Bihar, Orissa, Kerala, Orissa, Kerala
Source: Based on Authors calculations from Bhattacharya 2007
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The classification of states in terms of growth rate and size of the economy
provides parameters to compare economic similarities between the sub-national
states. The standard measure of growth rate, contribution from secondary sector
and per capita SDP reveals the extent of similarity between Gujarat, Maharashtra
and Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal.
Table 4.4 State wise comparisons on broad economic indicators, 1980-2005
Year State Growth Rate Contribution from Industry Per Capita SDP
1980-2005 Andhra Pradesh 6.04 16.076 7576.72
1980-2005 Gujarat 6.98 29.424 10450.94
1980-2005 Maharashtra 5.84 26.886 11355.04
1980-2005 West Bengal 5.72 18.78 7305.88
Source: Based on Authors calculations from Bhattacharya 2007 and Indiastat.com
As the data reveals for the period between 1980- 2005, Andhra Pradesh
had a growth rate of 6.04 percent whereas for West Bengal it was 5.72 percent.
The contribution from industry for the states was 16.07 percent and 18.78 percent
respectively while per capita SDP was nearly same with 7576.72 and 7305.88. Thus,
the two states can be considered broadly similar in terms of economic structure,
and both were among the middle growth and middle income states of India.
Similarly for the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat, we can find similarity
in economic structure as industrial contribution constituted 26.9 percent and 29.4
percent of the state domestic product. Although the economic growth rate of
Gujarat surpassed that of Maharashtra, the two states are quite similar in terms of
their per capita SDP. Gujarat and Maharashtra constitute the highest income states
of India accounting for maximum investment both domestic and foreign.
Importantly the similarity between the states goes beyond broad economic
indicators as we look into the nature of industrialisation in each state. This is
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significant for study of labour as contemporary global transformations have led to
growth of technology led automation, new high growth sectors like petroleum and
chemicals, new production organisations with implications for growth, investments
and labour policy. Hence, the industrial structure of the states constitutes a
significant dimension of selection as states with similar industrial structure are
likely to be subject to similar global market pressures.
Using the Annual Survey of Industries from 1980-1998 for Net Value
added at the 2 digit level we compare the industrial composition of the states in
terms of output. To make the selection robust the number of workers employed in
different industries is also considered in analysis.
The categorisation of states is developed in terms of net value added and
workers employed according to 2 digit industries based on the ASI data for the
period 1980-1998. On the basis of average contribution by each 2 digit level
industry to the total in the organised sector, the research develops a picture of
proportional contribution according to industry during 1980-2005 for each state.
Table 4.5 Nature of industries in the states, 1979- 1998
Top Industries contributing to Value added ASI 2 digit level 1979-1998
Andhra Pradesh 2021 22 30 33 3536
West Bengal 25 37 30 33 3536
Gujarat 30 31 3536 40 23
Maharashtra 30 3536 37 31 2021
Top Industries in terms of Employment generated according to ASI 2 digit level 1979-1998
Andhra Pradesh 2021 22 40 3536 23
West Bengal 25 33 2021 37 3536
Gujarat 23 24 2021 30 3536
Maharashtra 23 2021 30 3536 37
Source: Authors calculations based on Annual Survey of Industries, Various Issues
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As the table reveals Gujarat and Maharashtra are structurally similar in
terms of nature of industries with a predominance of petroleum, textile and
machine tools industry. Similarly with Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal high
degree of similarity can be identified with agro industries, machine tools and steel
dominating industrial structure.
Hence, the selected states especially the paired cases of Gujarat -
Maharashtra and West Bengal-Andhra Pradesh represent states that are
economically and institutionally ‘most like’. Theoretically the impact of economic
and institutional factors in determining policy outcomes should be similar in the
paired case and any perceived divergence in labour or other policies may be
attributed to political factors.
To make matters more interesting, the similarity between the states goes
beyond economic structure. The states are also quite similar in terms of socio-
economic development as indicated by Human Development Index.
Table 4.6 Composite HDI Index for the selected states, 1981-2001
State-wise Human Development Index - Combined in India
State/UT 1981
Value Rank
1991
Value Rank
2001
Value Rank
Andhra Pradesh 0.298 9 0.377 9 0.416 10
Gujarat 0.36 4 0.431 6 0.479 6
Maharashtra 0.363 3 0.452 4 0.523 4
West Bengal 0.305 8 0.404 8 0.472 8
India 0.302 0.381 0.472
Source: Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 5459, dated 17.05.2002. Indiastat.com
Although difficult to quantify, levels of socio-economic development have
featured in literature on growth and development as important variables. For
example, the modernisation literature suggests that societies with similar levels of
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technological advancements and economic changes can enable changes in moral
and cultural values which may have implications for trade unions, business
associations and broader social concerns. Similarly, it has been argued that states
with similar levels of socio-economic development are more likely to be affected
by the opportunities and constraints of global transformations. As such states with
similar HDI may be argued to be characterised by comparable levels socio-
political-cultural development.
Evident from the discussion is the degree of similarity between the states
especially Maharashtra and Gujarat on one hand and West Bengal and Andhra
Pradesh on the other. The choice of paired cases based on similarity in size of
economy, structure of the economy, composition of industries and institutional
and structural factors enables structured comparison. The case selection exposes
the limitations of simple sub national comparisons based on apparent similarities
and paves the way for a more nuanced selection of cases.
In other words, the case study based on rigorous economic classification
presents four states of which Gujarat and Maharashtra are the high growth, high
FDI state with similar economic conditions while West Bengal and Andhra
Pradesh are the medium growth, medium FDI states with comparable economic
condition.
5. The puzzle of labour market variation
Interestingly despite the high degree of similarity in economic and
institutional framework among the selected states labour market outcome appears
to diverge. As mentioned, existing scholarship has pointed out significant
differences in the extent of labour market flexibility across states of India. Besley
(2004) in their study based on the amendment of ID Act consider West Bengal,
Gujarat, and Andhra Pradesh as pro labour states.
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In a comprehensive analysis of labour market, Shyam Sundar (2008)
suggests that West Bengal is the most regulated state where as Gujarat and Uttar
Pradesh are the least regulated state. The states of Maharashtra and Kerala are
fairly regulated positioned at 3 and 4 with Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan on the
lower side of regulation positioned at 7 and 8 out of 10 states considered. The
analysis of Shyam Sundar (2008) based on labour judiciary, number of trade
unions, workdays lost due to work stoppages, number of scheduled employments
under the minimum wages acts, average minimum wage, number of inspections of
shops, average labour cost per man days worked and state industrial relations laws
is more inclusive than that of Besley (2004) which evaluates only amendments to
Industrial disputes act.
Analysis of labour market condition across the states as per the proposed
index of flexibility reveals that Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat have comparatively
flexible labour market than Maharashtra and West Bengal. The graphical
representation of the different measures of labour market flexibility makes the
point abundantly clear.
Table 4.7 State wise comparison of wage as a proportion of net value added, 1980-
2005
Source: Annual Survey of Industry (various issues), Government of India
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The data on wage share i.e. wage as a proportion of net value added reveals
that labour share is higher in West Bengal compared to all the other states. In
terms of relative position, the share of wage is greatest in West Bengal beginning at
nearly 47 percent in 1980 and declining to nearly 30 percent in 2004-2005. The
wage share in Andhra Pradesh begins at nearly 30 percent and declines to 19
percent during the same period. Wage share in Maharashtra and Gujarat during the
same period decline from 28 percent to 12 percent and 29 percent to 9 percent
respectively. The graphical representation on wage share presents comparative
picture of the states across 5 year over the entire period.
Interestingly all the states show a declining trend in labour share which
indicates operation of market forces such as increasing capital intensive production
and increasing productivity of labour. However importantly the rate of decline
appears to be lower in the states of West Bengal and Maharashtra compared to
Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat.
Similarly, the data on the proportion of contractual workers employed in
industry reveals a picture of variation. Like in the case of wage share decrease
indicating greater flexibility, share of contractual employment also reveals an
upward trend indicating greater flexibility.
The data on proportion of Contractual worker reveals that Andhra Pradesh
employs highest proportion of contractual workers which hovers around 50
percent of all employment, followed by Gujarat where contractual workers
increase from around 15 percent to nearly 35 percent between 1996 to 2005. In
Maharashtra the share of contractual worker witnesses, a sharp increase during
1998-99 and steadily increases to around 30 percent. West Bengal employs the least
proportion of contractual workers which increases from marginal levels to around
15 percent during 1997-2005. Thus, extent of contractual workers reveal that
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Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat are more flexible compared to Maharashtra and West
Bengal.
Table 4.8 State wise comparison of proportion of contractual worker, 1996-2005
Source: Annual Survey of Industry (various issues), Government of India
Similarly, the data on implementation reveals a secular declining trend in
inspection across the states since 1991 with Andhra Pradesh leading the way,
followed by West Bengal, Gujarat and Maharashtra.
Table 4.9 State wise comparison of implementation of labour laws, 1985- 2005
Source: Indian Labour Statistics (various issues), Government of India
The data on inspection, however, should be read with caution because of
the inconsistency in the data. Also, states have implemented different norms for
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industrial monitoring such as self-certification scheme that may lead to incorrect
assumptions. Nonetheless, the data represents an important trend of decreasing
state monitoring of the industrial sector.
In terms of labour regulation amendments at the state level, calculations
confirm the conventional understanding with West Bengal making most pro-
labour amendments, followed by Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat.
4.10 Table of Labour Law Amendments across sub-national states, 1980-2005
Party wise
amendment
Andhra Pradesh Gujarat Maharashtra West Bengal
Congress TDP Congress BJP Congress
NCP
BJP-
Shiv
Sena
Left Front
Pro Labour 0 8 0 1 9 0 22
Pro
Employer
0 4 0 3 6 0 0
Source: Authors classification from P.L. Malik ‘Handbook of Labour and Industrial Laws’,
Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 2009
The construction of the composite index broadly follows the index
constructed by Besley (2004) with pro labour amendments marked -1 and pro
employer 1. Thus interpretation of the composite score suggests that considering
all the state level amendments overall West Bengal has made 15 pro labour
amendments, Andhra Pradesh 5 pro labour, Maharashtra 3 pro labour and Gujarat
neither pro labour nor pro employer. However such a composite score cannot
indicate the exact nature of changes which have been elaborated in the appendix.
As the data reveals, all the pro-labour amendments in West Bengal and
Andhra Pradesh were brought by the Left Government and the TDP government
respectively in the 1980’s. In 1980, the Left Front brought 9 pro labour
amendments, followed by 1 in 1983, 3 in 1986-87 and 2 in 1989.  In 1987, the
TDP government brought 6 pro labour amendments, but the same TDP in 2003
brought 2 pro employers amendments facilitating labour flexibility.
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In contrast, Maharashtra signifies both pro worker and pro employer
amendments since the 1980’s. Although during the 1980’s pro labour amendments
dominate, since liberalisation increasingly pro employer legislations were brought
forward to increase flexibility of labour market. Interestingly both the pro-labour
and pro employer legislations were largely brought by the Congress party and one
can find a certain pattern of balanced legislation whereby the government sends
signal to both employers and employees about its concerns. Gujarat, on the other
hand, has relatively low amendments and most of the recent ones have been
towards increasing labour market flexibility. The Government of Gujarat under the
BJP has not only sought to increase contractual employment but also put
termination out of scope of Industrial Disputes.
Thus, evident from the graphical representation of wage share, contractual
workforce and implementation of Factories Act is a secular increase in labour
market flexibility across the states since economic liberalisation. Labour is
intrinsically a part of the productive process like capital and under conditions of
globalisation it is subject to forces of domestic and global market that cannot be
completely constrained by governments or domestic interests. Hence significant
pressure for policy convergence under conditions of globalisation may appear to
be valid as labour flexibility increases secularly across states.
However, the data also suggests significant variations in the extent of
flexibility across states. Such a finding corroborates large number of studies that
argue significant variation in labour markets across sub-national states. As revealed
from the analysis of labour conditions in the states Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh
have more flexible labour market compared to Maharashtra and West Bengal. In
fact if we hypothetically arrange the states in terms of flexibility, Gujarat appears to
come out on top, followed by Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and West Bengal.
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Such an evaluation is endorsed by the regulatory classification of Shyam
Sundar (2008) and contemporary research on labour situation which position West
Bengal as an employee friendly state and Gujarat as pro employer state. The data
on the percentage of workers retrenched reaffirms the remarkable sub-national
variation.
The data on proportion of workers retrenched reveals that work
reorganisation through retrenchment has been most pronounced in Andhra
Pradesh and least in West Bengal. Although data on retrenchment is hugely under
reported in government records, the data reveals significant sub-national trends.
Since retrenchment is potentially a very sensitive issue for trade unions and
business, the variation suggests a crucial role of political variables in influencing
regional divergences in labour policy and outcome.
4.11 State wise comparison of proportion of workers retrenched, 1980- 2005
Source: Indian Labour Statistics (various issues), Government of India
6. Conclusion
The elaboration of case study makes it apparent that the four states
represent variations in labour market policy and outcome with Andhra Pradesh,
Gujarat being more flexible compared to Maharashtra and West Bengal. To be
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precise although Maharashtra and West Bengal might exhibit increasing labour
flexibility, such a development is relatively less than that of Gujarat or Andhra
Pradesh. A careful reading of the legal amendments seems to confirm the
classification of Aghion (2008) about the former states being pro-employer and
Maharashtra, West Bengal pro-employee respectively.
Gujarat has been one of the most liberal market friendly states in India and
has emerged as one of the foremost locations for investment with business friendly
attitude. The Government of Gujarat policy document explicitly states
privatisation, disinvestment, labour reforms and establishment of Special
Economic Zones with flexible labour laws as the achievements of the
Government. Similarly, Andhra Pradesh was the first state in India after
liberalisation to negotiate loans form World Bank and undertake massive
privatisation of electricity and transport sectors. In contrast, contemporary
research on labour situation considers West Bengal as an example of employee
friendly state (Nagaraj 2004).
Interestingly the position of Maharashtra is eclectic. Maharashtra has been
market friendly and has liberalised some of the labour norms over the years such
as Factories Act 1948, Trade Union Act 1928 and liberalising labour inspection.
However, the extent of liberalisation of labour market is somewhat lower
compared to that of Gujarat or Andhra Pradesh. Given the structural and
institutional similarities, the apparent divergences in labour market flexibility across
the states suggest important political dynamics at play.
In conclusion, it is essential to mention the time frame for the research as
political and economic developments are constrained by spatial and temporal
factors. The research broadly covers the time period between 1980 -2005 with
1991 as the point of break with economic liberalisation in India. The significance
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of the period under consideration is not merely in terms of economic changes but
also political developments in India.
The period of 1980-85 broadly correlates with the reign of Indira Gandhi
and constitutes the last phase of absolute state control when the public sector
would constitute the commanding height of the economy. At the sub-national
level, it marked the assertion of regional parties such as TDP in Andhra Pradesh,
Left Front in West Bengal.
The period 1985-1990 roughly corresponds to the period of partial
liberalisation of Rajiv Gandhi, but the state continued to control the economy. The
entire period can also be viewed as the last phase of one party dominant rule in
India by the Congress party. In terms of industrial restructuring this period is
important as Mill strikes in Western India came to an end with outcome decisively
in favour of employers. The event marked widespread industrial restructuring.
The period of 1990-1995 is the period of formal and sweeping economic
liberalisation and political instability. Political instability and coalition governments
became a reality during late 1980’s as India was rocked by communal and sectarian
political agendas. The trend towards regionalisation of politics became crystallised
as regional parties became key players and politics at the sub-national level
increasingly shaped political dynamics.
The period 1995-2000 can be branded as the period of steady reforms
when the actual effects of economic liberalisation could be felt in real terms.
During this period, BJP emerges as an alternative to Congress rule at the national
level, but not without coalition partners. Finally the period of 2000-2005 is the
latest and most recent phase of liberalisation for which data is available.
The period under study allows us to consider economic variations given
the time lag between policies and their outcome, but also allows comparison of
economic outcomes with politically distinct periods for political-economic analysis.
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Part II
Analytical Section
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Chapter 5
Interest group: Business as a socio-political category
The following section attempts to explain the variations in labour market
across sub-national states through political actors, specifically business interests,
trade unions and political party in power.
1. Business as socio-political interest
Any analysis of economic reforms including labour policy should begin
with business as an interest group. The dissertation adopts the term business rather
than capital or any other term primarily due to research objective of interest group
driven explanation. At a generic level, the term capital is understood as a factor of
production or wealth that is required in the production of other goods and
production of more wealth. In contrast, business indicates agents involved in trade
or production activities for profit. As such, business as an analytical category is more
suited for interest based analysis than capital.
The choice of business groups as the explanatory variable is obvious in a
capitalist system as entrepreneur or business own the means of production, employ
wage labour and play a crucial role in the accumulation process. Emphasising the
centrality of business in economic globalisation Hall (2001: 5) argues that firms act
as ‘key agents of adjustment’ and therefore constitute the centrepiece of analysis.’ However,
despite the recognised importance of business in politics under capitalism, there is
lack of theoretical work on the linkage between business and public policies,
particularly in the context of transitional economies. This chapter attempts at
understanding labour market variations through business as a relevant interest
group.
117
Businesses favour greater flexibility in the labour market to increase
managerial prerogatives and allow quick adjustment of factors of production.
According to Hensman (2001) corporates in India have favoured dilution of
existing labour laws to attain greater flexibility. The pressure for flexibility is
enhanced under conditions of globalisation due to competitive pressures for
attracting investments and greater policy space to business. Globalisation not only
exposes business to global competition but also strengthens the relative bargaining
position of business through the creation of economic and political regimes such
as WTO, reduced tariffs, capital market mobility and reduced foreign ownership
restrictions (Held 1999).
As such, increased labour market flexibility noticed since liberalisation, has
relation to the increasing relevance of business in policy making.  The argument
presented in this chapter qualifies the relation between business and policy by
highlighting the political dynamics. As the case study of labour market variations
suggests, business influence on labour policy is significantly conditioned by the
representation of business castes and groups within parties. To put simply labour
reforms understood through flexibility does not correspond to the size of the
private sector i.e. the material resources of business groups but on the position of
business classes and groups within support base of parties. Such an outcome
reflects the continued importance of partisan orientation in mediating public
policies under conditions of globalisation.
The chapter is arranged in the following manner; the first section deals
with the broad theoretical arguments regarding business and politics in the context
of globalisation. Section two elaborates on business-labour dynamics with special
reference to India. The methodology and framework of analysis is presented in
section three. Section four presents the analysis based on quantitative data and
qualitative interviews of business actors across the four cases. Finally, the
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conclusion presents the main findings through a historical-institutional
understanding of the relative variation in business influence over government due
to partisan orientation.
2. Globalisation and Business
Globalisation is argued to be a benevolent process for capital or business
by strengthening the dominance of market economy, constricting the role of states
and expanding the influence of transnational corporations (Held 1999; Stiglitz
2002). It is associated with the rise in the political power of business vis-à-vis other
social groups as well as the state through increased concentration of economic
power, access to policy makers and threat of capital flight. Evidence suggests that
bargaining between business and other social groups has been altered under
conditions of globalisation. Scholars have often pointed out increasing policy
relevance of “government-business” coalition which incorporates business
interests in policy making (Mazumdar 2008).
Further, it is argued that powers and functions of the state are eroding vis-
à-vis global actors such as multinational corporations and inter-governmental
organisations. The Multi-National Corporations with the multi-nationalisation of
production and enormous economic power are in a position where governments
are often forced to negotiate on favourable terms (Dunning 1997).
Thus increased economic inter relation between states, global economic
and technological changes along with ideational reorientation is increasing the
scope of business relative to other social groups within societies. The role of
business interests in such transformations are not always exogenous, but as
numerous studies have revealed, often instrumental in influencing pro-market
policy reform (Chibber 2006). The impact of business in policy transformation
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towards neo-liberal reforms is a crucial question and this dissertation attempts to
redress the issue through labour reforms.
Notably business here refers specifically to the private sector of the
economy which is marked by heterogeneous set of interests based on nature, size
and location of the firm. As a category business covers both trade and industry and
range from small scale traders, medium sized firms to large industries. Intuitively
we can assume that not all businesses are affected in a similar manner by
globalisation. Even studies on globalisation such as ‘The Globalisation Report’ suggest
employers are poorly organised and fundamentally heterogeneous in their response
to liberalisation (International Labour Organisation. 1997).
Theoretically the response of business to liberalisation may vary as
businesses that are threatened by liberalisation, namely the import substituting
domestic industries may favour protectionism as against the export oriented
businesses that support liberalisation (Katzenstein 1976). Interview with businesses
during fieldwork also reaffirms such an understanding of variegated response to
globalisation. However variations in business attitude towards globalisation
although extant should not be interpreted as opposition to globalisation and
liberalisation per se.
Globalisation in terms of public policy involves two broad aspects, namely;
internal liberalisation and external liberalisation. Internal liberalisation implies
deregulations and privatisation of economic activity that augments business
importance in economy and policy making. Naturally such a development is
supported by business. External liberalisation, however, has evoked mixed
response from business and questions of protectionism from international
competition for weak industry; economic sovereignty, state promotion of export
industry has repeatedly emerged as areas of conflict.
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Such differences in opinion with respect to external liberalisation have
been reflected in the attitude of business organisations. FICCI, the apex business
organisation of indigenous private capital expressed unhappiness with the
privileges accorded to MNC’s during the early days of liberalisation. The reaction
was natural given that FICCI represents more traditional and national business
enterprises that faced greater competition due to trade liberalisation.
Comparatively the response of CII and ASSOCHAM towards external economic
liberalisation was generally more favourable given the larger representation of
MNC’s and export oriented industries (Kochanek 1995).
However variations in business attitude should not be interpreted as
opposition to globalisation and liberalisation per se. Business has been in favour of
internal liberalisation and increased economic integration. In interviews with
business organisations and chambers across the four states, liberalisation was
almost universally lauded and concerns raised by business were more about stalled
reforms rather than global competition. However, the emphasis in the context has
been on internal liberalisation as businesses want greater policy deregulation to
enhance business capacity in an integrated global market. They want greater
flexibility in the form of exit policy so as to facilitate restructuring, removal of
restrictive legislation on urban land and rent control, reform of tax laws,
privatisation of the public sector, and improvement of infrastructure to compete in
the global economy (Nayar 1998). As such business attitude under conditions of
globalisation is towards greater liberalisation and policy deregulation.
2.1 Business and Labour Policy
Business generally favours greater flexibility in competitive market
economy. As Martin (2004) points out, firms resist any policies that interfere with
their profitability by increasing tax burdens, or raising the wage floor of collective
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bargaining, or interfere with managerial control. Labour regulations and trade
unions often pose impediments to such profitability and market corrections.
Although the necessity of some social regulation is accepted, it is argued that
restrictive provisions have a negative effect on growth of business (Fallon 1993;
Besley 2004). Increasing integration from trade and deregulation creates
competitive pressures on business to reduce cost and increase flexibility. Interview
with business associations across the states also corroborate business preference
for flexibility in the labour market particularly since regulations affect firms in the
formal sector (see chapter 4).
In the context of India, the adoption of market led development strategy
has increasingly led to structural pressures for labour market flexibility. India like
other most transitional economies has a small industrial sector with overwhelming
dependence on agricultural and service sector. As a labour surplus and capital
scarce economy, the state is under pressure to provide incentives to capital for
investment. Such a developmental model is reinforced by the proliferation of trade
and investment regimes leading to the creation of certain global norms based on
liberal market model. This is reflected in the repeated concerns of governments as
well as business organisations about institutional impediments in attracting
investments and encouraging economic growth. As such theoretically it can be
assumed that a large private sector will significantly increase the pressures for
labour market flexibility due to political-economic reasons.
However the capacity of business to influence public policies as an interest
group may not be conditioned by economic considerations alone. Political
economic theory suggests that in democracies power of any interest group is
significantly determined by wider dynamics such as countervailing interests in
society, linkages to government and so on. In fact, an important weakness of
varieties of capitalism literature, that explains reform variation through economic
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coordination among business, is its lack of emphasis on the state and political
actors. Even literature on welfare state that ascribe lack of reforms and prevalence
of welfare measures to the political-institutional dynamics (Pierson 2001) fail in
this regard. Although path dependency and institutional inertia can potentially
explain the continuation of specific labour market regimes, it is essential to
decipher the conditions that enable specific political economic interests such as
business to overcome institutional legacies or vice versa.
Labour policy and outcomes are not merely determined by size of private
sector or employer coordination but also by factors such as strength of labour,
interaction between social economic interests and wider political process. Hence, it
is necessary to evaluate the role of business as a socio-political actor in a wider
political matrix especially in India characterised by historical weakness of interest
groups and legacy of state presence in economic policy making.
2.2 Business and politics: determining public policies
As an interest group with specific economic interests business seek to
influence government policies. Under conditions of globalisation business as an
interest enjoys increased autonomy and leverage as the locus of policy making has
increasingly shifted from national state to the market.
Approaching the issue of business influence on policy making Godbole
(2004) has distinguished certain broad ideological-political perspectives. The
dominant leftist view considers that politics under capitalism is dominated by
business and interconnected elite of financiers and directors. An important
theoretical derivative that in effect challenges the idea of a conscious ruling class
has been structural dependence of the state on capital. The dependence of governments
on the performance of the voluntary market transactions of business for growth
and employment create the necessary conditions for business inducement in liberal
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democracies. The privileges of business firms are not challenged, because
restrictive government policies decrease investment, employment, government
receipts, and economic growth (Lindblom 1977).
Contradicting the structural predominance of business over policy, the
Class Organisation hypothesis considers business as an important part of society with
varying relevance over time reflected through state-market dynamics. The class
organisation hypothesis finds business influence on politics as dependent upon the
resources at the disposal of business. According to Lucas (1997) the shift in the
understanding of developmental role for business can be accounted for through
resources at the disposal of business. He argues that previous development
strategies emphasised the importance of interventionist state capable of
dominating social groups, including business as it was assumed that business
classes were weak and rent seeking. However contemporary trends privilege the
role of the private sector as economic liberalisation and international competition
has shifted the balance of power between business and government.
According to partisan electoral view the relevance of business is a function of
political-ideological dynamics manifested through party in power. Parties draw
their support from different socio-economic groups and the power of such groups
fluctuates with the fortunes of their allied parties. It has been witnessed that power
of business or capital is much restricted under left party while it is greater under
administration of right (Alvarez 1991; Garrett 1998a). The composition of
government in terms of ideological orientation and socio-economic basis have
implications for macroeconomic policies such as level of unemployment, labour
market rules, inflation, income distributions, growth strategies, and growth rates.
Finally, Political Institutions argument suggests that government policies and
institutions have implications for relative power and influence of interest groups
over politics. As pointed out in Quinn and Shapiro (2004) institutions of
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government have a significant degree of autonomy and policies that are at odds
with prevailing objectives are unlikely to be pursued.
Since the objective of this chapter is to determine the role of business
interests in labour reforms, implicitly it is recognised that policy is not structurally
determined by capital. Further, in the sub-national context any impact of political
institutions in policy can be argued to be similar.
3. Determining business power
Empirical research on business-politics is confounded by the problem of
identifying mechanisms and sources of business influence. Business influence on
policy may operate on individual as well as collective level, both manifest and
latently. Moreover, the effectiveness of business influence over policy is
determined by the nature of policy at stake. The three main categories of public
policy; distribution, regulation, and redistribution, tends to develop their own
characteristic political structure, political process and group relations (Godbole
2004).
Given the constraints in locating the interactions between business and
politics, the chapter analyses the role of business from a material- historical
perspective to determine the sources of business influence that corroborate labour
market flexibility in the selected states.
The power of business emanates from its control over capital and
consequently the forces of production. As explained, modern governments
everywhere for reasons of legitimacy have to ensure constant economic growth
and, accordingly, must provide rewards to business to help foster that growth.
Consequently we can argue that if the productive resources (capital, technology,
industries) are under greater control of government, business is relatively
marginalised. Therefore, the extent of public-private ownership of firms in an
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economy should provide some understanding of business power. Expanding on
the argument further, the fact that multinational firms have become critical drivers
of technological innovation, learning, and economic growth affords them a very
“privileged position” in domestic policy. Thus, the increasing concentration of
foreign investment as well as private capital should augment the power of business
under globalisation.
Hence in order to compare the relative position of business across the
states this research evaluates data on the contribution of industry to the SDP, the
share of public-private ownership of firms in the economy and extent of FDI as
proxy variables for material resources at the disposal of business. Further, data on
the number of export oriented firms in the economy is also considered due to their
privileged position as foreign exchange earner as well as to account for the
differences in business orientation based on the nature of industry.
However, analysis on the basis of mere economic data entails predicting
policy choice from economic effects without knowing anything about the domestic
political interactions. The mere possession of productive resources is not enough
and business capacity to influence varies according to political institutional
framework. As Lucas (1997) points out, it is not necessary that the power of capital
by itself will succeed in producing policies that are favourable for business. Like
any interest group, institutional capacity of business associations to perform their
representative functions depends on factors like professional resources of the organisation,
freedom from excessive government influence and level of centralisation.
Existing scholarship contends that corporatist organisation result in greater
support and participation by employers in social policy formation and
implementation. However such corporatist business organisations while increasing
the power of business over policy making also may increase the bearing of social
costs by business (Martin 2004). Given the absence of data on the extent of
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centralisation and fragmentation of business organisations, qualitative interviews
provide some clues about the level and extent of business influence.
Finally, the influence of business over policies may be determined through
political-institutional dynamics. The partisan orientation hypothesis argues that
governments marked by parties with pro-business policies share close
collaboration with business to pursue friendly policies and vice versa. Hillman
(1995) has argued that business government relations across countries can be
better understood by examining the institutions through which they interact; both
formal and informal, such as parties, executive, bureaucrats, business associations.
The resources in the hands of business to influence government and parties vary
from macroeconomic responses such as investment for states to financial
assistance to political parties, personal gratification of political elites and
connection to bureaucracy. As such linkages between political parties and business
may be significant in determining business influence.
In order to evaluate the sources and potential impact of business over
labour market policies the dissertation focuses on material resources of business,
organisation of business and business-politics relations in the sub national states.
4. Case study: analysis of variation through business influence
Businesses in India have been consistently arguing, especially since
liberalisation for greater flexibility in labour policy to facilitate factor adjustment.
In interviews with business organisations and chambers of commerce across the
states, the issue of archaic labour regulations has emerged as the consistent theme.
The attitude of business is summed by Mr. B.P. Pant the Director of Labour
Employment and Skill Development Division of FICCI, who argues that labour
policy is increasingly incompatible with the changes in the economy, which has
made production process more capital and skill intensive. The present labour
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regulations and industrial relations are not enabling for business due to excessive
restrictions and interventions by trade unions and government (Pant 2010).
Scholars working on labour and industrial relations have consistently
pointed out that employers in India, have responded to these restrictive regulations
in many ways such as sub-contracting, increasing capital intensity, expansion of
leasing-in capacity of small firms, setting up of production in states where labour is
not organised or militant, and the increasing resort to corruption and bribery in
order to avoid the legal consequences of retrenchment (Datta Chaudhuri 1996;
Ramaswamy 1988; Papola 1994). As a senior member of Bengal Chamber pointed
out, businesses in India have learnt to manipulate the system like declaration of
lockouts in place of suspension of work to counter labour militancy
(Bandyopadhyay 1996).
Notably although, formal legal amendments towards flexibility have not
happened, some measure of flexibility has been formally incorporated such as
restructuring of unprofitable public-sector enterprises and a voluntary retirement
scheme (assisted by the National Renewal Fund) by the government. The sub-
national governments in India have taken the initiative, in varying degrees, to
become business friendly by amending labour laws and relaxing their
implementation. Such a development is reflected in the substantial differences in
labour conditions and regulations across states.
4.1 Material resources of business
Any attempt to decipher potential influence of business should begin with
an assessment of resources at the disposal of business. At a macro level, the
control over economic resources, namely capital and employment constitute the
most noteworthy determinant of business influence. Since the focus is on labour
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policies pertaining to formal industrial sector of the economy, the contribution of
industrial sector to state GDP provides an important starting point.
As the data reveals, contribution of industry to NSDP is highest is Gujarat
and since economic liberalisation secondary sector contribution have increased to
nearly 40% of SDP. Although economically Maharashtra continues to be the
dominant state in India, share of industrial sector has varied little over the period
hovering around 30%. Further, disaggregated data reveals that since 1980’s share
of service sector in the economy has accounted for most of the SDP growth.
5.1 State wise share of industrial contribution to state SDP, 1980 -1998
Source: NSDP table from indiastat.com
In contrast West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh present a picture where
primary sector and tertiary sector dwarf the contribution of the secondary sector.
Interestingly West Bengal presents a declining picture while Andhra Pradesh shows
an expanding secondary sector. Such an outcome has often been cited in favour of
flexible labour markets promoting industrial development.
Importantly the contribution of business to NSDP in the states of West
Bengal and Maharashtra appear stagnant compared to states of Andhra Pradesh
and Gujarat which show an upward trend. Such a situation in Gujarat and Andhra
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Pradesh confirms that businesses consider these states suitable for investment and
potentially implies greater focus of government on business. In order to determine
the exact nature of the relation, it is necessary to look into the business-
government dynamics at sub-national states from a historical perspective.
In terms of resources at the disposal of business, theoretically greater share
of public sector would imply lower business influence not only on government but
the overall economy and vice versa. As it is difficult to get comprehensive data on
public and private capital at the state level, data on employment share in public and
private sector is considered. The logic for the selection of such a proxy variables
lies in the importance of employment generation by business, a function
considered vital for the economy. As such greater employment in the private
sector would indicate greater leverage of business.
5.2 State wise share of industrial employment in the private sector, 1980-2005
Source: Statistical Abstract, Government of India, Various Issues
The data on relative employment in the private sector factory reveals that
during the period 1980-2005, employment trend remains more or less stable.
Private sector employment is lowest in West Bengal around 65 percent while it is
highest in Gujarat touching nearly 90 percent of the total employment.  In the
states of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh employment in the public sector hovers
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around 80 percent and 75 percent respectively. In this context, Andhra Pradesh
reveals significant variations across the period which potentially indicates greater
volatility in the industrial employment.
5.3 State wise employment in private sector of economy, 1980 -2005
Source: Statistical Abstract, Government of India, Various Issues
The data on overall private sector employment in the economy reveals that
in Gujarat and Maharashtra private sector accounted for more than half of the
total employment, with 60 percent employment in Gujarat accounted by the
private sector. Private sector employment in Andhra Pradesh has increased over
the period to reach 50 percent while for West Bengal, the figure has decreased.
Evident from the data is that businesses i.e. private sector contributes relatively
more to SDP and employment in Gujarat and Maharashtra in contrast to West
Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. Disaggregated picture reveals that private sector
contribution is employment is greater in Gujarat than Maharashtra; while the
extent of private sector is more or less similar across West Bengal and Andhra
Pradesh.
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The data on employment share, across states and over time, reveal sub-
national and infra-state variation. At an absolute level in terms of resources at the
disposal of business Gujarat is characterised by greater business resources followed
by Maharashtra.   Theoretically greater material resources at the disposal of
business may translate into greater leverage for business. In contrast Andhra
Pradesh and West Bengal are marked by comparable and weaker organisation of
business in terms of resources. Combining the different measures of business
resources, it appears that business has greater resources at disposal and makes a
greater contribution in terms of investment and employment in states of Gujarat
and Maharashtra. In West Bengal organisation of business is revealed to be
weakest.
At an infra-state level, over time developments reveal that, since
liberalisation share of private sector employment has increased largely due to the
changed policy orientation of market led development. However the extent of
expansion of private sector varies among the states. The point can be elaborated
through data on export oriented firms across the sub-national states.
5.4 State wise distribution of export oriented units and FDI approval,
1991-2003
States/UTs Number of
unit.
% of India Investment % of  India FDI Approved
1991-2005
Andhra
Pradesh
458 10.75 42440 18.01 118916.49
Gujarat 509 11.95 8627 3.66 129010.05
Maharashtra 607 14.25 8149 3.46 406761.98
West Bengal 118 2.77 2930 1.24 80520.16
Source: indiastat.com
The export oriented firms emerged primarily after economic liberalisation
and reflect the choice of business over location as well as political economic
orientation of government. Analysing the relative position of business with regard
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to investment, particularly FDI and export oriented units reveals that the state of
Maharashtra has not only attracted most FDI but houses most export oriented
units. The states of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh are positioned behind
Maharashtra with relatively high levels of FDI and export firms. West Bengal is on
the lower end among the states considered both in terms of FDI as well as export
oriented firms. The data on export processing units presents an interesting picture
as Andhra Pradesh appears to be favoured for business location in terms of trade
oriented firms. The states of Gujarat and Maharashtra retain their comparative
advantage in attracting industries while West Bengal appears least attractive for
business.
As such according to material resources business influence should be
greater in Maharashtra and Gujarat followed by Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal.
However, such an evaluation does not correspond to the experience of labour
market flexibility across the states. In Andhra Pradesh although the contribution
from business is lower, the state has been able to reorient policy to become more
amenable to business interests. For example, the amendments to Labour Laws in
Contract Labour Act which expanded the definition of non-core activities is often
cited as an example of pro-business orientation of the state. Such a transformation
incidentally cannot be explained through material resources of business as
elaborated through the case study. In short material resources of business do not
corroborate the relative variations in labour market flexibility, especially in the
states of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh as flexibility is greater in the latter
despite lower business resources.
The non-correspondence between variations in labour market flexibility
and material resources of business suggests the operation of some other causal
variable. To put simply, the material resources of business do not entirely explain
the extent of business influence as states characterised by greater business
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resources are not the most flexible or vice versa. Further the states are marked by
divergences in the extent of organisation by business. As such, it may be useful to
look at the organisation of business across states and political linkages of business
that may potentially explain the variation.
5. Extent of organisation of business interests
An additional factor that may account for the divergences in business
influence is the inter-relation between business and the policy makers. In a
democracy, such policy makers include elected representatives as well as
bureaucracy and actors such as political parties. Thus, the study of wider political
dynamics especially the nature of interest aggregation by organisation and the
business-politics linkages may provide vital clues to understand the variation in
business influence.
The importance of political dynamics in determining the influence of
business has been pointed out by scholars like Sinha (2005). Based on the study of
regional variations in developmental policies she argues that even under the post-
independence centre dominated development trajectory, regional political-
economic configurations had a crucial role in policy making. She points out that
the government in Gujarat historically focussed more on public-private partnership
and played a facilitating role for private business in contrast to West Bengal where
government followed a development strategy dependent on central public sector.
Such a difference in developmental strategy was due to regional political and
institutional dynamics.
In terms of specific political-institutional dynamics that effect business
influence or power is extent of business organisation and partisan orientation of
government.
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5.1 Organisation of business
A potential explanation for relative weakness of business in Maharashtra
inspite of material resources and vice versa in Andhra Pradesh may be due to
problems of organisation. Like other interest groups, the capacity of business to
influence policy and outcome depends on the resources of the organisation,
freedom from government influence, level of centralisation and existence of other
countervailing interests. As such analysis of specific dynamics of business
associations across the states may potentially indicate some causal factor.
The states under consideration are marked by a multiplicity of business
organisations based on region, industry and even rivalry across businesses.
Although all states have multiple business organisations, Gujarat and Andhra
Pradesh are characterised by relative centralisation of business organisations
compared to Maharashtra and West Bengal. For example in Gujarat, the Gujarat
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCI) is the apex organisation not only in
Gujarat but also as the largest regional body in India. GCCI offers an extensive
range of diversified services providing information, acting as a channel of between
business and government, acting as an interest group presenting pre and post
budget memorandums before the various authorities. Interview with officials in the
Chamber confirms the extent of close collaboration between government and
Chamber with prominent politicians in the patron list. Similarly, in Andhra Pradesh
the Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry is the
apex organisation reflecting a high degree of centralisation.
In contrast West Bengal is characterised by multiple and competing
Business Organisations, like the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Indian Chamber
of Commerce and Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, Oriental Chamber of
Commerce, Federation of Small and Medium Industries etc. These chambers of
commerce represent the various industry associations and provide the logistic
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support to business. Policy matters are directly taken up by the industry
associations and Chambers of Commerce provides logistic support only (Mukarji
1989). Hence, extent of fragmentation or centralisation may potentially have some
role in the explaining variations in business influence.
However extent of concentration of business is not an exogenous variable
and essentially reflects factors like industrial composition, extent of business
coordination, nature of business classes and similar historical institutional
developments. As such, organisation of business as a variable in determining
business influence can at best be marginal. What emerges from the discussion is
the variation in relative efficiency of the business organisations across the states.
In an interesting study on state business relations, Cali (2009) has sought to
compare the nature of relation based on an index of existence of business
organisation, investment promotion agency and expenditure on industry. Although
the some of the proxy chosen to quantify the variables may be questioned, it
represents advancement in State Business Relation (SBR) literature and provides an
overall trend in state business relation (see appendix). The findings of Cali (2009)
in the four states under consideration for the period 1975-2008 reveal a high and
increasing trend for Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh with comparatively lower SBR in
Maharashtra while it is lowest in West Bengal. Interestingly for West Bengal, the
SBR trend declines till 1990 and then begin to move upward. Such a SBR trend
broadly correlates with the evaluation of business influence across the states in the
dissertation.
The greater organisational centralisation of business in Gujarat and Andhra
Pradesh and not in West Bengal and Maharashtra which have an earlier history of
capitalist development raises crucial questions concerning the conditions that
augment greater coherence among business. In other words, what conditions led to
greater centralisation of business interests in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh as
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opposed to Maharashtra. The question assumes relevance in the light of the fact
that mere possession of resources by business does not translate into influence,
and broader political processes particularly coherence in interest aggregation and
business-party linkage have a role in this regard.
6. Partisan orientation: business - party linkage
The conventional explanation regarding sub-national variation in labour
market flexibility emphasises on the nature of government. The relation between
business and government policy is not simple, and just as greater business
contribution should lead to influence of business, business decision to invest is
influenced by government policies. Alvarez (1991) points out that expectation
about labour and government may affect business strategy as capitalists may be less
likely to invest in the domestic economy when it confronts a strong labour
movement and left government. Naturally the nature of party in power has
implications for the nature of business-party linkage. Although the theme will be
discussed in detail in the chapter on political parties, this section presents some
preliminary findings on the issue of business-party linkage.
According to political-economic literature partisanship, i.e. orientation of
government in terms of left or right economic programmes has significant relation
to macroeconomic characteristics, such as employment levels, monetary growth
rates, income distributions, growth strategies, and growth rates (Quinn 1991). Such
difference in programmatic orientation of parties is argued to emanate from the
differences in social support base of parties. Theoretically, partisan orientation of
government can be explained through a combination of ideological and electoral
imperative as parties in democracy seek to represent groups in society on the basis
of specific programme. Even though, ideological and instrumental interests may
change they are relatively stable providing medium and long term stability in party
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system. Scholars like Frieden (1996) and Hankla (2006) have pointed out the
importance of support base of the regime in the determination of policy in
democratic systems.
The argument of partisan orientation is particularly relevant as ideological
differences in party programme do not appear to explain the relative variations in
labour flexibility across regimes. As the case study reveals major political parties
such as Congress and BJP have a similar position on economic reforms, but the
outcomes in labour flexibility are visibly different across parties and states.
Moreover, variations in government orientation towards flexibility can be
identified across sub-national states despite same political party in government. A
case in point is Congress party government in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh
which exhibit divergent outcomes in labour market. As such, it may be useful to
consider the extent of business representation within parties that can lead to
divergences in business influence.
To determine the dynamics between business and political party, the
dissertation looks at representation of business within parties through an analysis
of elected members of parliament. Since members of parliament are directly
elected across the states during the same time, such data not only indicates the
share of proprietary classes in the political system but also helps to overcome state
specific political conditions.
Such a methodology is supported by literature on political parties that
suggest candidate selection by parties reflect their support base both at the level of
ideas as well as identity. As Hazan (2006) points out, parties seek to address the
issue of representation through candidate selection and selected candidates not
only reflect the political belief of their voters but also share descriptive
characteristic similar to those they represent. In the context of the case study such
an analysis is augmented by socio-political specificities characterise association of
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business with specific communities As Damodaran (2008) has pointed out
historical patterns of social stratification in India have led to broad correspondence
between occupational groups and caste (endogamous occupational groups within
Hindu society) structures within society.
As such analysis of social composition of elected representatives (MP’s)
can potentially indicate the nature of support base of parties and consequently the
extent of business representation within parties. Theoretically greater
representation of business castes among elected representative should lead to
greater business influence and vice versa.
6.1 Partisan orientation: representation of business within party
Analysis of business representation across parties based on social
composition of elected members of parliament confirms the partisan orientation
hypothesis. The extent of labour market flexibility across the states seems to
correspond to variations in the presence of business castes as a support base for
parties. In other words, the data suggests that states where business castes
constitute a dominant base for political parties especially the party in government
are marked by greater labour flexibility. In contrast if business castes do not
constitute a politically dominant support base due to reasons such as existence of
strong countervailing groups or marginalisation of business their influence appears
low.
In sum, the findings suggest that influence of business under stood
through labour flexibility is a function of political relevance of business. The
argument becomes clear if we consider each sub-national state separately and
analyse the dominance of business from a historical-political perspective. The
argument is developed through data on elected members of parliament
supplemented by available literature on political parties in the states. To develop a
caste based analysis of partisan support the research uses caste and professional
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composition of Members of Parliament collected from Who’s Who of Lok Sabha
published by the Lok Sabha Secretariat. The database on members is then
disaggregated in terms of caste composition. In this context, it is necessary to point
out that dominance of particular castes or groups within parties is influenced by
wider dynamic such as party system, nature of political mobilisation and structures
of social stratification.
6.1.1 Andhra Pradesh
According to literature, industrialisation in Andhra Pradesh occurred
mainly under the auspices of the state under economic planning and until 1970s;
the regional elite of the state were not keen on industrialisation largely due to their
association with land. As Alivelu (2009) points out it was only after the green
revolution, particularly in the fertile region of the state that one finds the
emergence of agriculture turned industrial class along with an urban educated
middle class. Such a development marked the emergence of a regional business
class and increasing participation of private sector in the economy.
Interestingly, due to specific historical-social reasons peculiar to the state
the emergent agriculturalist turned industrial section was largely dominated by two
castes–the Kammas and the Reddis with some presence of Kapus. In the political
scheme of things, the Reddis, a landed aristocracy turned industrial caste,
traditionally dominated the Congress party. Probably that is why the first pro-
business tendencies in the government understood through labour flexibility can
be identified during the Congress regime in the early 1980s.
The historic rivalry between Kamma- Reddi, given their caste equation,
meant that the Kammas did not find adequate space in the Congress party and
largely supported the opposition. Eventually, the emergence of the Telegu Desam
Party in the 1980s provided the Kammas a political platform and large sections
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aligned with the TDP. The political assertion of the Kammas through the TDP
explains the visible increase in the representation of business among MP’s in the
state during early 1980’s.
The assertion of this regional bourgeoisie became decisive during post
liberalisation period reflected through the leadership change in the TDP when
N.T. Rama Rao, the founder leader, was displaced by his son-in-law Chandrababu
Naidu. Observers of Andhra politics such as Suri (2004b) have pointed out that
the leadership contest between NTR who represented opposition to reforms and
Chandrababu Naidu who favoured increased reforms signified a wider social
contestation where the business classes played a crucial role.
Analysis of support base of parties based on elected representative in the
state corroborates the dominance of Reddis and Kammas in the politics of the
state. As the data reveals Reddy, Kamma and marginally Kapu constitute the
dominant caste groups within the state (S.C and S.T seats are constitutionally
reserved) and tend to be represented by the two major political parties.
5.5 Crosstab of caste and political affil iation of MPs’, 1980 -2004
Party/ Caste Crosstab Congress TDP Communist BJP Others Total
Brahmins 9 5 3 1 0 18
Reddy 45 20 4 1 6 76
Kamma 19 18 1 1 1 40
Kapu (BC) 12 17 0 1 2 32
Velama 5 3 0 2 2 12
Goud (BC) 6 6 2 3 0 17
SC_ST 22 14 1 1 0 38
Muslims 4 1 0 0 6 11
Others 7 3 0 2 2 14
140 90 11 12 19 272
Source: Authors calculation based on Who’s Who of Lok Sabha (Various issues)
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Since these castes also constitute the major business communities in the
state, business interest appear to be dominant within the support base of both
Congress and TDP. In terms of relative variance between the support bases of the
parties, the Congress appears to be characterised by somewhat more
heterogeneous support base than the TDP.
Thus, business groups in Andhra Pradesh by virtue of their dominance in
the support base of main parties have greater influence over public policy. The
relatively greater labour market flexibility in the state despite lower business
resources seems to be explained by this greater political influence of business.
The argument is further reinforced by the data on the profession of
members of parliament over the period. As the data reveals, extent of business
representation among members of the parliament is significantly high in the state
as out of total 293 elected members during 1980-2004, 100 had some sort of
business interest.
5.7 Crosstab of profession and political affiliation of MPs’, 1980 -2004
Profession Congress TDP Communist BJP Others Total
Business 14 7 0 5 0 26
Agriculture 48 35 0 2 5 90
Professional 22 23 3 2 4 54
Political Worker 15 5 6 0 6 32
Business & Agri 20 8 0 3 2 33
Agri & Profession 7 9 0 0 1 17
Busi & Profession 22 10 2 1 1 36
Busi, Agri, Profess 5 0 0 0 0 5
Total 153 97 11 13 19 293
Source: Authors calculation based on Who’s Who of Lok Sabha (Various issues)
142
Thus, the relatively greater influence of business in Andhra Pradesh inspite
of the comparatively less material resources at disposal can be attributed to
business-party linkage. The dominance of business groups within parties has meant
greater leverage to business in public policies.
6.1.2 Gujarat
Detecting partisan orientation in the context of labour market reforms in
Gujarat is difficult as the material resources of business suggest dominant role of
business. A historical overview reveals that Gujarat has been characterised by the
political dominance of regional bourgeoisie, which can be traced even before
liberalisation. According to Sinha (2005) a class of capitalist farmers who later
turned into industrial class (Patidar Patel), the artisan – trader (Bania) class and the
backward castes constitute the regional bourgeoisie in the state. This regional
business class developed and gained in strength even during the stage of economic
planning due to conscious policy choice of regional political elites. In fact, greater
share of private sector and relative lack of public sector investments was a
conscious policy to strengthen the business classes by ensuring larger share of the
economy (Sinha 2005).
Since the mid-1980s, after a brief period of political turmoil, the state has
witnessed a stable two party competition between Congress and the BJP. Given
the reformist economic orientation of the BJP and continuous BJP rule in the state
since 1990s the increasing labour market flexibility in the state is quite expected.
Interestingly, labour flexibility appears to increase under Congress regime prior to
economic liberalisation due to the hegemonic dominance of business in the politics
of the state. The dominance of patidar-bania-brahmin alliance has meant that
irrespective of political parties, the developmental orientation of the state always
incorporated business interests.
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5.8 Crosstab of caste and polit ical affil iation of MP’s, 1980-2005
Caste Congress BJP Others Total
Brahmin 5 11 0 16
SC_ST 17 8 0 25
Kshatriya 40 21 0 61
Patel 20 32 2 54
Kayastha 0 5 0 5
Charan 3 4 0 7
Ahir 2 1 0 3
Others 0 5 0 5
Total 87 87 2 176
Source: Authors calculation based on Who’s Who of Lok Sabha (Various issues)
Evident from the data certain castes particularly Patels (Patidar), Brahmin
and Kshatriya dominate politics in the state. As a significant number of Patels,
Brahmins and some Kshatriyas constitute the regional bourgeoisie, business
groups emerge as dominant support base for parties. The dominance of business
castes as a support base appears to be greater in case of the BJP which
corroborates commonplace characterisation of the party as the party of ‘baniyas’.
The support base of Congress party is not devoid of representation of business
castes although there is greater representation of backward and scheduled castes.
However, such difference cannot obviate the across party dominance of
business castes and groups. A look at the list of members of parliament in the state
and their profession corroborates the dominance of business and professional
classes in politics of the state. Business and professional classes (regional
bourgeoisie) dominate politics in the state although variations in the levels of
representation can be perceived between the Congress and the BJP. The
representation of the regional bourgeoisie is around 80 percent of all BJP
candidates and nearly 60 percent for the Congress which indicates business group
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domination over politics across regimes and explains the institutionalisation of
pro-business development policies.
5.9 Crosstab of profession and political affiliation of MPs, 1980 -2004
Profession Congress BJP Others Total
Business 7 3 0 10
Agriculture 28 16 1 45
Professional 12 42 1 55
Political Worker 5 0 0 5
Business and Agriculture 17 5 0 22
Agriculture and Professional 2 4 0 6
Business and Professional 20 18 0 38
Busi,Agriculture, Professional 0 1 0 1
Total 91 89 2 182
Source: Authors calculation based on Who’s Who of Lok Sabha (Various issues)
6.1.3 Maharashtra
Maharashtra is potentially the most intriguing case as the state has been
historically one of the frontrunners in terms of economic growth and industrial
development. Given the large and vibrant industrial sector in the state, business
should be comparatively more influential in bringing about greater labour
flexibility. However as the case study suggests Maharashtra is marked by
comparatively lower labour market flexibility. Although business constitutes an
influential and powerful social group in the state, it has not emerged as a
hegemonic group as in Gujarat.
The influence of business, in spite of a large private sector, appears lower
because of the peculiar political dynamics of the states. Observers of Maharashtra
politics have pointed out that numerically dominant Maratha-Kunbi caste-
traditional middle peasant agrarian section constitute the most important political
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group in the state. According to Palshikar (1999) formal political power has been
vested with the numerically dominant maratha-kunbi caste group in the state.
However the material interests of the brahmins (regional bourgeoisie- industrial
and urban middle class) have also been preserved by the government through an
elaborate patronage network.
The argument can be elaborated through the data on the dominant caste
composition of the elected members of parliament in the state.
5.10 Crosstab of caste and political affiliation of MPs, 1980-2004
Caste Congress BJP NCP Shiv Sena Others Total
Brahmin 20 13 2 12 6 53
SC_ST 39 6 0 7 5 57
Kshatriya 7 3 0 0 1 11
Vyasya 0 0 0 2 1 3
Patel-Patidar 5 0 0 0 0 5
Ahir (OBC) 6 0 0 0 0 6
Dhangar 5 3 0 3 0 11
Maratha-Kunbi 70 16 13 24 3 126
Lingayat 11 1 0 0 0 12
Muslim 7 0 0 0 0 7
Mali 8 1 0 3 0 12
Others 6 8 0 0 0 14
Total 184 51 15 51 16 317
Source: Authors calculation based on Who’s Who of Lok Sabha (Various issues)
As the data reveals, the agrarian caste of Maratha-Kunbi dominates politics
in the state in an overwhelming manner and consequently business interests
although powerful is not hegemonic. In terms of partisan variation in support
base between the main political alliance, namely Congress-NCP and BJP-Shiv
Sena, it is evident that the former is relatively more heterogeneous with greater
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representation of scheduled castes and marginalised communities. However the
argument of dominance of Maratha-Kunbi agrarian caste in politics leading to
lower influence of business interests needs closer scrutiny as sections of the caste
have shifted from agriculture to industry. As Damodaran (2008) points out,
Maratha castes have gradually entered industrial mainstream through co-operative
ventures particularly in sugarcane. The data on the professional composition of
elected members of parliament corroborate such an argument.
As the data reveals, there is significant representation of business among
members of Parliament in the state which has increased particularly since early
1990s. As expected the proportional representation of business interests is greater
in case of BJP-Shiv Sena compared to Congress-NCP.
5.11 Crosstab of profession and political affiliation of MPs, 1980-2004
Profession Congress BJP NCP Shiv Sena Others Total
Business 16 2 1 13 0 32
Agriculture 78 17 10 9 2 116
Professional 35 9 0 4 10 58
Political Worker 15 3 0 2 2 23
Business and Agriculture 13 6 1 11 2 33
Agri and Professional 4 1 0 0 0 5
Business and Professional 30 16 3 13 0 62
Busi- Agro- Professional 2 0 0 0 1 3
Total 193 54 15 52 17 332
Source: Authors calculation based on Who’s Who of Lok Sabha (Various issues)
Thus, Maharashtra presents a situation where business castes-class despite
material resources and representation has been unable to exert commensurate
influence on policies. A potential explanation for such an outcome lies in the
nature of wider support base for parties which will be dealt in subsequent chapters.
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6.1.4 West Bengal
The state of West Bengal represents a stark contrast to Gujarat where
business has marginal political influence. The data on business representation
reveals that business has practically no presence measured in terms of proportion
of businessmen elected as MPs. Such an outcome becomes somewhat
comprehensible in the light of the fact that the state has been ruled continuously
for the last 34 years by the Left Front- an alliance of left parties dominated by the
Communist Party of India (Marxist).
According to Sinha (2005) the peculiar politics in the state can be
understood through the overwhelming dominance of the Bhadralok community in
the politics of the state which meant that industrial elites were precluded from the
political scheme. The social position of the bhadralok, in the urban governmental
professions and middle class status with a historical legacy of cultural renaissance,
nationalist fervour and Marxism induced ideas significantly radicalised the
ideational discourse in the state.
Given the ideological nature of the regime, business especially large
industries, were not particularly welcome and small scale sector along with public
sector was encouraged (Raychaudhuri 2007). The data on employment reveals that
compared to the other states the share of private sector employment is not only
lower, but overall private sector employment has actually declined in the state. As
such both in terms of resources and political influence business have not been able
to exert any significant influence on public policy.
In the context of West Bengal, caste based disaggregation of elected
representatives is not presented as business castes are marked by a historical
absence in the state.
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5.12 Cross Tab of profession and political affil iation of MPs, 1980-2004
Profession Congress Communist BJP AITC AIFB RSP Total
Business 3 0 0 2 0 0 5
Agriculture 1 12 0 0 0 4 17
Professional 24 80 1 16 9 17 147
Political Worker 10 89 2 4 9 4 118
Busi-Agriculture 0 8 0 0 0 0 8
Total 38 189 3 22 18 25 295
Source: Authors calculation based on Who’s Who of Lok Sabha (Various issues)
The analysis of business presence in support base of parties’ i.e. partisan
representation across states reveals some important dimension of business politics
linkage across the states. The situation in Andhra Pradesh suggests that competing
business castes constitute important support base for competing political parties.
In terms of inter-party difference in support base, the Congress has relatively
heterogeneous support base compared to the TDP. The case study reveals that
business influence measured in terms labour flexibility is significantly augmented
by business-politics linkage in the state.
The case study of Gujarat affirms partisan orientation in terms of business
domination. However specific to Gujarat the linkage between business and politics
transcends partisan divisions as business influence seems endure political
alteration. In contrast, marginal influence of business in West Bengal can be
attributed to the relative absence of business interests within political parties.
The situation in Maharashtra also confirms the relevance of partisan
orientation as material or organisational strength of business is counteracted by the
inability to emerge as a dominant social base for political parties. The case indicates
that the mere presence of business interests is not adequate for political influence
and the wider support base of parties needs to be considered in analysis.
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The relevance of contending social groups in determining business
influence and attitude may be identified from the difference in business attitude
reflected across the states. An important finding of field work was the difference in
orientation of business on the issue of labour market flexibility. Almost all the
respondents in Chambers of Commerce in West Bengal and Maharashtra
approached questions of flexibility with emphasis on socio-economic equality,
often recognising the adverse effect of liberalisation of labour. As Mr. Chatterjee
(2010), member of the Employers Federation of India eastern region, pointed out
in the course of interview ‘reforms is a social process that should aim at reducing social
tensions’. Business in West Bengal and Maharashtra although strongly endorsing
labour flexibility for attracting investment and efficiency seem to approach the
issue at a social level.
In contrast, the approach of business towards questions of flexibility in
Andhra Pradesh and particularly Gujarat resembled the classic neoliberal paradigm
where much more faith is on the beneficial impact of the markets. Parekh (2010), a
senior consultant with CII in Gujarat, argued ‘business logic has never been made
subservient to politics in Gujarat, and that is why Gujarat has fared so well after liberalisation.’
Most business leaders in Gujarat emphasised on the benefits of growth reflected
through enlightened interaction between business and labour that resulted in very
low confrontation. The contrast in attitude is most prominent in terms of business
attitude towards trade unions as business in West Bengal and Maharashtra appear
to be more amenable considering it as a natural process of industrialisation while in
Gujarat businesses preferred individual interaction with labour with relative
marginalisation of organised labour. As Atul Kapasi, Secretary of Small Scale
Industries Federation in Gujarat pointed out ‘employers have been more organised to
contain the trade unionism through semi-formal and informal networks and blacklisting of union
organisers’.
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7. Conclusion
The finding of this chapter reveals that the extent of labour market
flexibility across the sub-national states does not correspond to the size of the
private sector in the economy. In other words, material resources at the disposal of
business do not explain the relative variations in business influence. Disaggregated
analysis suggests that in terms of economic structure, the power of business should
be greater in Maharashtra and Gujarat compared to West Bengal or Andhra
Pradesh. However, the data suggests that labour flexibility is significantly higher in
Andhra Pradesh compared to Maharashtra despite comparatively smaller private
sector and vice versa.
The differences in business influence in determining labour market
flexibility appear to be a function of political organisation, specifically
representation of business castes in the support base of parties. Sub-national
analysis of business representation suggests that the existence of assertive and
dominant business caste-class within main parties in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat
have led to greater pro-business orientation. The near complete absence of
business classes in the politics of West Bengal has meant marginal influence of
business in public policy. However, as the situation in Maharashtra reveals, mere
presence of business interests within political parties is not adequate for business
influence. Rather the ability of business castes-classes to emerge as a dominant
support base i.e. electorally relevant constituency is crucial for business influence.
The argument of partisan orientation can be theoretically substantiated as
interest groups in India have developed along pluralist lines and are often divided
along nature of capital, regional concentration and even caste. The post-
independence legacy of dirigisme had meant that the influence of interest groups
dependent on their capacity to influence parties in government and electoral
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outcomes. As such the relevance of business within electoral support base for
parties emerges as a crucial factor in determining influence.
The finding thus challenges the conventional notion of variegated business
influence across sub-national states due to cultural variations. An extension of the
cultural variation argument is the debate about nature of business class, specifically
in terms of social origin. It has been argued with some degree of empirical veracity
that regionally loyal bourgeoisie with ties to the political elites has been one of the
conditions of economic development. As the case study reveals, the emergence of
agriculture turned industrial class in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh with ties to
political parties facilitate industrial growth and pro market reforms. In contrast
West Bengal, marked by the absence of an integrated and regionally orientated
capitalist class, has trailed in economic reforms (Banerjee 1998). Although there
may be elements of truth in such argument, the case of Maharashtra contradicts it
as like West Bengal, the state has been characterised by dominance of non-Marathi
capital.
To sum up, the relative power of business across the states appears to vary
due to the relation between business and government which in turn is structured
by the salience of business castes as an electorally relevant group. States where
business castes form support base for parties and  have access to decision makers
are the ones characterised by greater labour flexibility. As such the partisan
orientation hypothesis appears to be most relevant explanation for variations in
business influence. However the exact relation between the presence of business
castes as a support base and the extent of its influence is contingent upon the
composition of broader socio-economic support base for the regime. Parties in
democracy derive their support from more than one group in society, and as such
the domination of business interests within parties and government is not a matter
of simple correlation, an issue that will be dealt in subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 6
Trade Union as contending socio-political group
1. Trade unions, globalisation and reforms
The discussion on business in the previous chapter reveals that material
resources of business do not corroborate its influence in the labour market. Rather
the power of business to influence labour market outcome appears to be
conditioned by political organisation of business along with material resources of
business. To put it simply, the relative influence of business on labour policy
appears to be influenced by the presence of business castes and groups in support
base of government. Therefore, partisan orientation based on the presence or
absence of specific class-caste interests emerges as an explanatory variable.
Although such a finding is theoretically validated by literature on political parties,
in order to reinforce the analysis based on labour reforms the dissertation also
considers trade unionism as a potential variable. The partisan orientation
explanation for sub-national variation in flexibility remains partial without
considering the role of trade union.
Trade unions occupy a central place in any discussion of labour reforms as
the organised face of labour. Conventional analysis of labour market flexibility has
emphasised without fail the role of trade unions and protective legislations as
impediments to successful reform (Crouch 1990; Horton 1991; Papola 1994). In
short the successful implementation of labour reforms and outcome is conditioned
by the presence or absence of strong trade unions. Important to mention that in
political economic literature, the strength of business and trade unions is
considered inversely related and as such question may be raised about the
relevance of analysing both business and labour separately. However as the case
study suggests such an analysis is necessary to illuminate the impact of intermediate
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variables specifically political parties that lead to relative variations in the inverse
relation between labour and business.
Based on the case study the chapter argues that strong trade unions are
somewhat capable of preventing flexibility i.e. union strength is inversely related to
the extent of labour market flexibility. Such an outcome confirms existing literature
that argues trade unions in India have been able to stall reforms due to their
absolute number and control over key economic resources (Varshney 1999).
However the findings of the chapter deviate from conventional analysis in so far as
to suggest that trade union influence on the extent of labour flexibility remains
intractably a political process. Even though trade union activism prevents
flexibility, the effectiveness of such action is significantly augmented or limited by
the union-government relations.
The arguments presented do not necessarily defy, but add to the literature
that highlight the growing distance between political parties and unions as a factor
in declining importance of labour. Burgess (2004) argues that in the 20th century
trade unions were the dominant instruments of collective action as they forged
alliances with political parties and in the process played a role in shaping
development strategies. The advent of globalisation with mobility of capital,
expansion of service sector, changes in production method led to decline of
traditional base of trade unions and created fluid identities. As such, the centrality
of unions as mediators between workers and the state declined, and political
parties largely evaded their commitments to labour due to international pressures,
liberalisation of the economy, enhanced incentive to make economy attractive and
altered political ideological context.
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In terms of specific findings regarding trade unionism across the sub-
national states, the chapter highlights certain prominent features. Firstly the spread
and assertiveness of unions is significantly influenced by the economic structure in
terms of public-private composition and institutional framework. Trade union
strength is found to be greater in states characterised by the existence of larger
public sector which appears to be a logical corollary to the inverse relationship
between business and size of public sector. As such historical-institutional
developments appear to have a role in influencing contemporary labour market.
Secondly trade unions seem unable to prevent reforms when government is pro-
reform indicating greater role of partisan variables in determining labour power.
Interestingly greater representation of trade unionists among members of
parliament i.e. government appears to contain labour movement and increase
flexibility. Historical relation between the trade union movement and political
parties has been argued to increase policy influence of labour. However after
liberalisation it has meant greater pressures on trade unions by political parties to
adopt macro view of economic development.
The arguments suggested are dealt in detail in the rest of the chapter which
is arranged in the following manner. In the first section, a review of literature on
trade union and their response to reform is undertaken to elaborate the theoretical
framework. The second section briefly describes the evolution and features of
trade union movement in India which provides a historical backdrop along with a
cursory elaboration of trade union in selected states. The third section presents
data on trade union movement for the states of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat,
Maharashtra and West Bengal.
The theoretical arguments are analysed with reference to data from trade
union movement in the sub national states of India. The fourth section draws
conclusions from the data and provides possible answers for the divergences in
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labour market flexibility. The outcome derived highlights the continued relevance
of trade unions for protecting the interest of labour as well as the importance of
wider socio-political support base of regime party that determine the capacity of
trade union to influence labour reforms.
1.1 Trade Union
A good starting point to interrogate the relation between trade unions and
labour reforms under conditions of globalisation would be to address the issue of
trade union. As a legitimate voluntary association of employees in industrial
enterprises trade unions pursue objectives embodying workers interests. However
considerations of worker interest have been a matter of intense debate given their
normative content. Flanders (1970) famously argued that trade unions have two
faces as they focus on improving the position of their members through
representation, bargaining, and collective determination along with the
advancement of broader objectives such as the promotion of democracy, social
justice and support for disadvantaged groups.
Literatures on trade union reveal general consensus that along with
economism (demands of wage and work conditions) trade unions also seeks to extend
democracy to industrial sphere and strengthen the labour position. According to
Etzioni (1971) the dual objective of trade unions can be addressed from an
organisational perspective as one stated legitimising objective and the other actual
sociological directing trade union behaviour. Like parties ideological and wider
social orientation of trade unions serve as future goals for trade unions and
provide legitimacy while concerns of workplace determine the regular functioning
and immediate support base for trade unions. It needs to be pointed out that the
dual objectives of trade unions may lead to differences in trade union orientation
and goals.
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Empirical evidence reveals that the attitude of trade union towards
globalisation is not uniform, especially with regard to economic reform.
Theoretically we can distinguish three potential factors that may explain the
variations in the response of trade unions to issue of reform and flexibility; namely
material conditions, political-ideological orientation and organisational framework.
Material conditions: The effect on globalisation (Chapter 2) has not been
uniform across societies and economies. Naturally such a development has meant
variegated impact of globalisation on labour. According to Wood (1994) educated
and skilled labour benefit from globalisation at the cost of unskilled labour.
Similarly, economic literature has pointed out wage and employment increase in
export sectors of the economy along with loss of employment in the import sector
due to globalisation. As such the impact of trade unions to economic reforms is
conditioned by the material interests of labour and often differences between
export and import, skilled and unskilled unions emerge.
Level of organisation: Scholars of welfare state literature have pointed out
that centralised trade union movements, represented in a corporatist arrangement,
are capable of internalising the externalities and have broader socio economic
orientation. Hence, in centralised labour markets with powerful trade union may
accept reforms for long term overall economic benefit (Anderson 2001). The
response of organised labour to reforms has been found to vary from militant
opposition to general acquiescence due to differentials in the degree of trade union
centralisation.
Political-Ideological orientation: Trade unions are akin to political parties as
they perform the function of articulation of demands, create consciousness and
serve as a specific interest group. There    are literature highlighting differences in
the orientation of trade unions particularly between left trade unions and non-left
trade unions due to ideological reasons (Masilamani 1994).  The impact of political
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factors is not confined to the realm of ideas, and political competition, and
loyalties to government have been found to impact trade union response to
liberalisation. Murillo (2001) in her study of Latin American trade unions has
pointed out that political linkage between government and trade union facilitates
cooperation where as political competition for trade union control provide
incentives for militancy. However, competition among trade unions for the
representation of the same group of workers weakens unions internally and intra
union coordination externally.
The brief discussion on trade union suggests that unions are likely to resist
any reform that negatively affects its constituency i.e. labour. However the exact
response of trade union to particular reform is determined by a combination of
material conditions, political dynamics and institutional features of trade unions.
1.2 Trade union and globalisation
As revealed in the discussion on globalisation and labour (Chapter 2)
changes under the condition of globalisation have led to increased power of
business and a corresponding decline in labour’s bargaining power (Paczynska
2006). In consonance with the neoliberal ideology trade unions are considered as
rent seeking institutional impediment to free operation of markets. The
International Labour Organisation report suggests waning influence of labour as
exhibited from declining data on trade union membership and trade union density
in the last two decades (International Labour Organisation 1996).
Broadly, the literature on trade union locates the source of such emaciation
in wider global restructuring associated with globalisation. Scholars like Sato (2008)
have suggested that decline of trade unions is due to increasing currency of flexible
labour and changing production process. Similarly, Rodrik (1997) has identified
deteriorating labour conditions with competition for investment and pressure from
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MNC’s. Similarly, Gillain and Pokrant (2010) argue that the changed global
production network have undermined the capacity of organised labour primarily
through mobility of capital in a networked and multi-scalar form of capitalism in
which trade unions remain limited by spatial restrictions.
Empirical evidence of unionisation in India reveals that economic
liberalisation and deregulation have led to severe decline in the strength of
organised labour. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung report which covers the main
industries in Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Maharashtra reveals a trend
towards decline of permanent employment with the proliferation of contractual
labour and declining rates of unionisation since liberalisation (Davala 1992). The
period between 1995-96 and 2001-02 witnessed a retrenchment of 1.3 million
employees (13 per cent of workforce) spread across 15 major industry groups
(Nagaraj 2004). At an aggregate level, Sharma (2006) has calculated that the
percentage of contract workers to total workers in manufacturing as a whole
increased from about 12 percent in 1985 to about 23 percent in 2002. The
emaciation of trade unions can be gathered from data on declining proportion of
labour protests (strikes) in the face of such increasing flexibility.
The developments outlined are not unique to India but part of wider
structural adjustment reforms that have corresponded globalisation. Hence
globalisation has negative consequences for established privileges and powers of
organised labour (such as secure employment, pension and health benefits along
with weakening influence of labour on policy) and elicits critical response from
trade unions in general.
1.3 Trade union and labour market reform
As an organisation of workers in industrial enterprises trade unions pursue
specific objectives embodying workers interests such as improving the position of
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their members through representation, bargaining and collective determination.
Trade unions by the very logic of their existence seek to protect and increase
wages, work conditions and social benefits for its constituents (Chatterji 1980).
Naturally reforms that negatively affect established privileges of labour such as
work conditions, wage share elicit opposition from trade unions. Horton (1991) in
the study of reform in Latin America found strong trade union as an impediment
to reform.
Trade Unions try to prevent labour market flexibility and use their
collective status as well as significant voting power to scuttle or extract
compensation for reforms that have implications for wage, employment and job
security (Garrett 1998b; Downes 2004). Apart from direct collective mobilisation,
trade unions often make use of relevant institutional framework such as access to
decision making and legal prerogatives to prevent labour market flexibility.
In India, the influence of trade union over policy remains significantly
determined by wider political dynamics especially institutional framework and
union-government relationship. The industrial relations framework adopted after
independence was institutionalised through an elaborate system of control,
creation of large public sector enterprises and decision making prerogative with the
state. In such a system, the state sought to control industrial disputes through
development of pluralist corporatist industrial relations and complex legal system
(Bhattacherjee 1999). As such state institutions and politics had an overarching
influence in determining industrial relation and bargaining between labour and
capital. Such historical-institutional developments ensured that a spatially restricted
labour movement relied more on political negotiations and patronage than
bargaining. According to Rudolph (1987) the industrial relation was characterised
by state domination and ‘involuted pluralism’ where the trade union movement
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proliferated massively along territorial, horizontal and vertical partisan lines but
was marked by decline or loss of vigour.
Although globalisation marks a shift in industrial relations in so far as
retreats of the state, historical institutional developments imply that wider politics continue to
determine trade union. The impact of partisan politics on trade unionism can also
be identified in so far as the extent of withdrawal of the state has implications
relative power of trade unions. As Banerjee (2005) points out the transformation in
overall industrial relations with breakdown of the social compact that marked
labour regime contributed to decline in the strength of labour movement.  Based
on the case study of trade unionism in India Miyamura (2010) has pointed out that
the apparent ‘retreat of the state’ from industrial relations masks the active political
interventions at various levels that allow ‘reforms by stealth’.
The brief discussion suggests the trade unions are generally opposed to
reforms towards greater flexibility due to their implications for established
privileges such as wage, employment and work conditions. The trade unions use
their collective status, institutional mechanism such as laws to prevent labour
market flexibility. In the case of India due to historical developments political
dynamics particularly trade union linkage to parties (in government) exerts
influence on the capacity of trade unions. Intuitively it can be argued that the
difference in the resistance put forth by labour to issues such as closure of textile
mills and labour market flexibility is due to differences in trade union orientation
and power.
2 Determining the power of trade union
Like any socio-economic interest in society the response trade unions does
not necessarily influence policy outcome. Labour market reforms outcome is a
combination of preferences of unions, government and employers and the labour
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market institutions prevalent under conditions of negotiated bargaining. Hence the
capacity of trade unions to impress their opinion is a crucial component in
analysing trade union influence on labour flexibility.
Broadly the literature suggests that trade union capacity to influence policy
and outcome is determined by organisation strength, institutional framework and
political dynamics. A survey of literature on trade unions suggests that factors such
as extent of organisation and centralisation, institutional access to resources,
participation in decision making, autonomy from state and legal prerogatives,
substantive legal rights (Alesina 1997; Paczynska 2006); prevalent economic
condition (Kume 1998); nature of economic system i.e. organisation of production
and product market (Miyamura 2010) and partisan dynamics determine the
strength of trade union movement.
Trade union essentially functions to overcome the weakness of
unorganised individuals labour in capitalist wage system through collective action.
The unions gain power from their capacity to withdraw labour and prevent
alternative allocation of labour by acting monopolistic. Hence the extent of
membership of trade union represents strength of organised labour.  It has also
been argued that data on trade union mobilisation such as number and intensity of
strikes provide important and complementary information (Flanagan 1999).
As trade unions are interest aggregating organisation, their strength is
influenced by the extent of fragmentation or centralisation. As in the case of
business organisations greater centralisation as in corporatist structure increases
the strength of labour in policy formation and implementation. Naturally
fragmentation in trade union movement decreases the strength of unions.
The power of trade unions is also affected by the economic system which
can be narrowed down to differences in terms of ownership (public-private). There
is general acceptance that power of trade unions and business is inversely related
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and as greater share of private sector increases the strength of business (chapter 5)
it decreases that of trade unions. There is empirical evidence of positive correlation
between extent of public sector and trade unionism (Ramaswamy 1989). Moreover,
as Heller (1984) points out the impact of trade union in developing economies
largely operates through the public sector and government decision on wage is
likely to affect 15 to 40 percent of the employed workers in urban labour market
having a pervasive ‘leverage effect’ on domestic wage cost.
Finally trade union strength across the sub-national states may vary due to
wider political dynamics specifically the nature of linkage between unions and party
in government. Government may influence the outcome of bargaining through
policy interventions due to its ideological and political orientation. Pierson (1994)
has pointed out during economic reforms trade unions may be accommodated
through benefits or marginalised by new reform coalitions depending on
government approach to reforms. Such a possibility is greater in the context of
transitional economies characterised by historical-institutional legacy of state
control. As such power of trade unions can be argued to depend on the distance
between policy preference of government and trade unions. To put it in specific
terms, the difference in policy preference of trade unions and government as
reflected in disputes in the public sector indicate relative influence of trade unions.
Greater distance in policy preference represents lower influence of trade union in
government.
The brief discussion on trade union strength and behaviour provides the
theoretical framework to interrogate sub-national variation in labour market
reform through strength of labour. The primary objective for such an exercise is to
decipher the role, if any, of trade unions in explaining the sub national variations in
labour flexibility. Implicit in such an effort is the recognition of multi-causal nature
of labour market reform.
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3. Trade Unions and Labour Flexibility: accounting for sub-national variations
Before analysing trade union movements as a potential explanation for
variation, it is necessary to highlight the scarcity of coherent and reliable data on
trade unionism. Bhattacherjee (1999) has rightly pointed out that trade union
membership data in India are notoriously unreliable as there is a political economy
to its collection and presentation. Apart from irregular submission of data which
reflects the lack of professionalism and apathy of the state; different sub-national
states follow different criteria for data collection (data on average membership
available only for the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat while Andhra Pradesh and
West Bengal provide data on the number of new unions registered in a year). That
is why most analysis of trade unionism has to either resort to using proxy variables
in quantitative analysis of labour movement or undertake a micro qualitative study.
This chapter takes recourse to both quantitative analyses of proxy variables as well
as qualitative secondary research.
Primary data is collected from Indian Labour Yearbook and Indian Labour
Statistics published by the Ministry of Labour, Government of India. Moreover,
Statistical Abstract published by Government of India and National Sample Survey
Organisation data from 50th round and 55th round provide some data on the
extent of unionisation. Additionally interviews of activists from leading trade
unions and secondary literature have been used.
3.1 Powers of trade unions: organisation and mobilisation
Analysis of relative strength based on membership of unions across the
states is difficult given the absence of comparable data. Most literature on unions
uses data on industrial disputes, specifically strike and lockout data, to derive
conclusions about unionism.
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6.1 State wise data on share of mandays lost due to strikes by lockouts, 1984-2006
Source: Indian Labour Statistics (various issues)
Existing literature on trade unions use data on mandays lost due to strike
and lockout to estimate  the relative strength of business and labour as a strike is
initiated by labour while the lockout by management (Datt 2003). The data can be
considered as a proxy for relative ability of labour and capital to extract economic
costs. The data on mandays lost due to strikes and lockout reveals that strikes have
been decreasing compared to lockout across the state. Interestingly mandays loss
due to industrial disputes has been lowest in Gujarat with no significant difference
between lock out and strike. In West Bengal contrary to the image, lockouts seem
to outweigh strikes across the period except for a brief period in 1980s. Gujarat
and West Bengal represent the two extremes in industrial relations in terms of
disputes. In Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, industrial disputes appear to be on
the decline largely due to declining strikes.
Such a trend has led many to deduce that employer militancy has been
greater across the states over the years indicating declining powers of trade unions
particularly in West Bengal under left rule (Datt 2003). However it is important not
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to conclude about the power dynamics between labour and capital from industrial
disputes as strikes and lockout are both reflection of industrial relation as well as
overall economic situation. Lockouts can be the outcome of employer assertion as
well as deteriorating viability of industry. Similarly, strike can be the assertion of
organised labour for demands or a purely political gesture of a politicised union
movement. Banerjee (1998) has shown that the jute industry singularly accounts
for majority of mandays loss in West Bengal and accounting for the sick jute
industry there is not much difference in labour militancy between Maharashtra and
West Bengal.
A simpler and straight forward way to measure the extent of trade
unionism is to measure trade union density. The number of trade unions
normalised by the number of industrial units indicates, in the absence of
membership data, spread of trade unions. Theoretically, it can be assumed that
greater presence of trade union creates consciousness among workers and
facilitates mobilisation. Such a measure, although limited as it does not consider
multiple trade unions (under the industrial relations system in India till 2001, only 7
people in an industrial unit could form trade unions) or sectoral division of unions,
nonetheless provides a macro picture of the extent of trade unionism.
6.2 State wise density of trade unions according to industrial units, 1980-2006
Source: Authors calculation based on Indian Labour Yearbook (Various issues)
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As the graph reveals, the average number of trade unions is greatest in
West Bengal which at times is greater than 1 indicating extreme fragmentation of
unions. Although the period since late 1990s reveals a declining trend, average
unionism remains very high in the state. Among the remaining states, unionism is
higher in Andhra Pradesh and indicates an increasing trend since 1990s followed
by Maharashtra. Gujarat has lowest levels of unionism indicating weak organisation
of labour.
The extent of trade unionism is lowest in Gujarat covering only about 10
percent of firms which remains static over the period. In Maharashtra union
presence is in about 30 percent and appears to increase rather slowly after the
massive de-organisation of unions in early 1980s. Andhra Pradesh has
comparatively higher trade union density which varies around 40 percent and
reveals an increasing trend. Broadly trade union presence is highest in West Bengal
followed at a distance by Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and lastly Gujarat which
confirms conventional understanding.
In light of the limitations of existing measures, the chapter takes recourse
to trade union mobilisation. Power of trade union is derived from the extent of
membership and ability to act as monopoly supplier of labour. Hence data on
collective mobilisation during industrial action has the potential, to indicate trade
union strength. Such a measure i.e. average worker participation in strikes
normalised by the total number of workers in the economy indicates the extent of
workforce under direct or indirect control of labour movement. Considered over a
long period to accommodate state specific exogenous variables, the average strike
participation is a coherent measure of relative strength of unions. The average
strike participation is measured by calculating average workers participating in
industrial actions normalised by total organised workforce. The greater the
number, the greater we can assume is the support for trade unions.
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6.3 State wise worker participating in strikes normalised by average daily
employment, 1980-2005
Source: Authors calculations based on Indian Labour Yearbook (Various Issues)
Strike Participation measured by proportion of total workers involved in
strike reveals that trade unions mobilisation has declined over the period which
confirms weakening of labour as pointed out in existing literature. Sub- national
study of worker mobilisation reveals that Maharashtra and Gujarat are marked by
comparatively low strike participation which has declined even further since mid-
1980. There is some indication of increasing worker mobilisation in the period
after 2000. Extent of worker mobilisation is highest in West Bengal although a
sharp decline can be identified since the period of liberalisation. Andhra Pradesh
on the other hand is marked by intermediate levels of mobilisation with some
degree of variation. The table below presents data on trade unionism, measured
through union membership as a proportion of the total workforce.
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6.4 Data on Unionisation in Urban India based on NSS, 1993-94 and 1999-2000
calculated by Jha (2005)
Year State Manufacture Average
1993-94 Andhra Pradesh 23.9 53.90
1993-94 Gujarat 22.4 41.10
1993-94 Maharashtra 37.8 43.00
1993-94 West Bengal 43.2 61.40
1993-94 India 26.3 49.10
1999-00 Andhra Pradesh 26.65 58.52
1999-00 Gujarat 18.04 64.33
1999-00 Maharashtra 19.22 61.42
1999-00 West Bengal 25.2 59.21
1999-00 India 19.04 52.97
Source: Jha (2005)
Thus, the data reveals comparatively greater collective mobilisation in West
Bengal confirming popular opinion. However the state is also characterised by
declining trends since 1990. Trade unions emerge stronger in Andhra Pradesh
compared to Maharashtra and Gujarat and interestingly reveal an increasing trend.
The states of Maharashtra and Gujarat appear more or less similar in terms of
labour mobilisation during the period although the extent of unionism is greater in
the former. The assessment about relative strength of trade unionisation is
somewhat corroborated independently by Jha (2005) who has calculated the extent
of unionisation from NSSO data for the year 1993-94 and 1999-2000.
The discussion of trade unionism in the selected states provides us with
some contradictory images. West Bengal appears to have the highest labour
mobilisation and yet lock outs constitute greater amount of mandays loss.
Similarly, Gujarat has lowest labour mobilisation and yet strikes outweigh lockouts.
Collating all the potential measures of union strength it becomes evident that trade
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unions have witnessed a significant decline in their spread and strength.
Comparatively trade unions are strongest in West Bengal and weakest in Gujarat
which corresponds with the situation in labour market flexibility. However, the
situation in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh do not appear to account for
variations as unions appear stronger in the latter compared to the former. Despite
higher union mobilisation and presence, the capacity of trade unions to impede
labour market flexibility appears to be lesser in Andhra Pradesh compared to
Maharashtra. Thus, mere organisational strength of trade union does not explain
the variation in labour market flexibility across the selected cases.
3.2 Power of trade unions: level of bargaining
As pointed out in the theoretical discussion the strength of trade unions is
not merely conditioned by the membership and it may be instructive to look into
other factors that determine the strength of organised labour. There exists
considerable literature on the determinant of trade union power that emphasise on
the importance of level of trade union bargaining and legal prerogatives. It is
argued that small, fragmented organised labour generates weak pressure. When
trade union is very powerful and centralised it moderates demand as it is part of
the decision making aware of greater economic costs. Only when trade union is
moderately strong at the sector or industry level they exert aggressive pressure for
achievement of demands. Hence, differences in the level of union bargaining may
lead to variations in trade union strength across the sub-national states.
Data on level of trade union bargaining is not readily available, and as such
this dissertation takes recourse to secondary research findings. The extant literature
on trade union in India provides theoretically and empirically robust arguments
that can potentially reflect on the level of bargaining.
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Analysing the divergences in wage share across industries and continued
fragmentation of trade unions Bhattacherjee (1999) concludes that occupational
and skill differences have led to increased differentiation between trade unions.
Based on his case study of trade unionism in West Bengal and Maharashtra he
argues that high skilled industries in Maharashtra were marked by independent
trade unions which opted for increased wage in the wage-employment trade off. In
contrast, the traditional and declining industries in West Bengal were marked by
political unions which opted for employment due to lack of employment
opportunity and direct relation of membership to bargaining capacity.
Consequently greater proportion of industries in Maharashtra has opted for firm
level bargaining compared to West Bengal. Miyamura (2001) has also argued along
similar lines to suggest that company based unions are more predominant in
industrially dynamic areas where as less dynamic areas have party based unions. He
argues that dynamic regions provide strong incentives for unions to seek company
based ‘rents’ rather than political rents that are more attractive in less industrially
dynamic regions.
Following Bhattacherjee (1999) and Miyamura (2010) it can be argued that
company based unions are expected to be predominant in industrially vibrant
Gujarat and Maharashtra compared to Andhra Pradesh while West Bengal is more
likely to be characterised such political unions. Micro level study of trade unionism
in the states corroborates such a claim with greater prevalence of company based
trade unions in Gujarat and Maharashtra followed by Andhra Pradesh (Davala
1992).
In terms of bargaining behaviour, company based unions are confined
within firms as unions without explicit political agenda have a general tendency to
perceive themselves as professional organisations with a given function defined
within the limits of the company. Thus, company based unions are not only limited
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by their limited scope but also orientation towards issues of labour and capital.
Hence the capacity of such trade unions to influence policy outcome, particularly
from the macro perspective should be lower. In contrast, political unions are more
likely to have industry level bargaining with greater influence at the macro level.
As such, theoretically, the trade union strength based on the level of
bargaining should be greater in West Bengal and least in Gujarat. Such an
evaluation of strength of trade unions emanating from level of bargaining seems to
correspond to the evaluation of labour market flexibility in West Bengal and
Gujarat. In the sub-national states of Gujarat and Maharashtra and even partly
Andhra Pradesh the relatively greater company based union create weaker
bargaining pressures from labour. However, the situation in Maharashtra and
Andhra Pradesh remain unclear as company level bargaining is greater in the
former but labour flexibility appears lower.
3.3 Trade unions: Historical-institutional developments
A potential source of variation in trade union influence lies in institutional
factors like public sector employment and legal prerogatives. Varshney (1999) has
argued that organised labour has been able to stall reforms in India in spite of its
limited penetration because of control over key economic resources such as public
sector. Based on a cross country analysis Forteza (2001) has argued that size of
public sector has significant relation to the strength of labour to oppose reforms
due to electoral considerations of government. According to literature greater
share of public sector in the economy not only constrains the influence of business
interests but also augments that of labour. Employment in the public sector
provides greater protection and better work condition to labour. Moreover as trade
unionism in India relied mostly on large public sector and private sector industries,
in states with greater public sector employment unions can have greater leverage in
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affecting labour policy. Ramaswamy (1989) has argued that post-independence
strategy of public sector investments led to the creation of sizeable organised
labour that provided bulwark for public sectors and trade unions. Thus, it can be
presumed that greater proportion of employment in the public sector not only
implies greater capacity of governments to influence economic outcomes but also
greater power of labour to influence outcomes.
6.5 State wise public sector employment in total industrial employment, 1980-2006
Source: Indian Labour Statistics (Various Issues)
The data on public sector factory employment reveals that share of public
sector is largest in West Bengal followed by Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and
eventually Gujarat. It is well documented that West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh
had significant public sector led industrialisation.  Maharashtra attracted both
public and private investment while industrialisation in Gujarat relied more on
private investment due to regional political economic reasons. As such workers
and their organisation can be argued to be strongest in West Bengal and weakest in
Gujarat. However, like the case of trade union mobilisation, developments in
Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra do not correspond to analysis of trade union
strength.
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Another important determinant of relative power of labour is prevalent
legal framework. Legal prerogatives, particularly laws can provide important
external fillip to organised interests. To analyse relative position of states in terms
of legal issues of labour flexibility the dissertation looks into the labour law
amendments brought at the sub-national level. In terms of amendment of labour
regulation, West Bengal has most pro-labour amendments followed by Andhra
Pradesh. In contrast, the Congress in Maharashtra signifies both pro worker
and pro employer amendments since the 1980’s. Although during the 1980’s pro-
labour amendments dominate, since liberalisation increasingly pro employer
legislations were brought forward to increase flexibility of labour market.
6.6 State wise Labour Law Amendments
Amendment Andhra Pradesh Gujarat Maharashtra West Bengal
Pro Labour 8 1 9 22
Pro Employer 4 3 6 0
Source: Authors classification based on P.L. Malik ‘Handbook of Labour and Industrial
Laws’, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 2009
As the data reveals, pro-Labour amendments dominate in West Bengal
while the situation is reverse in Gujarat. Accordingly labour movement can be
argued to be stronger in the former and weaker in the latter that corroborates the
analysis of trade unionism in the two states. The states of Maharashtra and Andhra
Pradesh are marked by greater pro-labour reform, but in recent years pro-employer
amendments seem to dominate. Apparently level the legal protection accorded to
labour is greater in Andhra Pradesh compared to Maharashtra. However the
analysis of labour market situation in the two states does not seem to correspond.
In Andhra Pradesh despite the greater share of public sector and legal protection
labour flexibility appears greater compared to Maharashtra.
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A potential reason for such non-congruence is the non-incorporation of
ideological and political linkages of trade unions. As discussed a crucial
determinant of trade union influence is the nature of trade union interaction with
government.
3.4 Impact of political ideological context on trade unionism
Historical institutional developments in India has led to significant role for
political linkages in determining interest group dynamics. As such power of trade
unions is significantly regulated by the linkages to the government or more
specifically the political party in government. Although such government- interest
group linkage is a structural feature of democracy, in the context of India it is
considerably enhanced by the relative weakness of associational groups and
historical presence of the state in economy. As revealed in course of discussion
trade unions in India have very limited presence and in an institutional framework
of ‘state dominated pluralism’ interest groups operated through partisan channels.
Consideration of political ideological dynamics in determining trade union
influence over labour market can be disaggregated into ideological position of
trade unions as well as trade union and political party- government linkage within
broader political matrix. In India, unionised workers in all sectors are divided
between major trade union federations and several independent trade unions. Most
of the major union federations are closely affiliated with different national political
parties as all major political parties in India have their “own” trade unions.
Although trade unions are in general opposed to labour market flexibility surveys
and interviews during fieldwork reveal differences in trade union response
according to their political position.
For example, both the Indian National Trade Union Congress affiliated to
the centrist Congress party and Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh affiliated to the rightist
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Bharatiya Janata Party express their opposition to labour flexibility. However, they
are not opposed to liberalisation in principle and simply oppose some aspects of
process (Masilamani 1994). Similarly, the Hind Mazdoor Sabha recognises the need
for reforms but want a calibrated approach. Naturally BMS and INTUC often
tread the path of moderation and cooperation on the issue of reform. The non-
political unions such as SEWA in Gujarat focus on small scale and informal
workers and seek to improve the condition of labour through negotiated
settlements and cooperatives to provide social protection.
In contrast, the left trade unions are ideologically opposed to neoliberal
policies and feature at the fore front of such movement (Uba 2008). The two
biggest left trade unions AITUC and CITU are totally opposed to economic
liberalisation and consider such policy as an attack on the working class and
capitulation of India to imperialist domination. However such a broad
generalisation of all India trends masks important differences in trade union
behaviour across the states and over time.
Important to consider here is the impact of state specific features affecting
trade union response, namely the party in power and secondly the relative
dominance of different trade unions. For example, in West Bengal the INTUC has
participated in struggles and strikes against the ratification of central command
which can be attributed to the distinct political economy of the state as well as
outcome of trade union competition with left trade unions. Such state specific
variation in trade union behaviour has been corroborated by Uba (2008) who looks
at the protests organised by trade unions against privatisation. Thus at the
ideological level the trade union movement in Gujarat, marked by dominance of
nongovernmental SEWA, BMS and INTUC is characterised by conciliated
settlement and non-radical trade unionism. Such behaviour can be traced to
historical dominance of Gandhian philosophy, and weakness of the left movement.
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In Maharashtra, the decline of left trade unions and the emergence of newer and
independent unions have led to lesser degree of labour militancy than previous
decades while in Andhra Pradesh,  the continued presence of left trade unions,
especially in the public sector has meant relatively greater radicalism. Trade unions
appear to be most radical in their opposition to flexibility in West Bengal owing to
predominance of left trade unionism.
Analysing the dynamics between trade unions and political party, available
evidence suggests growing distance between unions and government under
conditions of globalisation. As governments across the states, since the 1980’s
have increasingly adopted neo liberal policies the linkage between party and
affiliated trade unions has come under strain. Thus, the ideological and
programmatic shift of the political parties especially in government has been a
significant variable in the waning of trade union influence. As Uba (2008) points
out that all parties long identified with a labour-friendly, left-of-centre,
predominantly statist political position, initiated market reforms at their respective
levels which points towards a certain convergence over the issue of the need for
labour rationalisation regardless of their ideological orientation. This changing
orientation of political parties especially when in government has been a significant
factor in determining the relative importance of trade unionism and labour policy.
At a partisan level BJP has been increasingly identified with neoliberal
policies along with the Congress which potentially explains the greater reforms in
states marked by their dominance. The pro-reform parties when in power
significantly impede the strength of trade union bargaining. The Left, on the other
hand, continues to oppose neo liberal policies and even when left governed West
Bengal creates investor friendly environment, the policy orientation is not as
pronounced as other states. However the relation between political party and trade
union is not a simple as revealed in the increasing flexibility in left ruled West
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Bengal after liberalisation or variations in flexibility across states especially
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh under Congress party government.
A potential measure of political influence of trade unions may be through
presence of trade unionist within elected position of political parties. Theoretically
one can argue that greater representation of trade unionist within broader political
processes would not only increase the access of labour to decision makers but also
provide greater support from socio-political forces. In order to analyse the direct
link between trade unions and political party we look into data on the proportion
of trade unionist elected as Member of Parliament from the selected states during
1980-2004.
6.7 State wise number of Trade Unionists elected as MPs, 1980-2004
Source: Who’s Who of Lok Sabha (Various Issues)
The data reveals a remarkable correspondence between representation of
trade unionist and the general trend of flexibility across the states. The state with
least flexible labour market i.e. West Bengal is marked by significant presence of
trade unionists, and the most flexible Gujarat has marginal presence of unionists.
Maharashtra represents increasing representation of trade after liberalisation unlike
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all the other three states where trade union representation has declined since
liberalisation. At a casual glance, it may appear that strength of trade union in
impeding flexibility is a function of political presence of trade unions. However it
may be premature to deduce too much from this data as a careful reading suggests
that except for West Bengal, the representation of trade union across the states has
been too small to have any effect. Moreover given the dominance of political
unions in India such party-trade union linkage does not necessarily imply an
increase in the strength of labour as parties in the changed circumstances often use
such linkage to maintain control over labour.
Interestingly collating the data on strike mobilisation with trade union
representation reveals that after liberalisation union representation in party have
worked to tame trade unions. The extent of trade unionists as MPs statistically
corresponds with decreasing number of strikes and mobilisation. Thus, the link of
trade union to institutions of government appears to contain labour movement
and increase flexibility. Independent analysis of trade union opposition also finds
that trade unions affiliated with party in power do not actively mobilise and oppose
government policies reflecting the logic of political opportunity structure (Uba
2008).
The widening shift between trade unions and political parties is revealed
through data on public sector disputes with greater disputes indicating wider rift
between government and trade unions. Venkataratnam (1997) has pointed out that
before liberalisation, industrial conflicts occurred mainly in the private sector but
since 1990’s industrial disputes in public sectors have increased significantly due to
reform orientation of governments. Such an interpretation in the sub-national
context may be suspect due to historical differences in industrialisation, trade
union movement and political context. However in conjunction with other data
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and secondary literature, it provides valuable clues to understanding the dynamics
between government and trade union across the sub-national states.
6.8 State wise proportion of mandays lost in public-sector due to dispute, 1984-2006
Source: Indian Labour Statistics (Various Issues)
The most remarkable outcome is the high level of dispute in public sector in
Andhra Pradesh accounting for three quarters of all mandays lost since 1980s. This
is indicative of schism between trade unions and government leading to direct
conflict and potentially explains high flexibility in the state despite significant levels
of unionisation. Qualitative evidence of reform confirm that Andhra Pradesh is at
the forefront of public sector reform which has been vigorously but unsuccessfully
opposed by organised labour (Mooij 2005). Importantly public sector
disinvestment or relaxation of labour provisions is not merely a matter of
economic choice but also a political choice by the government.
Thus, the case study reveals that the orientation of the political parties
especially when in government varies between the cases which directs attention to
broader political variables. The conflict appears to be least in West Bengal which
can be attributed to the ideological and political congruence between left
government and trade unions. Interestingly the disputes in public sector also
appear to be low in case of Gujarat which in the light of high levels of flexibility
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can be explained through the low levels of public sector in the economy and
weakness of trade unions. In Gujarat and Maharashtra the extent of mandays lost
appear somewhat similar and exhibit upward trend since liberalisation which
reflects the growing tension between trade unions and government. Interestingly in
Maharashtra the extent of public sector dispute remains low till the mid-1990s and
witnesses a sharp increase thereafter.
Specific study of party and union relation suggest that distance between the
two has increased significantly after liberalisation across all states. Even though,
sub-national comparison presents West Bengal as being characterised by low party-
union dispute, Bhattacharjee (1999) has pointed out that growing distance between
the CPI(M) and its labour wing CITU since the mid-1990s as the government sent
strong signals to the trade unions to accept the requirements of industrial
regeneration. Similarly, the BMS General Secretary Hasmukh Dave in an interview
with the Frontline magazine criticised the BJP led NDA government as being hasty
and more reformist than previous governments. He expressed disappointment at
BJP implementing the very anti-labour policies they opposed while in opposition.
. Broadly the analysis of linkage between party and trade union it can be
pointed out that at a relative level trade unions have greater leverage in influencing
policies in West Bengal and least in Gujarat. In Maharashtra increasing
government-trade union difference can be argued to limit the influence of trade
unions although to a much lesser degree than in Andhra Pradesh. However at an
absolute scale trade unions have declined in their influence over political processes
as well as parties. As Burgess (2004) has pointed out political parties in transitional
economies have strong incentive to renege on their commitments to labour when
in office due to changes industrial production, liberalisation of the economy and
transformations in partisan support as traditional identities become fluid. The
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theme of trade unions and partisan support will be discussed in subsequent
chapters.
4. Trade union and labour flexibility
The discussion on trade unions across the sub-national states in the
context of labour market flexibility presents some interesting outcomes. The
analysis of the different parameters reveals that in general trade unions are on a
decline which in some states (Maharashtra and Gujarat) predates economic
reforms of 1990. The decline in trade unions appears to have gathered pace under
conditions of liberalisation. Thus, any analysis that emphasises on the importance
of labour in the determination of public policy is either largely exaggerated or
contextual. It is necessary to point out that there exists remarkable unanimity
among scholars regarding the weakness of trade unions in India and even the most
vocal critics claim that TU are organisations of small labour aristocracy. According
to the World Labour Report 1997-98, union membership as a percentage of non-
agricultural labour in India declined from 6.6 per cent in 1985 to 5.5 per cent in
1995 and from 26.5 per cent to 22.8 per cent as a percentage of formal sector
workers during the same period.
At a comparative level strength trade unions appear to stronger in West
Bengal, followed by Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat in terms of
organisational strength. The condition of trade union in in West Bengal and
Gujarat corroborates the extent of labour flexibility in the state.
An important variable in determining the extent of trade union influence
appears to be the share of private sector in the economy. The case study reveals
public sector has an significant role in determining the strength of trade unions as
it constitutes the major source of employment in the organised sector and trade
unions are able to exploit the dual position of their employer as monopoly
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provider in services critical to the smooth functioning of the economy and the
enforcer of protective labour legislation (Bhattacharjee 1996). However despite
greater organisation strength and larger public sector compared to Maharashtra,
labour flexibility stands significantly greater in Andhra Pradesh.
The reason for such an outcome i.e. lowers reforms in Maharashtra and
higher reforms in Andhra Pradesh despite stronger trade unionism appear to be
the reform orientation of government. Such an outcome adds to the explanation
suggested in the previous chapter on business influence being determined by
partisan orientation. Historically the alliance of trade unions with political parties
enabled them to play a vital role in shaping political regimes and development
strategies. As such trade union power was determined by political-ideological
dynamics of trade unions and political parties in power. In short even though
strong trade unions impede labour flexibility, the effectiveness of labour to
influence macro outcomes remains dependent on partisan government due to low
levels of organisation and fragmentation. The importance of political factors is
further augmented by the fact that economic structure in terms of public–private
share is a function of broader economic orientation of government.
The importance of wider political dynamics, namely trade union and
political party dynamics is anticipated due to historical institutional antecedents.
The experience of unionism during the colonial rule and subsequent dirigisme
regime after independence significantly shaped trade union behaviour and capacity.
It was during the independence movement that trade unions were absorbed into
the political movements which ensured dominant political interface of trade union
(Shyam Sundar 1996; Sinha 1996). The political linkage of trade unions became
more pronounced with the adoption of state led development strategy where the
government acted paternalistic and the industrial relations relied on government
intervention. As such, trade unions in India emphasised more on state mediated
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solutions rather than collective bargaining. Naturally the linkage between trade
union and party in power emerged as a crucial determinant of union influence.
Structural changes in economy consequent and reorientation of
governments due to political economic reason appear to have significantly altered
the capacity of labour. Firstly the transformations associated with globalisation
such as mobility of capital, transformations in production, technological revolution
and heterogeneity of skills has weakened traditional identity of work as well as
workers. All this has contributed to declining base of traditional trade unions.
Secondly wider political changes such as spread of mass consumer culture, new
social movements, ideological congruity in developmental models and spread of
mass media among others have reduced the control of unions over political
decisions. Thirdly political parties in government are under increased pressures
from emergence of new political alliances to make economy attractive to capital. In
face of increasing difference between political party and union, trade unions have
become increasingly marginalised. However the marginalisation of trade unions has
not been uniform due variations in to party-union relation based on ideological as
well as of instrumental considerations. In the context of selected case study, party–
union relation appears to be largely determined by union membership, extent of
centralisation, representation within political parties, existing legal framework and
nature of the economy (Burgess 2004).
In sum, the discussion on trade unionism in the context of labour
flexibility across the states shows that strength of organised labour movement is
partially responsible for variation in labour flexibility. Such an outcome is in
consonance with the conventional inverse relation between the strength of a trade
union movement and labour market flexibility. However investigating the sources
of trade union strength and influence brings into discussion the wider political
dynamics particularly trade union-party in government relation. Trade unions when
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faced with reformist government appear to be severely restricted. Further greater
representation of trade unionists among institutions of government appears to
contain labour movement and increase flexibility. In this context, the relation
between union, party and government emerge as an important determinant of
reform. Theoretically it can be argued following Burgess (2004) that divergent
response of the unions can be explained by the relative power of the party, ability
of workers to punish labour leaders for disloyal behaviour and the party’s capacity
to act autonomously from its government. The first variable shapes the incentive
for labour leaders to choose sides while second determines whether the party can
prevail over government. In sum trade union influence has a political dimension as
policy distance between government-union, nature of union competition and
institutional factors such as legal prerogatives seem to determine trade union
effectiveness against flexibility.
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Chapter 7
Partisan orientation of government
1. Partisan orientation and public policy
The discussion on trade unions and business show that political parties
have a significant influence on reforms, not only in terms of framing policies when
in government, but also determining relative influence of contending interest
groups. As chapter 5 and 6 show, influence of business and trade unions is
significantly predisposed by their linkages with the party in power. Thus, wider
political dynamics especially political party in power and its interrelation to interest
groups emerges as significant in determining policy outcome.
In literature, the importance of political parties has been theoretically
endorsed from a structural-functional perspective. Political parties constitute a
foundational structure of liberal democracy mediating between the state and
diverse societal interests. Such a role is augmented in transitional countries such as
India due to historical institutional developments of an interventionist state where
government held the reigns of the economy.
This chapter analyses the inter-party and intra-party dynamics across sub-
national states to determine the role of political parties in labour market reform. In
other words, the analysis seeks to explain how certain interests emerge as dominant
at sub-national states leading to definite outcomes. The findings suggest that
partisan orientation has a crucial role in determining relative power of interest
groups and consequently labour policy and outcome. The conclusion broadly
mirrors power resource hypothesis regarding economic-social policies as the nature
of support base of party has a direct correlation to the extent of labour flexibility.
Thus, the argument corroborates the conclusions of chapter 5 of greater labour
market flexibility under regimes with significant representation of business.
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However, as evidenced in Maharashtra, the capacity of an interest group to
emerge as dominant within the support base of a party is conditioned by the
presence or absence of similar politically relevant groups. Hence, partisan
orientation is conditioned by the composition of support base, and specific
interests have a greater chance to persevere when the support base is relatively
homogenous in composition. In short, the presence of interests groups and the
extent of homogeneity of support base determine partisan orientation of
government.
In terms of labour market, the chapter argues that parties with relatively
homogenous socio-economic support base and significant representation of
business promote greater reform and flexibility. Conversely, governments in spite
of business representation often find it difficult to pursue reforms if, the support
base is wide and heterogeneous. Greater labour market flexibility in Andhra
Pradesh and Gujarat can be attributed to governments backed by the support base
characterised by the predominance of business castes. In contrast, the situation in
Maharashtra can be explained through the socio-economically wide support base
of regime parties where business influence although present cannot become
hegemonic. The situation in West Bengal with lower flexibility can similarly be
explained through a regime drawing ideological and political support from non-
business and weaker sections of society.
The divergences in the electoral support base of parties across states are
the product of interlocking interaction between existing social cleavages and
competition amongst parties to enlist social support. In India, historical social
reality and political dynamics have ensured that political aggregation develops
largely along ascriptive lines, which at times create relatively heterogeneous or
homogenous support bases for parties. These divergences in the support base of
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parties shape not only orientation of governments across regimes but also across
states.
At a theoretical level, the finding suggests that political saliency of
economic interests is crucial for determining policy even under conditions of
globalisation. Such an outcome challenges contemporary notions of increasing
irrelevance of governments and politics in economic policy making.
The argument is elaborated in the chapter in the following manner. The
first part briefly deals with the theoretical relation between political party and
public policy, particularly labour market reforms. The second section presents the
argument for partisan orientation in the context of four sub national states under
consideration. The third section lays out the methodology adopted for analysis
with emphasis on ideological and instrumental interests of parties in India. The
fourth section presents the interaction of political parties in power and labour
reforms across the sub-national states. The section presents a descriptive narrative
of the evolution of party system and highlights the distinctive features of party
system across the cases. The concluding section presents the relation between
party in power and extent of flexibility witnessed through distributive and
redistributive pressures emanating from support base of parties.
2. Political party and public policy
The importance of political party and broader political system in the
determination of policy are well acknowledged in the literature. Political parties
reflect and mediate social demands acting as channels of communication between
the state and society. The functions of political parties, such as political
socialisation, electoral mobilisation, agenda setting, formation of governments,
interest representation of sections of society and social integration enable citizens
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to participate effectively in politics and determine distribution as well as
redistribution of resources in society (De Souza 2006; Hasan 2004).
The importance of policy formulation and implementation is magnified in
the labour market. Government has a decisive role in industrial relations and issues
such as disinvestment, deregulation and liberalisation with substantial
consequences for economy and politics. The conventional relation between
political parties and economic-social policies derived from literature reveals two
broad strands of arguments, namely instrumental and ideological arguments. While
instrumentalist logic presupposes the electoral motive of parties as determining the
social and economic agendas of parties, the ideological argument focuses on party
ideology as an explanation for the different policies enacted by the government.
Study of political parties has observed almost universally an alignment of
social cleavages (religion, class, ethnicity, and region) with parties based on
programmatic orientation that is relatively stable. This dissertation considers
ideological and instrumental interests of parties separately in order to ascertain the
causality of policy variation.
2.1 Ideology as a potential explanation
Political Parties in their simplest form are organisations seeking to utilise
the power of the state to pursue certain objectives determined by their ideological
orientation. As such ideology of party in power has had a decisive role in
determining policy. In the context of labour policy, scholars like Esping-Andersen
(1990) and Garrett (2000) have argued a general association of greater state
control, extensive labour market regulation and economic closure with leftist
parties and free market with neo liberal ideology. It is argued that left parties
favour employment growth and expansionary macroeconomic policies while,
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parties to the right of the ideological spectrum prefer to reduce inflation and
budget deficit due to ideological and partisan interests.
The differences in ideological position of political parties affect the choice
of policy and methods to attain socially desirable outcome. For example, parties
with neoliberal economic outlook seek to improve the investment climate and
reduce the budget deficit whereas parties to the left prioritise employment over
budget deficit.
However, ideological explanations for government behaviour have
increasingly come under strain as government across the world appear to be
constrained by global economic considerations. It is argued that governments
increasingly adopt similar policies that expand the scope of markets, empower non
state actors and encourage economic interdependence. The new politics
perspective conceives socio-economic transformations as emanating from changes
of post-industrial society and rejects the relevance of ideology.
Contending the ‘end of ideology’ argument scholars like Korpi (2003)
point out the continued relevance partisan politics as substantial cuts in insurance
programs in OECD countries can be largely explained through partisan
government. He points out that the risk of cuts in social insurance were
significantly lower with left party representation in cabinets and higher for secular
conservative-centrist governments.
2.2 Support base as a potential explanation
Parties not only pursue ideological objectives but are also driven by
instrumental objective of re-election and expansion of support base. Support base
refers to categories of individuals or groups who are relatively stable in their
support for a particular party due to programmatic or other factors. Research on
party system has revealed that stability of the party system is dependent upon
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secure mass base that change rather slowly and despite the wide segment of society
that political parties claim or seek to represent, it is possible to identify some of
dominant support base for parties. This group alignment of parties is crucial as in a
democracies competition among socio-economic groups are manifested through
partisan competition.
Thus, analysis of the social basis of parties can reveal instrumental logic of
party behaviour in the choice of policies. Social groups like business who control
economic resources tend to favour market distribution, but disadvantaged groups
like workers and poor favour to alter economic outcomes through political
redistribution. Naturally the choice of policy is bound to vary if there are
significant differences in the composition of support base of parties.
There exists considerable literature on the politics of reform which focus
on domestic class configuration or social networks. The importance of support
base is reflected in the literature that views reform as an exercise in political ‘blame
avoidance’ (Bonoli 2005, 164). This strand of argument contends that reforms are
attained either through a broad reform coalition to deflect criticism or gradual and
strategically tied packages to divide potential opposition (Williamson 1994).
Similarly, research on public expenditure and taxation in America such as Quinn
and Shapiro (2004) find support for partisanship thesis. Hence government
policies regard reforms can be found to vary according to the nature of socio-
economic support base of the party in power.
It is necessary to point out that there exist broad correspondence between
ideological orientation and nature of support base. The extensive research on party
system has revealed that stability of the party system is dependent upon secure
mass base and party commitments (ideology) that change rather slowly ensuring
stability in the competing balance of parties (Petrocik 1999). Despite such
congruence, this dissertation considers both ideological and instrumental interest
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of parties separately as in the context of economic reforms ideological position of
parties is often unclear. To put simply, the necessity of considering support base
and ideology separately is due to the relative lack of ideological differences
between parties.
3. Determining party behaviour: ideological orientation and support base
To determine the ideological position of parties this research follows the
widely accepted methodology of looking at party manifesto and policy statements.
However, since labour reforms do not feature prominently in policy statements of
most parties, actions of the partisan governments are also considered in the
analysis.
Conventional understanding suggests that left parties are opposed to
globalisation due to their political-ideological dispensation and consequently
oppose labour market flexibility. The ideological distinction among the non-left
parties in matters of reform, however, appears remarkably marginal. Suri (2004a) in
his analysis of 2004 parliamentary elections in India points out that although
economic reforms had been an electoral issue, the differences among main political
parties namely Congress and BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) was regarding
implementation of economic reforms and not against the reforms as such. Political
observers point out that the electoral defeat of the reformist National Democratic
Alliance in 2004 was not a verdict against reform as there is consensus on the
basics of reform between main parties. Interestingly, regional parties like TDP
(Telegu Desam Party) in Andhra Pradesh which opposed economic reforms,
became a champion of reform once in office. As such, ideological distinction
appears to lose its edge under conditions of globalisation when parties are in
government.
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Although structural pressures emanating from economic transformation
are important, such an explanation of government behaviour is limited due to the
non-incorporation of instrumental understanding. In other words, the structural
pressure argument reduces the role of political agency and does not elaborate or
explain how political parties implement reforms that may come into conflict with
their support base. Political parties represent different social interests and
satisfaction of support base demand is a crucial electoral imperative for parties. As
Sinha (2005) points out, parties represent different social cleavages and the party
system are organised along dominant social cleavages in a society. The salience of
such social cleavage is dependent upon the number of factors such as degree of
cross cutting of cleavage in society, social stratification and ideological position of
parties.
In this research, the classification and identification of dominant groups is
based on conventional categorisations of caste and class which according to Heath
(1999) represent the two fundamental aspect of socio-economy in India. Caste is a
hereditary and ascriptive form of stratification which defines communities into
thousands of endogamous hereditary groups called Jatis. According to Hindu
religious texts the Jatis may be categorised into four broad hierarchical varnas;
namely Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, Shudras followed by non-caste
untouchables. According to Beteille (1965) significant characteristics of caste are its
hereditary nature, the pursuit of traditional occupations, hierarchical rank, and
endogamy.
Importantly caste as a hierarchical system of social stratification also has
economic implications. According to Mukherjee (1999: 1760) although jati division
of society is viewed in the realm of 'cultural' relations, such as inter-dining, inter-
marriage, purity-pollution, in economic terms ‘the landlords, traders, moneylenders
belonged essentially to the high castes, the bulk of self-sufficient peasants, small-
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scale artisans, petty traders, belonged to the middle castes and, those at the lowest
echelon such as, the marginal peasants, landless workers, belonged overwhelmingly
to the lowest castes and the tribes. Thus, there exist overlapping correspondence
of caste with class and social groups tend to be largely bound within particular
economic classes in India. Based on empirical evidence with approximately 27,000
respondents Vaid (2012) has found tentative congruence between castes and
classes at the extremes of the caste system and a slight weakening of the relation
over time. She argues a correspondence between manual/non-manual employment
divide, with high castes dominating white-collar work and avoiding manual work
(Vaid 2012).
The discussion on business (chapter 5) also suggests that industrial classes
largely emerge from the traditional trading and business castes and groups with
control over capital or land have been historically concentrated among few castes
(see Srinivas for ideas of dominant caste and entrenched caste). Thus, caste and
class as categories of stratifications share broad congruence at the societal level. As
such analysis of support base in terms of caste configuration broadly highlights the
socio-economic profile of support base of parties.
The determination of support base of party is derived from literature such
as ‘Who Voted for the BJP’ by Chhibber (1997), ‘United Colours of Congress: Social profile
of Congress Voters’ by Heath (1999) and Yadav (2006) which analyse the support
base of parties based on voting in elections. There exist substantial literature on
political parties at the sub-national level such as Palshikar (1996), Suri (2004),
Alivelu (2009) and Shah (2002) that discuss political competition and support base
of parties. In addition, analysis of support base of parties is attempted through the
proxy variable of parliamentarians elected across the states over the period 1980 to
2004. Candidate selection by parties are a reflection of their support base as
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candidates mirror the political belief and share descriptive characteristic similar to
those they represent.
In this context, few clarifications are required regarding the choice of
Member of Parliament in place of Member of State Assembly for sub-national
analysis. Firstly, data on M.P’s is easier to collect given the Lok Sabha Secretariat
publishes list of members titled Who’s Who of Lok Sabha with professional and
other details. Further the number of M.P’s is significantly smaller than M.L.A’s (in
West Bengal 294 MLA and 42 MP) which make collecting and collating data for
four sub-national states over 20 year period more manageable. Finally, M.P’s are
elected through parliamentary elections across all the states largely on the basis of a
national agenda and during parliamentary elections the impact of specific sub-
national variables is of much lower magnitude. As such elected members of
parliament can potentially indicate the relative domination of various social groups
within parties.
4. Labour market flexibility and party in power
The role of political party in economic reforms is much acknowledged in
theoretical as well as commonplace understanding. Most analysis on labour
reforms seems to suggest a prominent role for party in power. Even in the selected
case study, cursory examination suggests a direct relation between ideological
position of government and extent of reform as evidenced from higher labour
flexibility in Gujarat under explicitly reform oriented BJP and lower labour
flexibility in West Bengal governed by an alliance of left parties.
Although party system will be discussed later, it is necessary to mention
that since the 1980’s political competition in the states has been characterised by
continued bipolarisation. In Andhra Pradesh, the main contending political parties
have been the regional Telegu Desam Party (TDP) and the centrist national party
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Indian National Congress (Congress) while in Gujarat political contestation is
between rightist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Congress. West Bengal and
Maharashtra have also been characterised by bipolar political contest, albeit
between stable political alliances. In West Bengal,  the Left Front coalition (a
coalition of left parties with Communist Party of India as the main constituent)
was the ruling party for 34 years with Trinamool Congress (since 1999) acting as
the principal opposition. In Maharashtra since the early 1990’s Congress-NCP
(centrist-regional) and the BJP-Shiv Sena (right-regional) are the main actors
dominating political space.
A study of labour market reforms across the states as well as across
regimes can reflect on the relation between political party in power and reforms. In
this context, two main indicators of the relationship between party and labour
relations are the legislative amendments and policy stance adopted by the
government. Labour law amendments brought by governments and policy
interventions constitute the fundamental method of governmental control. To
analyse labour law amendments brought at the sub-national level the dissertation
replicates the qualitative classification of Besley and Burgess (2004).
7.1 State wise Labour Law Amendments across parties, 1980-2005
State/ party
amendment
Andhra Pradesh Gujarat Maharashtra West
Bengal
Cong(I) TDP Cong(I) BJP Cong(I)
NCP
BJP
Shiv Sena
Left Front
Pro Labour 0 8 0 1 9 0 22
Pro
Employer
0 4 0 3 6 0 0
Source: Authors classification based on P.L. Malik ‘Handbook of Labour and Industrial
Laws’, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 2009
The composite data on labour law amendments, between 1980 and 2005
confirms the conventional analysis of BJP as a pro-reform party and the Left Front
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in West Bengal as a markedly pro-labour regime. The government of Gujarat
under the BJP has sought to relax labour regulation to increase contractual
employment and place termination out of scope of Industrial Disputes. In terms of
labour regulation amendments at the state level, West Bengal has most pro-labour
amendments followed by Andhra Pradesh.
Interestingly, all the pro-labour amendments in West Bengal and Andhra
Pradesh were brought forth by the Left Government and the TDP government in
the 1980’s. Most of the legislations brought forth in Andhra Pradesh were
emulated from the extensive pro labour regulations brought in by the Left Front
Government. In 1980, the Left Front brought 9 pro labour amendments, followed
by 1 in 1983, 3 in 1986-87 and 2 in 1989.  In 1987, the TDP government brought 8
pro labour amendments, but post liberalisation the TDP appears to have
reoriented its position as the party in 2003 brought 4 pro employer amendments
facilitating labour flexibility.
In contrast, the Congress regime in Maharashtra is marked by both pro
worker and pro employer amendments since the 1980’s. Although during the
1980’s pro-labour amendments dominate, since liberalisation increasingly pro
employer legislations were brought forward to increase flexibility of labour market.
Notably, both pro-labour and pro-employer legislations brought by the Congress
party reflect a pattern of balanced legislation whereby the government sends
signals to both employers and employees about its concerns. For example,
significant flexibility in labour market was introduced in in 2006 by expanding the
definition of contract labour, but at the same time the definition of worker in
terms of wage was also expanded.
The data on labour law amendments suggest that BJP governments have
been at the fore front of labour market flexibility while left governments accord
significant protection to labour. However, the situation in Maharashtra and Andhra
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Pradesh present a somewhat complicated picture as the government under the
Congress, and the TDP appears to favour flexibility, but the extent and orientation
varies. Also, in terms of operation of the labour market, the data suggests that
flexibility is comparatively lower in West Bengal and Maharashtra than Gujarat and
Andhra Pradesh.
Another proxy measure to evaluate the role of parties in labour market
flexibility is through government policy towards trade unions and issues of
privatisation. As pointed out in chapter 6 the clout of trade unions in India is
significantly determined by political dynamics, particularly party-TU linkage and
extent of public sector in the economy. In this context, measure of distance
between trade unions and government are the extent of disputes in the public
sector and government attitude to privatisation. Interestingly, interviews with trade
unions across the spectrum, especially INTUC (closely affiliated with Congress)
and BMS (closely connected to BJP) revealed increasing inability to influence the
government. The Left trade unions particularly in respect of West Bengal also
pointed out the same but approached the issue from a wider dynamics of structural
compulsions thrust upon by globalisation. However, the extent of public sector
disputes, as expected, is least under left regime and most when a significant trade
union confronts a decidedly reformist government.
Quantitatively the issue of party attitude towards flexibility can be assessed
with reference to policies of privatisation and disinvestment. As discussed in the
previous chapter privatisation or attitude towards privatisation has consequences
for power of labour as well as determination of wages and work conditions.
The data on public sector reforms reveals that Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat
have sought to undertake significant restructuring of the public sector as compared
to West Bengal and Maharashtra.
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7.2. Stare wise comparative picture of Public Sector Reform as on 2003
No. of state
public sector
undertakings
No. of state
public sector
privatised
Percentage of
public sector
reform
No. of workers
in state public
enterprises
Andhra Pradesh 128 13 67 150,965,000
Gujarat 50 3 48 94,967,000
Maharashtra 66 0 20 230,578,000
West Bengal 82 10
(public-private partnership)
15 153,071,000
Source: Uba, K. (2008). "Labour Union Resistance to economic liberalisation in India."
Asian Survey 48(5): 860–884.
The data provides evidence of ideological orientation of government as
Andhra Pradesh, and Gujarat have proceeded with significant public sector
restructuring while Maharashtra and West Bengal seem to proceed relative
cautiously on the issue.
Based on the data it becomes clear that the conventional explanation of
variation through governing parties explains the situation in West Bengal and
Gujarat. However, such an explanation cannot account for the relative variations
in flexibility across Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. Moreover, explanations
based on party in government cannot account for the sub-national variation across
same political party, as reflected in Congress party across Maharashtra and Andhra
Pradesh. In the former, the Congress regime appears cautious about reforms, but
in the latter, the party is significantly pro-reform. As such, it is necessary to
consider in detail the ideological and instrumental interest of parties across sub-
national states to determine the exact causality.
4.1 Ideological imperatives as an explanation for variation
The left parties are most consistent with their ideological opposition to
globalisation. The political-ideological report of 18th Party Conference of CPI (M)
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in 2005 argues that globalisation is a natural development of capitalism brought
about by the concentration of capital and need for subsequent investment for
profits. As such the process leads to jobless growth with deteriorating job security
and service conditions. The party is opposed to deregulation of labour market and
public sector enterprises. The party favours social control over the economy and
the party document explicitly states that closure or retrenchment decisions must be
taken by the government with the full confidence of the workers and the
management (Communist Party of India (Marxist) 2005).
In contrast, the parties such as Congress, BJP and TDP appear to have
reconciled to economic liberalism. Analysing the economic policy of the Congress
party from policy document, titled ‘An Expanding Economy - A Just Society - Freedom
from Hunger and Unemployment’ (Congress 2004) it becomes clear that the party has
modified its economic policies from socialist pattern of society to economic
liberalism. The official party statement argues that ‘Congress policies were modified in
response to the changing worlds of ‘50s and ‘60s to the ‘70s and then to the ‘80s and more
dramatically in the ‘90s’. The party believes in the potential of economic liberalism
for increased growth (‘we can grow at a high rate leading up to ten per cent a year and abolish
unemployment, abolish poverty, hunger, illiteracy and ensure universal coverage of primary health
care throughout the country, in the next ten years’) but with a strong emphasis on social
development (‘at the same time we can make our farmers prosper, and build capacities of our
dalits, backward classes, tribals and underprivileged minorities to secure greater opportunities and
be enriched, and empower our women’). The Congress party prides itself as the party
responsible for substantial reorientation of economic policies to further the
objectives of economic growth along with social justice. Congress opposition to
BJP on the issue of reforms is not so much in terms of content as in terms of
implementation. The Congress policy document suggests that the BJP government
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does not qualify for any characteristics of successful reforms due to lack of clarity
and commitment to reform. As the document states, ‘unlike the Congress, the BJP had
neither the heritage of modernising India, nor of championing the all-round progress of the economy
that benefited all cross-sections of our people’. Thus, in terms of labour market flexibility
the party programme suggests a balance between requirements of capital and social
needs of the marginalised including labour.
The BJP although critical of reforms undertaken by the Congress is an
advocate of free economy and consequently support economic reforms. According
to the BJP, the economic policy of state led development rendered Indian industry,
services and agriculture non-competitive and disadvantaged. The party had been a
critic of socialist pattern of development and planning urging for a liberal
economic regime. As the BJP policy statement states that the party is ‘opposed the
inefficient State capitalism that came about as a result of the collusion between the politicians,
bureaucrats and businessmen and was promoted at the cost of entrepreneurial classes’.
Interestingly the party appears critical of liberalisation introduced during 1990’s by
the Congress government as surrendering to foreign interests and reorients its
position vis-à-vis the Congress as the party of indigenous capital espousing
Swadeshi (national companies) against foreign companies. Notably, the BJP is not
opposed to liberalisation as such but argues for a particular brand of liberalisation
where Indian interests would be protected. The criticism of the Congress
economic policy primarily stems from internationalisation of the economy and BJP
calls for calibrated globalisation. In terms of economy policy, the party seems to
adhere to liberal economics with emphasis on fiscal rectitude, moderate inflation,
credit availability to industry and disinvestment of the public sector. Such an
attitude of the party is also reflected in their policy towards industry and labour
where the party emphasises relaxation of labour laws and a healthy capital market
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with the objectives of increasing capital investment in the corporate sector
(Bharatiya Janata Party 2010)
Unlike the national parties, the ideological position on different issues for
regional party like TDP is rather confined. Interestingly the issue of labour and
labour regulations does not form any significant part of party objective. There is a
superficial mention of labour in the manifesto with emphasis on development of
the informal sector and public sector employees. A survey of the TDP policy
documents suggests that issues of cultural nationalism, agriculture, rural
development, health, and poverty alleviation through state support constitute the
main policy priorities of the party. Issues such as women empowerment, pucca
houses to the poor, rice at Rs. 2 per kg, clothes to the poor at half the price and
centre-state relations have a significant space in party objectives. Thus, the policy
orientation of the TDP as far as the stated objectives reveals emphasis on
comprehensive and integrated rural development, welfare, social justice with
emphasis on backward castes and good governance. As the election manifesto of
2009 states since its inception in 1982, the TDP has provided a lion's share in
welfare and development activities to the weaker sections and backward classes. In
1987, TDP created history in rendering social justice to the BC's by giving 20%
reservation to local bodies, 27% in the public sector jobs (Telegudesam Party
2009).
Survey of stated ideological position of political parties reveals that except
for the left parties, labour or workers do not constitute any decisive ideological
category. The Congress party and TDP manifestos reveal a distinct concern for
socially marginalised groups addressed through state mediated social welfare
programmes. The BJP, on the other hand, appears to rely more on market forces
for the overall welfare and favours liberal market model. As such, it can be inferred
that labour market flexibility will be significantly higher in states ruled by the BJP
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and lower in Left party ruled state. However the position of centrist parties such as
Congress and TDP remain inconclusive from such a textual analysis. Moreover,
often policy stance of parties is found to vary between in office and out of office
situation owing to political and administrative exigencies. As such, it becomes
necessary to probe deeper into the relation between labour market reforms and
political party in power. Evident from the discussion on reforms across partisan
government is the sub-national difference between parties that reflect on the
limitations of ideological explanation.
Thus, it may be instructive to investigate the instrumental interests of
political parties based on their support base. The argument of socio-economic
class bias in reforms has also been corroborated in literature such as Mooij (2005)
which points to the importance of support base of parties.
4.2 Socio-Economic Support Base of Parties
To explain the relative variation in government attitude towards labour
flexibility, it is imperative to move beyond the simple unilinear explanation and
focus on the instrumental logic of party behaviour. The instrumental interest of a
party is to satisfy demands of the support base and expand support base due to
electoral considerations. The construction of the social base is dependent on pre-
existing social cleavages and political contestation. Scholars like Brass (1984) and
Manor (2002) have pointed out that formation of ethnic identity among any social
group is not automatic but the product of actions taken by elites and favourable
conditions arising from the political and economic environments. However once
they crystallise they appear to take a life of own.
As discussed in the theoretical section parties with business castes as a
dominant constituency in support base facilitate greater labour market reforms.
However the influence of business castes within the party in contingent upon the
203
broader support base i.e. existence of other numerically significant castes. As such
parties with relatively homogenous dominant support base with the presence of
business promote greater reform. Conversely if, the support base is wide and
heterogeneous, governments in spite of business representation often find it
difficult to pursue reforms due to the contradictory pressures from support base.
The argument stem from a broader logic relating to pressures on government from
diverse constituents and parties with relatively homogenous social support find it
easier to frame policies because of the relative absence of contradictory demands
emanating from support base. When the socio-economic support base of
government is wide, concerns of redistribution and welfare tend to dominate
exerted by disparate social support base.
The creation of socio-economically homogenous or heterogeneous support
base is the product of peculiar pre-existing social cleavage of caste that has broad
correspondence with economic position. In other words, the prevalence of caste as
a prominent cleavage and party strategy of group alignment according to caste in
specific cases lead to regimes with relatively homogenous support base with
business orientation. In such a support base, the dominant social groups have
largely similar economic and social profile enabling the party to pursue policies
unhindered by contradictory social pressures.
This dissertation argues that Andhra Pradesh, and Gujarat have had greater
labour market flexibility as the parties in government (Congress, TDP in Andhra
Pradesh and BJP in Gujarat) have significant business presence within relatively
homogenous social base of support. The relatively lower extent of flexibility in
West Bengal can also be attributed to the support base of non-business and
marginalised classes. In West Bengal, the support base of the regime is significantly
concentrated amongst the rural populace, farmers, workers which enables the
government to pursue pro poor, pro worker agenda. Maharashtra provides the
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most intriguing situation where pro-reform governments in spite of business
presence proceed gradually with reform due to the wide and heterogeneous
support base.
The elaboration of the case study across the states and over time reaffirms
the arguments and reveals that extent of labour flexibility can be explained through
the socio-economic support basis of the regimes. Based on the data the chapter
presents state wise analysis of support base of regimes across the sub-national
states.
4.2.1 Andhra Pradesh
The high levels of labour market flexibility in the state, particularly since
liberalisation, can potentially be explained with reference to the nature of dominant
support base of the two main contending parties in the state namely Congress
party and Telegu Desam party. Contextualising the extent of labour market
flexibility with political developments in the state we can identify certain
underlying trends.
The period from 1978-1983 marked the last phase of Congress domination
in the state which came to an end with the surprise electoral victory of TDP. The
TDP regime witnessed a secular rise in wage share, which reached its peak in 1987-
88 from a low of 28.15 percent in 1982-83, and eight pro labour regulations.
However, the wage share began to decline, and labour flexibility appeared
to increase during 1989 which coincided with the election of Congress
government. The period 1989 to 1994 witnessed a secular decline in wage share.
The period between 1994 -2004 witnessed the return of TDP to power,
with the unceremonious removal of NT Rama Rao and election of Chandrababu
Naidu as the party leader. During this decade long TDP rule, wage share appears
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to decrease, along with the enactment of pro employer legislations. In short labour
flexibility appears to increase.
As such one can broadly identify Congress regimes with increasing
flexibility and the first TDP government under NTR with decreasing labour
flexibility. However the rule of TDP under Chandrababu Naidu since 1994 has
been marked with increasing flexibility and policy realignment towards significant
labour reforms.
Evidently such variation in flexibility across regimes cannot be explained
through ideological position and points to the role of dominant socio-economic
support base of regimes.
Politics in Andhra Pradesh has been conventionally analysed in terms of
the dominant castes (Kohli 1988; Roy 2007). Analysing the political economy of
the state one can identify that after the green revolution in the 1970s, particularly
in the fertile region of the state, there was the emergence of agriculture turned
industrial class along with an urban educated middle class (Alivelu 2009). However
peculiar to the state, the emergent agriculturist turned industrial class was largely
dominated by few castes, notably Reddis and Kammas and partially Kapu
(Backward Caste).
In the political scheme of things the Reddis, the landowning and industrial
caste, dominated the Congress although the support base of the party was broad
catch-all. In terms of electoral mobilisation, the Congress relied heavily on the
patronage network based on a stable alliance of Reddis and Scheduled castes. As
long as the Congress also had the support of the backward castes, it could win
elections, but as many backwards moved away from the Congress, its electoral
hold on Andhra became precarious (Kohli 1988). Thus, the Congress government
had a wide support base that included economically and politically dominant
Reddis, scheduled castes, tribes and significant sections of the rural population.
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Such a wide and disparate social support base for the Congress meant competing
claims on the government, and while the interests of dominant industrial and
agrarian elites were preserved, the government symbolically catered to the weaker
sections of support base.
Since 1991, the economic policy orientation of Congress changed with
liberalisation which suited the dominant industrial interests and also made the
party ideologically and politically committed to reform. Such a change coincided
with the reorganisation of Congress support base during the 1990 which
comprised of economically-dominant Brahmins, Reddis and Vysyas, and
Scheduled castes (Srinivasulu 1999). The reorganisation of the Congress support
base was facilitated by changes in the party system characterised by the emergence
of TDP.
The impact of TDP governments on labour flexibility across the period
represents varying outcome. The first TDP government under NTR was marked
by significant gains for organised labour. However the TDP governments
subsequently in 1994 and 1999 were marked by a sharp decline in wage share and
implementation along with legislative changes to increase labour market flexibility.
Analysis of the socio-economic support base of TDP significantly explains
the variations in policy change. According to Kohli (1988) the decline of the
Congress and rise of TDP in the state could be traced to the rising caste conflict
between the Kammas and the Reddis and the increasing disenchantment of the
backwards castes during the decade of 1970s. Although the Kammas, a market
related rich peasant class proved to be enterprising by modernising agriculture and
diversifying into non agrarian sectors, they did not find commensurate share in
political power within Congress Party and as such sought to reorient themselves
with the TDP (Alivelu 2009).
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Although stylistic, such an argument is simplistic as Kammas do not
constitute a numerically large caste in the state. Rather the emergence of TDP
could be identified with the coalition between the Kammas and the numerically
large peasant and backward castes (OBCs) who reacted against the pro dalit
programmes of the Congress. Suri (2004b) has pointed out that along with kamma-
backward caste alliance, tensions between the national and regional bourgeoisie
who supported the TDP, and rise of new educated middle class elites aided the rise
of TDP. The economically dominant Kamma caste along with educated middle
class formed the backbone of TDP support. That is why the emergence of TDP
during early 1980s marks a sharp increase in the representation of business and
professionals among elected representatives.
Before liberalisation, the TDP reflected the dominant interests of the
regional bourgeoisie, agrarian backward castes and urban middle class which
particularly supported the welfare state. Given the TDP had a regionalist appeal in
telegugauravam or Telegu pride in its discourse, it sought to create a broad
platform that stressed on twin theme of populism and regional nationalism. The
opposition to Congress party both at the state and the centre contributed to a
political stance that highlighted centre-state disputes and welfarism aimed at overall
development. Although the TDP portrayed itself as a party of the poor and
deprived, its dominant support comprised of the Kammas- the emergent regional
agrarian and industrial interest, urban middle class and agrarian backward castes.
However by the early 1990s (liberalisation) the dominant sections within
the TDP, particularly the regional industrial class and the middle class reoriented
its policy priorities towards reform. The rise of Chandrababu Naidu within TDP
was the most apparent sign of such a transformation. Observers of Andhra politics
point out that the shift in leadership signified a wider social contestation where the
business classes played a crucial role. Scholars like Suri (2004b) and Roy (2007)
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point that Naidu represented the business interests and ushered policy realignment
by discarding populist policies of NTR. The TDP became downright reform
oriented and sought removal of subsidies, privatisation, reduction in welfare
expenditure, deregulation which catered to the dominant interests. Importantly this
shift was possible due to the congruity of interests in the support base which also
explains the significant increase in labour flexibility since 1994 under TDP rule.
Thus, the variations in labour flexibility over time and across governments
appear to be a product of the political context and the social basis of the parties. In
Andhra Pradesh, the dominant support base of both Congress and TDP appear
pro-reform which explains the secular increase in flexibility across regimes. Heath
(1999) points out the social basis of Congress and TDP cannot be clearly
distinguished in terms of social and economic categories. The discussion on
business in chapter 5 of the dissertation also points out relatively greater influence
of business in Andhra Pradesh. This domination of business in politics is aided by
the relative lack of difference in party support base.
7.3 Support base derived from caste and party affiliation of MPs, 1980-2004
Source: Authors calculation based on Who’s Who of Lok Sabha published by Lok Sabha
secretariat
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Evident from the data is the similarity between the support base of the
parties and domination of Kammas, Reddis and Kapu (BC) in politics of the state
and the high representation of business castes. The social basis of both Congress
party and TDP parties reflects the domination of reddis and kammas in terms of
caste composition as well as business as an explicit economic interest.
Comparatively the TDP support base is relatively more homogenous than that of
the Congress leading to greater reform orientation of the party since liberalisation.
The relative differences in the spread of the castes among support base of parties
explain the differences in flexibility observed across regimes. In short, relatively
homogenous support base with business representation of TDP compared to the
Congress explains greater reforms under TDP regime.
4.2.2 Gujarat
The state of Gujarat presents an intriguing situation as labour flexibility
appears to be independent of economic reforms and increasing flexibility can be
identified since the early 1980s. Analysing the situation in labour market in
conjunction with political developments it can be seen that wage share declines
from around a high of 31 percent in 1982 to 23 percent in the 1990. This period
coincided with Congress party rule in the state after a brief non-congress
government in the state.
In the year 1990, a coalition of Janata Party and BJP removed Congress
party from government and since 1995; the state has seen consecutive BJP
governments with explicit pro reforms orientations. The election of BJP appears to
be correlated with labour flexibility as substantial decline in wage share from
around 20 percent to 12 percent and secular increase in contractual workers can be
identified since 1995. In terms of state level amendments to labour laws, there was
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one pro labour amendment in 1972 and one in 2004 while there were three pro
employer amendments in 2004. Thus, Gujarat has been characterised by a
continuous increase in labour flexibility during the entire period across political
regimes.
Analysis of labour market flexibility is Gujarat reveals a trajectory of
capitalist development that is somewhat inconsistent with mainstream Indian
political economy. The sustained business friendly policies of the state can be
explained through the particular configuration of support base that has enabled
domination of regional bourgeoisie in politics.
The party system in Gujarat has broadly followed a two party competition
except for a brief period during 1970s. Till 1975 the Congress was the dominant
party in the state with impressive political organisation bolstered by the legacy of
the independence movement. In terms of support base, the Congress during 1960-
1975 drew on support from all castes and classes specifically the new class of
capitalist farmers who later turned into industrial class (Patidar), the artisan –trader
(Bania) class and the backward castes (Sinha 2005). According to Sinha (2005) the
pro-development coalition of upper castes, agrarian capitalists and disenfranchised
social groups created the institutional frameworks for industrial development of
the state. All of these groups acquired political and economic stakes in the rapid
expansion of labour intensive industrialisation. The process was facilitated by the
near complete hegemony of the ideologically positions between centrist and centre
of right parties, the prominence of Gandhian ideology of alliance between capital
and labour and dominance of regional bourgeoisie in politics.
After the split of the Congress, in 1971 the caste coalition also broke down
as Patels remained with the old Congress and later support Janata Party. The
Congress (I) in a strategy of mobilisation developed the KHAM coalition of
backwards castes, namely Kshatriya, Harijan, Adivasis and Muslims to counter the
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dominance of Bania-Brahman-Patels. Thus, the socio-economic support base of
the two parties became largely homogenous and broadly resembled the dominant
social cleavages. Interestingly the Congress regime based on support of the
economically and educationally backwards sections was also marked by increasing
labour flexibility. Scholars like Breman (2002) and Shah (2002) have carefully
documented the decline of organised textile industry in the state during Congress
rule. Thus, the Congress government exhibited a pro-business attitude even when
the official economic policy was based on mixed economy and support base was
primarily among backward castes.
Such an approach of the Congress party, according to Sinha (2005) was
due to the benefits of dispersed industrial growth that provided crucial revenue for
the government and employment for the masses. Although insightful, such an
argument is partial, as it ignores the conscious neglect of labour in the state and
considers developmental strategy as a ‘class neutral project based on enlightened
self-interest’. Any comprehensive analysis of developmental strategy pursued by
Congress party should consider the historical dominance of business or capital
within Congress.
The data on composition of Members of Parliament reveals that even
though the electoral base of Congress was based on marginalised sections, patidar-
patels remained a significant influence within the party. However, given the
specificity of dominant social basis of the Congress party, the government sought
to address the demands of its homogenous social base of socio-economically
marginalised through caste reservations for the Other Backward Castes (Wood
1984). Such an attempt to address social redistribution without affecting the
growth framework was also due to ideological position of Congress that
emphasised on caste cleavages at the cost of class.
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The change in the political situation in 1990 with the election of Janata-
BJP coalition signalled the political re-emergence of the socially and economically
dominant Brahmin-Bania-Patidar coalition (Shah 2007). The support base of
government acquired a firm upper class-upper caste concentration that
consolidated the interests of the professional class, agrarian and industrial
capitalist. Such an assertion is supported by electoral statistics that show BJP
support is concentrated among upper castes, middle and upper classes and weakest
among Muslims and underprivileged (Heath 2002).
The extent of labour flexibility appears to increase through the period as
the government sought to identify itself with pro-reform business friendly image.
Chhibber (1997) has pointed out the BJP support in the 1990s can be attributed to
its ability to forge a coalition between majority religious community and middle
classes and traders. It was a programmatic shift which enabled the BJP to gamer
the support of the middle classes, who were 'mobilisable' because of their growing
disaffection with the political and economic policies pursued by the Congress
party. Such a support base has implied fewer contradictory demands from support
base, and ability as well as pressure on the government to implement reforms.
7.4 Support base derived from caste and party affiliation of MPs, 1980-2004
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The graphical representation on caste composition of MP’s suggests that
BJP and Congress party are marked by differences in support base. The major
support for the BJP emerges from Brahmins, Patel, Kshatriya and Kayastha. The
Brahmin-Patel-Kayastha (Bania) constitutes the regional bourgeoisie of the state.
In contrast, the Congress although marked by significant presence of Patels and
Brahmins, is dominated by Kshatriya castes with a larger presence of Ahirs,
Charans and SC-ST who constitute socio-economically marginalised sections.
As such, relatively heterogeneous support base of the Congress with
significant representation of Patel and Brahmins meant increasing labour flexibility
over the period. The relatively homogeneous support base of BJP marked by the
dominance of Patel-Brahmin-Kayastha and peripheral presence of marginal castes
has translated into a vigorous reformist regime.
An important question in this regard is the absence of redistributive
pressures on the government as it pursues the interest of the dominant socio-
economic sections. Although it cannot be denied that industrialisation and
economic growth have had benefits, social and economic disparity or deprivation
has not vanished. According to Mahadevia development in the state has been
highly uneven in terms of regions, sectors and social groups, and while certain
sections of the population have benefited and become more prosperous, others
have been marginalised (Mooij 2005). The concern for redistributive demands is
essential in the context of discussion on labour as issues of wage and work
condition can potentially be part of such demands. Importantly the lack or absence
of labour issues in the political discourse of Gujarat appears even more remarkable
given the expansion of industrialisation.
A potential reason may be the historical weakness of left parties in the
state. The importance of ideological concerns cannot be undermined as political
competition has been between centrist and centre of right in the state. The main
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political parties in Gujarat, even the Congress, has had pro industry, pro capital
orientation given historical dominance of capital in the state. The relative lack of
public sector investments vis-à-vis private sector since independence was a
conscious policy of Gujarat government to further strengthen private capital.
With the rise of BJP, the demands of the disaffected sections of society
and social tensions have increasingly coalesced into a majority-minority communal
discourse which mutes social groups like tribal, gender, and labour. According to
Shah (2007) the anti-reservation riots during 1985 were the crucial point when BJP
began to reap the rewards of its mobilisation strategy as caste agitation against
reservation transformed into religious riots. Mahadevia (2005) points out the rise
of communalism and economic reforms appear to reinforce each other in Gujarat
as the two projects are similar in certain respects. The right wing authoritarian style
of governance has been helpful in implementing reforms, retaining power in the
state and muting redistributive pressures.
4.2.3 Maharashtra
Maharashtra potentially presents the most intriguing case in terms of
politics of labour market as it has been one of the foremost states in terms of
economic growth and attracting investments and yet labour market flexibility
remains relatively low, particularly compared to Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh.
The data reveals that flexibility measured in terms of wage share remains
more or less stable until 1984-85 which then declines secularly, especially after the
widespread closure of textile mills during 1982. The data on implementation like
other states witnesses a steady decline since 1991-92 with the onset of
liberalisation. Although the proportion of contractual workers in Maharashtra is
lower than Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, it has registered a sharp increase since
1998-99. In terms of labour regulation, there have been a significant number of
215
state level amendments. Till mid 1980’s most amendments were broadly pro-
labour, but recent amendments have been towards increased flexibility as 3 pro-
employer amendments were ratified against 1 pro-labour.
Correlating the developments in labour market and policy with political
developments, we find that the Congress regime before 1985 increased legislative
protection accorded to labour and market condition remains stable in terms of
flexibility. However, labour flexibility appears to increase since mid-1980s, which
seems to have been the combined effect of partial liberalisation, industrial
restructuring in the state and changing orientation of the government.
The period between 1985 and 1990 marked the immediate aftermath of the
Bombay Textile Mill strike which challenged the hegemony of the Congress led
Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Union and given its transformative potential was dealt
strictly by the Congress government often with intimidation and repression
(Omvedt 1983). Broadly, this period was a watershed in labour politics of the state
as it marked the emaciation of organised trade unions and paved the way for
industrial restructuring. Since economic liberalisation in 1991, the extent of
flexibility appears to increase in Maharashtra.
The 1990s witnessed the rise of Shiv Sena (SS) as a state wide political
force and BJP-SS coalition came to power in 1995. During the period, both wage
share and extent of contractual workers continues to decline, and labour law
implementation marked a sharp drop. The increased flexibility during this regime,
however, does not correspond to expectations in terms of quantitative increase
associated with an explicitly pro reformist government as in Gujarat.
The pace and extent of reform in Maharashtra (lower compared to
economically similar Gujarat) can be partially explained through the socio-
economic basis of support for the parties in government. Since politics in the state,
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in so far as the formation of government is concerned, has been dominated by the
Congress party, it is useful to begin the analysis with Congress.
The pre-eminence of the Congress party in the state was based on an
alliance between numerically dominant Maratha-Kunbi caste- traditional middle
peasant agrarian section and non-Brahmin non-dalit castes politically enumerated
as bahujan-samaj (Palshikar 1999). However the Congress government also sought
to accommodate the interests of socially dominant Brahmins and urban industrial
interests because of two reasons, namely the historic importance of industrial-
capital in the economy of the state and the Maratha leadership did not enjoy
hegemonic support like Bania-Patidar-Brahmin alliance in Gujarat. Thus, the
socio-economic basis of support for the Congress was dominated by the agrarian
Maratha-kunbi caste but in terms of scope it was wide consisting of diverging
interests and claims. The historic presence of industrial capital and organised
labour in the state along with a large number of oppositional parties meant the
governments had to make periodic symbolic gestures towards different
constituencies.
In terms of labour market, such a situation meant protection of some
labour interest vis-à-vis capital as reflected through the labour law amendments
and stable wage share during 1980-85. The Congress government sought to
maintain its support base by assuaging redistributive demands of wide and
heterogeneous support base through caste reservations and development boards
for backward areas. Like Gujarat, the ideological predisposition of the Congress
party significantly influenced the outlook towards redistributive demands from the
society. The historic presence of public sector, organised labour and dominance of
congress trade unions, largely through legislative measures also implied some
protection for labour.
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However, the decline of the textile industry and policy of partial
liberalisation of the Congress since mid-1980s meant significantly reduced strength
of organised labour and ascendency of industrial-urban interests. According to
Palshikar (1999) the increased importance of the industrial sector in the state
economy meant agrarian interests became less effective than before which had
implications for public policy. During the period 1985-95, the decline in wage
shares along with increasing labour flexibility which can be attributed to economic
liberalisation and changed policy orientation of the government. However the
Congress government with relatively wide and heterogeneous support base
consisting of industrial and agrarian elites, middle peasants, other backward castes,
rural poor and minorities adopted a gradualist approach despite developments
favouring flexibility.
Interestingly contrary to expectation the election of BJP-Shiv Sena
government in 1995 did not lead to an increase in the pace of labour reforms.
Heath (1999) has pointed out the support base of BJP emerges primarily from
upper castes and industrial and urban professional classes and as such the party is
more reform oriented. Similarly, Palshikar (1999) has pointed out that ascendency
of BJP-Shiv Sena marked the emergence of upper castes, urban middle class in the
political sphere hitherto dominated by agrarian middle peasantry. Such an alliance
has been the bedrock of support for reformist governments and hence the pace of
reforms in Maharashtra should have gathered pace. The explanation for relatively
gradual and slow reform under BJP-SS government lies in the composition of the
social basis of support of Shiv Sena which is the bigger partner in the alliance.
The social basis of Shiv Sena is relatively wide as it built upon groups
disenchanted with the Congress such as OBCs and sections of Maratha-Kunbi
castes (Palshikar 1996). As such, the support base of the BJP-Shiv Sena is only
marginally homogeneous than that of Congress-NCP.  Analysing the social base of
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the parties during 1990s Heath (1999) points out that in general Congress voters
are less well off than BJP-Shiv Sena voters although the difference is much less
than direct Congress-BJP contest. This explains the BJP-Shiv Sena government
policy of liberalisation which was aimed at the industrial and urban interests but
balanced by populist slogans for the urban poor.
The support base of the parties based on caste composition of Members of
Parliament during 1980-2004 reinforces the argument.
7.5 Support base derived from caste and party affiliation of MPs, 1980-2004
Evident from the data on members of Parliament is the absolute
domination, in terms of representation of Maratha-Kunbi caste in the politics of
the state particularly within the Congress party. The support base of the Congress
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is heterogeneous with significant representation from Lingayat, Mali, Brahmins,
Kshatriya, Muslims and Scheduled Castes. The upper castes largely concentrated
among urban and professional classes also have sizeable representation in the state.
Quite expectedly, the upper caste and urban representation is greater within the
BJP compared to Congress. Such a heterogeneous support base meant that
industrial interests within the Maratha caste could not emerge as hegemonic. In
contrast, the support base of the BJP-Shiv Sena depends largely on Brahmins and
Maratha-Kunbi. However, as pointed out the Shiv Sena also derives support from
marginal castes such as Dhangar and Mali which provide the alliance greater
heterogeneity.
Thus, Maharashtra present a picture where labour market flexibility has
increased over the years across regimes; however, the increase has not been as
pronounced as Gujarat and labour enjoy relatively better position in terms of wage
and legislative protection. An important feature of the state is the relatively low
levels of divergence in labour flexibility across the regimes. Such a congruity can be
attributed to the wide and heterogeneous support base of regime parties. The
electoral relevance of agrarian castes and the wide and heterogeneous support base
of parties have meant contradictory interests and claims on the government
ensuring gradual and slow reforms.
4.2.4 West Bengal
The situation in West Bengal is distinct from all the other states as the state
has been ruled continuously for 34 years by the Left Front- an alliance of left
parties with pro-labour, pro-poor agenda. As a government dominated by
Communist Party of India (Marxist), the condition of labour in terms of flexibility
is expected to be comparatively better than other states and the data on flexibility
confirms such an understanding.
220
The data reveals that till 1991, the wage share appears relatively stable
touching of high of 50 percent of the net value added. In terms of regulation, the
state has the maximum number of pro-labour regulations largely formulated after
the election of Left Front in 1977. The case of West Bengal appears to vindicate
the conventional understanding of pro-labour and pro poor agenda of left parties.
However after economic liberalisation particularly since 1991 a sharp break in the
extent of flexibility can be observed as wage share declines drastically along with an
upward trend for contractual workers. Although the extent of flexibility in West
Bengal is one of the lowest in India, the increasing trend and overall industrial
decline poses some difficult and pertinent questions about the interaction of policy
autonomy under conditions of globalisation.
The political dynamics in West Bengal has evolved a separate rhythm of
party competition distinct from national trajectory as Congress hegemony was
challenged in the state, and first non-Congress government was formed as early as
1967. An important feature of politics in the state has been the domination of the
social and political space by the Bhadralok community. The Bhadralok literally
meaning well-mannered person is a term originally used to denote the new class
who arose during colonial times and largely confined to members of the upper and
middle classes and castes of Bengal. The Bhadralok as a cultural construct
attributes economic and social privilege on to caste ascendancy most, though not
all belong to upper castes, mainly brahmins, kayastha and intermediate castes
(mahisya, baidya).
According to Sinha (2005) this near complete domination of bhadralok
community meant that industrial elites were precluded from the political scheme of
the state. The social position of the bhadralok, in the urban governmental
professions and middle class status with the legacy of cultural renaissance,
nationalist fervour and Marxism induced ideas significantly radicalised the
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ideational discourse in the state. Naturally, business as a class and liberal capitalist
model of development has been held suspect in the political dynamics of the state.
The overall milieu of the state explains the dominance of pro-labour and pro-social
justice discourse in the politics of the state which has been reinforced by the Left
political forces (Sinha 2005).
Evident from the data is the near complete domination of bhadralok
community in political representation i.e. Brahmins, Kayastha, Mahisya (middle
caste). In fact, the only significant difference between the competing parties is in
greater support of marginal castes for the left front and muslims for the opposition
Congress-TMC.
7. 6 Support base derived from caste and party affiliation of MPs, 1980-2004
Source: Authors calculation based on Who’s Who of Lok Sabha published by Lok Sabha
secretariat
The emergence of the Left parties in the state as a dominant political force
was largely through land movements in the rural sphere and radical labour
movements in the urban industrial sector. The social basis of support for the left
regime has largely been based on the alliance between industrial proletariat, urban
middle class-poor and the rural peasantry specifically middle peasants, small
farmers and landless labour (Chaudhuri, 1987). Thus given the ideological
orientation of left parties and their support base amongst the weaker sections of
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society particularly labour and agrarian peasantry; the condition of labour and rural
peasantry improved significantly.
Development in the context of labour flexibility reveals that wage share
during 1980-85 was exceptionally high and state support towards labour translated
into a number of pro-labour legislations. The Left Front government could pursue
such a pro-labour policy due to the homogenous basis of its social support
coherent. Analysis of the election result during the 1990s reveals that in terms of
class support the Congress draws support from socially and economically
privileged in its contest with the left. The percentage of poor who voted congress
was almost half of the rich who did so (Heath 1999). The left government could
pursue an agenda of land redistribution, revitalising local government institutions,
support for public sector and welfare state as it specifically catered to the main
constituencies of social support.
However, with regard to pro-labour policies of the government, it is also
necessary to consider that organised labour in West Bengal had become vulnerable
during this period due to industrial stagnation. West Bengal had been suffering
from industrial decline since 1965 and it is argued that pro-labour stance of the
government led to further industrial decline (Dasgupta 1998). As pointed out by
Chaudhuri (1987) employment in the factory sector in 1987-88 was even lower
than its 1970 census sector employment.
Thus, even though the left front government provided significant
legislative and political support to workers, such a strategy as critiqued in liberal
market theory limited employment generation (Fallon 1993). However scholars like
Banerjee (1998) and Dasgupta (1998) argue that reason for declining investment in
West Bengal were more complex with factors such as industrial structure, centre-
state relation that  led to remarkably little government investment overall economic
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recession in India, declining demand for industrial products especially jute and big
engineering among others contributing to industrial decline.
As a consequence of industrial stagnation and lack of investment, the left
front government changed its policy orientation to stimulate investment and
curtailing labour militancy. The CPI (M) as early as its fifteenth state party congress
declared its policy of acceptance of private investment and multinationals in
investment. The government revived the Labour Advisory Board to strengthen
collective bargaining procedures and dissuaded workers from striking. In spite of
such attempts, the 1980s saw a steady decline in the industrial situation and the
only area in which the Left Front government was able to provide employment
was in education, handicrafts and small industries sectors (Chaudhuri 1987).
Economic liberalisation of the 1990s offered new space to state
government for industrial investment free from central bureaucracy. However, in
the changed context of liberalisation the state governments had to seek
investments from private capital. This naturally meant providing incentives to
capital, including certain labour market condition which is reflected in the
increasing labour flexibility. Such explanation for increase in labour flexibility is
nevertheless partial. An important question in this regard concerns the impetus for
Left Front government to realign policies towards industrial investment. Sinha
(2005) has argued that Left Front in West Bengal could win elections despite the
gradual economic decline and pursue a policy of confrontation with the Central
government at the cost of investment due to the unique political dynamics of the
state which rewarded sub-national tendencies and offered little space to industrial
interests in politics.
As such, it is imperative to interrogate the potential factors that guided
such a policy transformation. Although structural pressures and need for
investment do have a role in determining the extent of reforms and consequently
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flexibility, the changing socio-economic social base also appears to have significant
influence. As pointed out the left front government emerged on the basis of a
stable relative homogenous support base of agrarian interest-small and marginal
farmers, industrial working class and professional middle class. Over the years, its
social support base subsequently expanded in the rural sector with the expansion
of middle peasants, incorporation of bigger peasantry along with marginal
peasants. In the urban sector, industrial stagnation significantly reduced the labour
constituency of support. Thus, there was a shift in socio-economic support basis
of the Left not so much in terms of class but in terms of spatial orientation. Such a
reliance  of left on the rural sector is reflected in critical perceptions that often
point out that left front government had been more committed to rural areas with
increasing anti-incumbency votes in the urban and industrial areas (Chakrabarty
1998). A cursory glance of the electoral records reveals that since mid-1980’s bulk
of left victory was accounted for by rural support base.
In an already handicapped industrial situation with declining employment
opportunity for the professional class which had expanded due to welfarist policies
created pressure on the government. It was only after the limitations of agrarian
expansion and the socio-economic transformation in support base during 1990s
that the need for increased industrial investment was translated into policy. This
was aided by the emergence of new middle class with rising global aspirations
within the Bhadralok community i.e. the professional middle class. Thus,
liberalisation provided the state an opportunity to pursue its policy without central
intervention but the opportunity was translated into policy when pressure
emanated from socio-economic support base.
The electoral verdict of 2001 assembly elections which was projected as the
referendum for industrialisation goes somewhat to endorse the argument.
Analysing the electoral verdict, Das (2001) points out that urban constituencies,
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especially middle class demonstrated its new found support as the Left was
victorious in 30 out of 64 urban constituencies. Importantly during the 1998 and
1999 parliamentary elections it was ahead in only in 13 and 18 assembly segments
respectively within urban conglomerations. In the industrial segments, the Front
won 42 of 81 seats which were significant as in the 1996 assembly election the
Front won only in 22 industrial seats. As such structural pressures for investment
due to policies of liberalisation and transformations in the support base appear to
have created pressures for reforms.
5. Conclusion
Based on the analysis of labour market flexibility and political party in
government the chapter frames the argument of partisan orientation. The findings
confirm the conclusion of chapter 5 (business) regarding the correlation between
business presence in support base and government attitude to reforms. However
the ability of business castes-classes to influence policy is determined by the extent
of homogeneity or heterogeneity in the support base. Thus, that nature of support
base of party is a casual variable in determining government attitude to reform and
consequently labour flexibility. In other words, the caste analysis of regime support
across sub-national states suggests that socio-economic homogeneity or
heterogeneity along with the extent of business representation determines the
extent of labour flexibility.
Parties with relatively homogenous dominant support base with business
presence find reforms easier to implement than parties with heterogeneous
support base. The differences can be attributed to two interconnected factors;
firstly a homogenous support base allows parties to formulate coherent and
focused policies due to fewer contradictory pressures, and secondly parties with
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homogenous support base are more likely to resist interest group pressures
compared to parties with heterogeneous support base.
Broadly regimes with relatively heterogeneous socio-economic support
base exemplified by the Congress party in Maharashtra tend to reform gradually.
Similarly given the predominant socio-economic base of BJP and TDP originating
in urban middle class and upper class-caste sections, both the parties appear more
reformists and labour flexibility is significantly higher during their regime. In West
Bengal the initial pro labour policy, in spite of industrial stagnation was driven the
support base of labour, bhadralok community and agrarian sections. It was the
transition in economic structure along with support base that led to pro-capital
postures by the left government. Hence the role of class based interest in reforms
process appears to be significant, and public policies under globalisation continue
to be nuanced if not shaped by distributive conflicts between major socio-
economic groups.
In this context, the transformation of middles classes across the states and
gradual marginalisation of labour require some elaboration. Corbridge (2000) has
rightly pointed out that structural changes in the Indian economy led to the
emergence of a new middle class who are the beneficiaries of globalisation. As a
result, the historic alliance between white collar and blue collar workers was
raptured and explosion of identity-based politics further fragmented labour
movement constricting political role of trade unions. Another significant aspect
has been the regionalisation of parties in India and its effects on reforms. As the
case study suggests national parties in India like the Congress party exhibit regional
differences due to variations in socio-economic dynamics. The effect of Congress
regime in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, or BJP in Gujarat and Maharashtra,
appear to vary due to regional specificities, especially composition of social castes
and classes. As such, it is necessary to situate interest groups, socio-economic
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classes and political parties within prevalent party system in order to capture the
gamut of political influences on policy.
The findings show the continued relevance of political dynamics especially
the relevance of class interests in support base of parties in the determination of
policies. Such a claim does not reject the conventional relation between economic
liberalisation and pressures for flexibility as flexibility seems to increase secularly
across the states, but presents a nuanced understanding of reforms being
conditioned by both transformations in the economy and the relative balance
between socio-economic classes. Although liberalisation of the economy has
significantly reduced state autonomy, domestic politics continues to influence the
process. It is the relative balance between social classes both in the sphere of
economy and politics determine the pace and extent of reforms. Such an
understanding is reinforced by the developments in Gujarat where increasing
flexibility and industrial restructuring took place much before economic
liberalisation. In short not all of reforms can be attributed to structural pressures
and political dynamics continues to influence how reforms unfold.
Important to mention is that the formation of socio-economically
homogeneous or heterogeneous support base is a function of both existing caste
cleavage and nature of political competition. As mentioned, the divergence in caste
configurations across sub-national states and specific correlation between caste and
occupation has influence on the nature of support base across states. Such an
assertion is corroborated by literatures on party system such as Brass (1991) and
Yadav (1999) that point out regional variation in caste domination of politics
across India. Caste cleavages provide the basis of political mobilisation and
depending on existing caste configuration and political competition both
economically homogenous as well as heterogeneous wide electoral support bases
emerge.
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A socio-economic support base is homogeneous if the nature of assets
(social and material) that individuals or groups control structure similar rewards
from collective action and the members of the group are affected equally and
similarly by the asymmetric effects of political democracy on markets and in
politics (Korpi 2003). To put simply homogeneity or heterogeneity is determined
by the similarity or dissimilarity of groups that constitute core support base of
parties in terms of socio-economic position and expectation from public policies.
The analysis of such heterogeneity and homogeneity in support base is possible
due to the broad correspondence between caste and class in India.
Even though, existing caste cleavage has implications for composition of
support base, partisan orientation is not static, and wider party system has a crucial
role in the construction of such support base. The extensive literature on party
support reveals that partisan linkage to social cleavage may vary due to particular
historical political dynamics. The case study also suggests that construction of
support base along ascriptive identity is influenced by the prevailing political
competition.
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Chapter 8
Party system: role of fragmentation and competition in reforms
1. Party system: contextualising political dynamics
The discussion in the preceding chapter reveals that relative variation in
labour market flexibility can largely be attributed to differences in support base of
parties and interest group-government interrelations. The finding reinforces
partisan orientation hypothesis as nature of party in government is found to
influence the extent of labour reform. Specifically parties with business
representation and relatively homogenous support base are found to undertake
greater labour reform compared to parties with heterogeneous base. In states such
as Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, the relative domination of business castes in
politics aided by fairly homogenous support base has led to greater labour market
flexibility compared to Maharashtra where business interests have to be negotiated
with contradictory pressures emanating from heterogeneous support base of
regimes.
However, such an analysis needs to be contextualised as parties, and
interest groups operate in an environment inhabited by contending forces and their
responses are influenced by the logic of opposition and prevailing situation.
Evidently broader political system specifically party system provides the framework
of choices for both policy makers and social groups. The party system is not only
reflective of the dominant social cleavages and prevalent political discourse, it also
acts as an intermediate variable that influence the behaviour of interest group and
political parties. The literature on party system points out that like all political
attitudes; partisanship (support for a particular party) is significantly determined by
political alternatives available, both in terms of electoral as well as ideological
choice. Budge (1976) has succinctly pointed out that partisan orientation depends
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on the presence of parties and extent of party competition. The importance of
party system is also highlighted in literature on economic reforms that suggest
fragmentation in the party system has implications for reform.
The nature and operation of the party system is not as an exogenous
variable but rather endogenous to the operation of interest groups, support base of
parties and political discourse. Hence, any effort to understand labour market
policies and their operation will have to consider the potential role of party system
in the wider context.
Based on the case study the chapter argues that party system has a vital role
in labour market reforms as an endogenous variable influencing partisan
configurations of support, ideological discourse and instrumental interest of
parties. The most attractive outcome of the research is the positive relation
between increasing fragmentation in the party system and labour reforms which
challenges the established ideas. The conventional theory on the relation between
party system and reform suggests that fragmentation impedes reform due to
increasing number of decision makers in a democracy. However contrary to
expectation, increase in the effective number of parties is found to have a positive
relation to the extent of labour flexibility. The positive relation points out the
limitations of structural understanding and shows that the impact of fragmentation
on reforms is mediated by political dynamics that need to be considered in analysis.
The chapter is arranged in the following manner. Section 1 briefly deals
with the theoretical relation between party system and labour market reforms. The
second section presents a broad analysis of the party system in India and the four
sub national states under consideration. The section provides a descriptive
narrative of the party system and highlights their distinctive features across the
states. The third section presents the actual case study of the interaction of party
system and labour reforms across the states. The final section seeks to explain the
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relation between party system and extent of flexibility derived from the cases. In
the process, the chapter contextualises the political economic analysis of labour
market reforms situating parties and interest groups within wider environment.
2. Party System and Public Policy
The importance of party system emanates from the fact that any policy
choice is determined by interaction between social and political actors within
specific historical institutional structures. Any policy choice or transformation is
the outcome of interaction between ideological and instrumental objectives of
party in government within a specific context. However, this policy context of
parties is characterised by the existence of oppositional parties and contending
interests. Chhibber (1995) points out that an inherent limitation of both ideological
and instrumental argument of party behaviour stems from the static analysis while
parties operate within dynamic socio-political-economic environment. Similarly,
choices of socio-political actors both individuals and groups are significantly
shaped by the available political as well as policy alternatives. Naturally in a liberal
democracy the nature and operation of the party system provides key insight to
any policy change.
Although there are many descriptions of party system in literature, in this
dissertation party system is defined following Sartori (1991) as the system of
interactions resulting from inter-party competition. As such a comprehensive
characterisation party system should consider the number of parties and nature of
political competition in terms of ideological distinction. The classification on the basis
of number of parties, however, is not a simple numerical evaluation but rather
enumeration of effective number of parties measured by votes received and seats
in the legislature. In sum, the understanding of party system adopted emphasises
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on political competition both in terms of effective number of political parties as
well as the ideological distinction between the parties.
According to literature, characteristics of party system have implications
for policy making in democracies.  Although scholars differ on the relative
importance, broadly, party institutionalisation, scope of party operation (national
or regional), party competition and extent of fragmentation are considered
significant causal variables in policy making.
Firstly, party institutionalisation refers to the stability of the party system
with regard to the presence of stable and coherent parties. An institutionalised
party system is marked by the presence of programmatic political parties with a
coherent policy orientation. In such a system parties perform aggregative and
mobilisation functions and has high levels of legitimacy. In contrast weakly
institutionalised party systems are marked by non-programmatic or personality
based parties with short-term populist policy proposals. According to Mainwaring
(1998) extent of party system institutionalisation is a function of party organisation,
stable inter-party competition; stable base of support for party, legitimacy of
parties and elections.
In terms of policy making, it is argued that institutionalisation has
implications for stability and consistency of public policies. In an institutionalised
party system, policy orientation of competing parties is relatively stable and
consistent due to ideological and material stability of parties. In weakly
institutionalised systems, on the contrary, policy stability is relatively weak due to
weaknesses of political parties.
Secondly, in a party system dominated by national parties, national agendas
receive greater emphasis both among voters and parties. However, if the party
system is dominated by regional political parties, local and sub-national issues
dominate the political discourse.
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Thirdly, party competition understood through ideological polarisation and
the number of competing parties has been considered as consequential
determinant of policy dynamics. The literature on reforms suggests that
fragmentation in the party system prevents alteration in socio-economic policies by
creating a large number of decision makers and hence making consensus elusive.
Scholars like Roubini (1989) and Haggard (1995) emphasise on the impact of party
competition and claim that reforms are more challenging in a fragmented party
system due to policy stalemate.
Similarly, ideological polarity is considered significant for reforms as policy
changes are most likely under low levels of ideological polarisation among main
parties. Theoretically, governments are able to effectively implement policies on
which there exist low levels of ideological difference. Based on a study of the post-
communist societies, Horowitz (2008) points out that in strong far-left parties and
identity based far right parties have an impeding effect on policy reform.
The discussion on party system and economic reforms remain incomplete
without reference to the dynamic two way relation between party system and
reforms. Just as, party system has implications for reforms; economic reforms
influence the operation of party system. According to Nayyar (1998) changes
consequent upon reform have three broad influences on politics, which in turn
shape the party system.
Firstly, implementation of economic reform may involve restructuring or
creation of several political institutions. These new institutional structures
transform the citizen- government interaction and the mediums to negotiate,
bargain and control. Clearly such developments have implications for agencies that
perform the role of interest aggregation and articulation such as interest groups.
Secondly, economic reforms tend to create a new political culture. At one
level, economic reforms are likely to generate a climate of competition aided by
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exposure to the international market. At another level, the process may lead to the
resurgence of regional or local cultural roots as national identities give way to
regional or local identities.
Thirdly, economic reform influences the process of political mobilisation.
In an earlier era of populism, promises of economic incentives were widely used to
arouse the masses during elections. In the age of ‘limited states’ and ‘fiscal
austerity’ political parties use sentimental issues of caste, religion or language in
electoral campaigns. The literature on reforms also points out the role of
institutional features of party system such as electoral rules, nature of political
system (unitary, federal) in determining the social and economic policies
(Rogowski 1987).
The brief theoretical discussion suggests that party system has serious
implications for policy reform in a democracy which needs to be incorporated in
reform analysis. The nature of political competition operating in a socio-economic
context can provide opportunities for generating as well as constraining demands
due to ideological and political dynamics. As such analysis of policy and outcome
remains incomplete without analysis of the party system.
2.1 Analysing party system and policy transformation
The theoretical discussion makes it evident that analysis of party system
and policy reforms involves a complex multi-layered analysis. The task, however, is
simplified in this dissertation due to the research design. Since this research builds
upon a sub-national comparative study, the impact of the institutional framework
is broadly similar, and as such factors like electoral rules is removed from the
analysis. Likewise, party system characteristics especially the extent of
institutionalisation and scope of operation also appear to be limited in their
explanatory capacity due to their apparent similarities across the selected cases.
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As mentioned in the case study section (chapter 4) the selected states are
characterised by stable two-party or bipolar competition between stable
programmatically coherent parties. The analysis of political parties in chapter 7 also
reveals that the party system is fairly institutionalised based on stable support base
and programmes. The party system of Gujarat and Maharashtra is almost similar
with Congress and BJP as the two principal political actors.
Further there is an increasingly dominant view that since 1990’s states have
emerged as the relevant unit for parties as well as social identity leading to
regionalisation of the party system (Yadav 1996; Sridharan 2002). As such the
impact of scope of parties can be considered a secondary order variable in the sub-
national analysis of the relation between labour reforms and party system.
Intuitively the potential determinant of party system and reform dynamics
appear to be the extent of competition and fragmentation in the party system. In
order to interrogate the relationship the dissertation analyses party system through
both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The qualitative evaluation about party
system is based on a historical descriptive analysis of party system at the sub-
national states. Quantitative analysis is based on measuring the effective number of
parties as an indicator of the extent of fragmentation and competition in the party
system.
The concept of effective number of parties measures the extent of political
competition on the basis of parties that have significance for government
formation or electoral competition. The number of effective parties is measured by
Leaks and Taagepera index which measures parties through the number of seats in
the state assembly and votes received in a given election. The quantification of
effective number of parties is based on the least arbitrary method of treating vote
share or seat share of parties by their own weight and adding such weighted
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measures to arrive at a composite number. The data on effective number of parties
is derived from Saez (2010) which discusses the impact of political cycles on public
sector expenditure in the sub-national states of India.
Further to measure the ideological extent of competition i.e. ideological
polarity, the dissertation looks into left party presence in selected states through
proportion of votes received in legislative elections. The underlying assumption for
such an exercise is the received as well as acquired wisdom that greater left support
indicates greater opposition to economic reforms. As the conclusions of chapter 7
suggest ideological distance between non-left parties on the issue of labour reform
is minimal. Hence extent of presence of left parties can be considered a measure of
ideological polarity in the party system on the issue of labour reform.
3. Party system: historical overview
Analysis of the specific relation between wider party system and labour
market reforms require a brief understanding of historical developments. The
political-electoral system adopted in India after independence was based on the
Westminster model of single member simple plurality electoral system (first past
the post) in a constitutionally arranged federal framework.
Discussions on party system in India invariably begin with the Indian
National Congress, which was the predominant political association during the
independence movement and the foremost political party after independence. In
the period 1952-1967, Congress won over two third majorities in the parliament
and state legislative elections on the basis of plurality of votes (44-48%) against a
fragmented opposition. The only exception was Nagaland, Kerala and J&K
(Sridharan 2002).
The dominance of Congress party during this period led Kothari (1964) to
term the Indian party system as the Congress System characterised by weak
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multiparty opposition to a strong dominant party. The preeminent position and
catch all nature of the Congress was possible due to the legacy of the
independence movement, heterogeneities in Indian society which prevented
polarisation, organisational and leadership skills of Congress leaders, and an
elaborate patronage network to build vote banks across communities (Manor 2002;
Frankel 1990).
The party system in the states under consideration also reflected a similar
trajectory with Congress dominance and fragmented multi party opposition.
However, an important divergence despite uniform Congress dominance was the
nature of opposition in the states. In Andhra Pradesh, till 1972 the communist
parties were the principal opposition in the state winning 51 seats and 19.5 percent
votes in 1962 elections. There was also some presence of the Socialists and
economically rightist Swatantra Party. Similarly, in West Bengal the Communist
Party emerged as the main opposition during this period with Forward Block and
Janata Party as minor opposition. On the other hand in Gujarat, economically
rightist Swatantra Party emerged as the main opposition in the 1962 and 1967
elections with 24.4 percent and 38.2 percent votes respectively.
In this context, the nature of opposition Maharashtra presents an intriguing
picture as the principal opposition party altered every election. For example in
1957, Janata Party emerged as the principal opposition with 36 seats but in 1962,
elections the Peasant and Workers Party emerged as the main opposition with 15
seats. Thus, Maharashtra was characterised by more fragmented opposition
compared to other states (Election Commission of India).
The break in Congress hegemony occurred in 1967 when opposition
parties dislodged the congress in eight of the sixteen sub national states. This
period witnessed the rise of bipolarisation of the state party system where single
but different opposition parties tended to dominate non Congress votes. In West
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Bengal, the first non-congress government was formed when Bangla Congress, a
breakaway section of the Congress and the left parties formed the United Front.
Even though the Congress remained in office in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Andhra
Pradesh, the party system underwent gradual alterations.
In Andhra Pradesh, there was gradual polarisation of opposition parties,
and in 1978, the Janata Party emerged as the principal opposition with 28.9 percent
of the votes possibly due to the merger of Swatantra, Jana Sangh, Socialists and
others. Interestingly the prominence of the left in the state underwent a secular
decline from a high of 51 seats in 1962 to 14 seats in 1978 (CPI and CPIM).
In Gujarat, the first non-Congress government was formed in 1975
through a coalition of Congress (O), Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Samyukta Socialist
Party, and the Swatantra Party. Similarly, in the year 1978 a coalition government
of Janata Party and breakaway congress formed the government in Maharashtra
although for a brief period (Election Commission of India).
Observers like Hasan (2004) have broadly pointed out splits in Congress,
increasing inability of Congress to mediate cleavages of a heterogeneous society
and tendency towards centralisation as responsible for the rise of oppositional
parties and political fragmentation. However, Sridharan (2002: 492-495) has
pointed to the role of structural factors in the transformation of the party system,
namely the systemic properties of the first-past-the-post electoral system operating
in a federal polity. He argues that federal polity increases the political attractiveness
for a party to be in power at the state level and as such opposition emerged at the
sub-national level after the separation of national and state elections. Such an
argument although attractive cannot eclipse the political dynamics of growing
disenchantment of people with failures of Congress government which
sympathetic commentator Manor (2002) calls ‘failure in governance’ as the
principal cause of such fragmentation. Such a tendency accelerated the exceptional
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post emergence election of 1977 when the Congress was defeated by a temporary
united opposition under the banner of Janata Party.
In the same year Left Front, a coalition of left parties came to office in
West Bengal as the Congress was relegated to third position after Janata Party in
terms of seats. Since 1977, the left front has formed 7 consecutive governments
with vote share of nearly 50%. The four main parties of left front are CPIM, CPI,
Forward Block and RSP. Over the year, the Congress increased its seat tally from a
low of 20 in 1977 to 82 in 1996 with 39.5% of votes. In Gujarat and Maharashtra,
however, both in 1980 and 1985 Congress returned to power with massive
majorities. Although Gujarat and Maharashtra went back to Congress fold in tune
with national trajectory, there was a break in the party system of Andhra Pradesh
in 1983 when the Telegu Desam Party (TDP) swept the elections and came to
power. An interesting development in the party system during this period was the
slow but steadily increasing prominence of rightist politics through Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) at the state level.
The period since 1989 has witnessed several independent but simultaneous
trajectories in the party system.  Firstly, there was a marked increase in electoral
competition with the rise in democratic participation. Secondly, there was a shift of
level of politics from all India to the states. Such a development was
complemented by the rise in number of parties based on regional, ethnic and
ascriptive appeals. The rise of regional parties and the shift of level of politics
appear to be mutually reinforcing developments as increasing fragmentation of
parties particularly regional parties prevented the growth of national parties leading
to dominance of coalition governments (Saez 2002).  Observers of Indian politics
like Verney (2003) and Yadav (2006) have pointed out a sharp and continuous
decline in the number of seats contested by the national parties while there has
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been an increase in the number of state parties and in the number of seats they
have won.
In short, this period was marked by a dual political system with continued
bipolarisation of the party system at the sub national level with the multi-party
system and coalition politics at the centre (Sridharan 2002; De Souza 2006). The
selected states also witnessed increasing bipolarity or two party competitions. In
Andhra Pradesh, the emergence of TDP altered the party system as it moved
towards two party competitions between Congress and regional TDP. Like Andhra
Pradesh, Gujarat has moved towards two party competitions but between the
national parties i.e. BJP and Congress.
The political competition in the states of Maharashtra and West Bengal
also represent a bipolar competition between two stable coalitions largely
homogenous in terms of the agenda and outlook. In Maharashtra, the 1990s
witnessed the rise of Shiv Sena as an electorally significant political force and BJP-
Shiv Sena coalition came to power in 1995 with vote share of 29.2 percent, a little
short than 31 percent of the Congress. In 1999,   the state witnessed the rise of
Nationalist Congress Party after a split in the Congress and Congress-NCP alliance
formed the government. Since then Congress- NCP alliance has continued in
office with the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance acting as the principal opposition. In West
Bengal, the Congress also underwent a split leading to the formation Trinamool
Congress which emerged as the principal opposition to the Left Front relegating
the Congress to third position.
Thus, party system in India as well as the states has undergone a
transformation from one party dominant system to either a two- party competition
or bipolar competition increasingly dominated by regional parties. The Congress
system came to an end by the end of the 1980's, and the Indian party system came
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to represent multiple bipolarities with two party competitions at the state level and
aggregation of various parties at the centre (Yadav 2006).
The fragmentation and transformation in the party system was also
contributed by profound socio-economic changes that marked Indian polity since
the mid-1980s. Nayyar (1998) has pointed out that political-economic linkage can
be broadly divided into three phases in India. The first phase (1947-1966) was
marked by a strong correspondence between development consensus in the
economy and the political consensus in the polity; the second phase (1967-1990)
was characterised by an emphasis on socialism and the politics of patronage and
populism; while the third phase (1991 onwards) is marked by market driven
capitalism and the politics of segmentation. Analysing contemporary developments
Heath (1999: 16) has catalogued four structural features that characterise the recent
(post liberalisation) phase of the party system: First, there is a participatory upsurge
among the hitherto marginalised sections of society. Second, there is an influx of
lower order beliefs, vocabularies and homespun ideologies in the discursive
practice of democracy. Third, the contest for manufacturing electoral majorities
has resulted in the redefinition of caste identities at a macro plane. Fourth, the sub-
national states have emerged as the relevant unit for party and social identity
choice.
4. Party system and labour market flexibility: research findings
The brief discussion on party system in the selected sub-national states
provides the background to analyse contemporary relation between party system
and reforms. As elaborated in the theoretical section, the analysis of relation
between party system and labour reforms focuses on the extent of party
competition in terms of ideological polarisation and number of effective parties as
causal variables in determining reforms.
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4.1 Ideological and programmatic difference
The discussion on political parties in the previous chapter suggests that
programmatic difference especially on economic reforms is marginal among the
major parties except for the left. Hence extent of ideological polarity as a potential
explanation appears to be weak. However, a persuasive argument suggests that the
very presence of left parties in the party system may influence the extent of
reforms due to the logic of competitive politics. The discussion on trade unions
(chapter 6) also reveals that the presence of left parties has implications for
organisation of trade unions as well as prominence of labour issues in political
discourse. In short, greater presence of left parties increases the extent of class
based discourse and union mobilisation. As such, it may be instructive to consider
the relevance of left parties in the party system as a proxy for the extent of
ideological polarisation.
8.1 State wise percentage of votes obtained by left parties in elections, 1980-2000
Left parties= communist parties and allied parties with left leaning ideology.
Source:  Malhotra and CSDS Data Unit (2003)
The data on votes received by left parties reveals that in terms of electoral
presence the left parties are strongest in West Bengal with marginal presence in the
other states. At a relative level left parties appear stronger in Andhra Pradesh than
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Maharashtra and Gujarat where left has little electoral support. Incidentally left
parties have had historic presence in states of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra
particularly among labour which has largely been emaciated.
The findings corroborate the argument of broader impact of left parties
especially in terms of organisation of the working class as the extent of
unionisation correlates to proportional presence of the left. It seems plausible to
argue that existence of left parties leads to significant organisation of the marginal
classes especially labour. Thus, ideological differences within constituents of
government or wider political system appear to be a weak explanation for lack of
reform in the labour market. Consequently the impact of ideological polarity or
nature of competition on labour market reform can be argued to be minimal.
4.2 Extent of fragmentation in party system
A related and prominent feature of party system affecting reforms is the
extent of fragmentation in the party system. Theoretically, conventional
understanding suggests that as a party system becomes fragmented, economic
reforms become challenging as an increasing number of decision makers create,
what Tsebelis calls, a ‘policy stalemate’ (Tsebelis 2002).  Increasing fragmentation
in the party system is likely to lead to weak governments inhibiting strong or
unpopular decisions often associated with reforms. Alesina (1991) argues that
ceteris paribus, reforms are adopted slowly in countries with more political
fragmentation due to increasing difficulty in making compromises between small
groups and instability of governments (Haggard 1994; Roubini 1989).
At first glance higher party fragmentation in West Bengal and Maharashtra
seem to corroborate the lower labour market flexibility observed in the states.
Similarly, we find that flexibility appears to be more in states conventionally
characterised by two party systems namely Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat.  However
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a careful reading of the state specific condition reveals that in terms of government
formation West Bengal and Maharashtra are in practice also bipolar with parties of
similar ideological orientation coalescing into two stable opposing poles.
Fragmentation as Tsebelis (2002) pointed out not merely implies greater number
of decision makers but crucially the policy distance between decision makers. In
the context of stable political alliances in West Bengal and Maharashtra between
like-minded parties, the states are marked by bipolar competition. Correspondingly,
explanations of greater reform in states with two party competitions compared to
states with multi-party coalition governments appear untenable in this context. For
all effective purposes, the alliance governments in Maharashtra and West Bengal
act like a single party with minor intra-party differences.
The data on political fragmentation across the states measured through the
number of effective parties suggests that effective number of parties have a
positive correlation with labour market flexibility. More precisely, we can identify
periods of changing party competition in terms of number of parties with periods
of increased labour flexibility.
8.3 State wise number of effective parties in terms of votes polled in elections,
1980-2005
Source: POLEX data from Sáez (2010)
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8.4 State wise number of effective parties in terms of seats in the legislature, 1980-
2005
Source: POLEX data from Sáez (2010)
The graph on party fragmentation measured through effective number of
parties reveals that extent of fragmentation has been higher in Maharashtra over
the period, with around 5 parties in the party system since mid-1990s. Specifically
in terms of votes Maharashtra witnesses a steady growth in number of effective
parties from 3.27 in 1980 which reaches a peak of 6.96 around 1995-96. Similarly,
Gujarat experiences a period of party system fragmentation between 1980 and
1995 when the effective number of parties increase from 1.46 to 3.46. Then on,
the number of parties appears to decrease and since 1995 the party system is
characterised by a stable two party competition.
In West Bengal, there is an increase in the number of effective parties since
1985 in terms of seats. However, fragmentation in terms of votes is perceptible
only since 1990s. Since late 1990s, the party system in the state is characterised by
the presence of 4 effective parties. In Andhra Pradesh, the number of parties
remains somewhat stable across the period particularly since 1983 which marked
the rise of TDP. The party system in the state is characterised by largely a two
party competition.
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Interestingly increased fragmentation across the states corresponds with
increasing flexibility in the labour market. For example, a marked surge in declining
wage share can be identified during 1985-86 in Gujarat and Maharashtra which
corresponds to a period of increase in number of parties. Similarly, in West Bengal
increasing number of parties since the 1990’s corresponds with a marked increase
in labour flexibility. Comparable trends could be identified in case of Andhra
Pradesh although the extent of fragmentation is relatively smaller.
The argument becomes comprehensible in the graphical representation of
the relation between fragmentation and wage share (a variable in labour flexibility)
across the states over the period.
8.5 Correlation between party system fragmentation and wage share, 1980-2005
A cursory glance of the graph indicates the negative correlation between
fragmentation and wage share which contradicts the conventional relation. Clear
from the representation is the negative relation between the number of parties in
the political system and the extent of wage share and thereby the positive relation
of fragmentation to labour flexibility.
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The analysis of relation between fragmentation and labour flexibility
reveals that contrary to conventional ideas increased political fragmentation has
helped labour market reforms. Such an argument questions the established
relationship between fragmentation of party system and reforms and necessitates
revisiting the arguments. Importantly, the argument of fragmentation augmenting
reforms does not imply that states with greater fragmentation have greater labour
flexibility but rather points out the facilitating role of party fragmentation in
reforms.
5. Explaining flexibility through fragmentation
The positive relation between fragmentation and labour reforms reveal
limitations of structuralist understanding of party fragmentation due to non-
incorporation of broader socio-political dynamics such as social cleavages,
operation of interest groups and ideological polarity. Theoretically the impact of
fragmentation on policy transformation will be lower in the absence of ideological
polarity between main parties. However if, the extent of fragmentation is higher,
level of ideological difference assumes importance. Similarly, the existence of
ideological difference among parties only becomes meaningful when extent of
fragmentation is high. As such the exact relation between fragmentation and
reforms depends on broader dynamics such as the number of parties, the
competing ideologies, nature of political mobilisation and aggregation.
In the context of the study, the positive correlation between increasing
flexibility and reforms is somewhat expected as the period of economic
liberalisation was also marked by increasing democratisation and fragmentation.
The period of late 1980’s and early 1990’s witnessed increased democratic
participation and electoral competition largely through mobilisation based of
religious, caste and regional appeals.
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This dissertation contends that increasing fragmentation and economic
reforms were not merely contemporaneous but also correlated developments.
The positive correlation between increasing numbers of parties and labour
flexibility can be interrogated at two levels; namely, transformations in the political
milieu and instrumental imperative of parties. The two levels are mutually
interconnected, and it is only for analytical clarity that this dissertation presents the
relation separately.
5.1 Fragmentation and transformations in the broader polity: discourse
The incidence of increasing labour market flexibility in the face of an
increasing number of parties can be accounted through the transformations in
wider polity, specifically political-ideological discourse. As pointed out in the
theoretical section, fragmentation loses its relevance in the absence of ideological
difference between parties over reform issues. The study of partisan politics across
the states reveals that fragmentation in the party system was largely based on
identity issues. As issues of identity gained prominence in politics, it led to
marginalisation of issues of labour and facilitated the adoption of similar economic
policies. A prominent example of such a contention is the Elite-Mass dichotomy
argument of Varshney (1999) which argues that the economic reforms were
possible as issues of reforms were crowded out of mass politics by emotive issues
such as hindutva and caste reservations that aroused greater passion and anxiety
among people and political parties.
Observers of Indian politics have pointed out that the period between late
1980’s and early 1990’s was marked by three independent yet correlated issues,
namely Masjid, Mandal and Market with religion and caste reservation becoming
the dominant political fissure driving politics (Yadav 1996). Such a transformation
in the politics on one hand increased scope of participation by previously
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marginalised groups but, on the other hand, led to muting of issues like class and
labour.
Theoretically the correlation between globalisation and identity politics has
been pointed in literature. Scholars have noted that in the realm of culture,
globalisation not only leads to certain homogenisation with the creation of global
culture of consumption but also reinforces regional identities through reactive
cultural assertion (Barber 1996).  According to Scholte (2000: 168) the assertion of
ethnic identity under conditions of globalisation is reinforced through various
channels. Globalisation provides space to ethnic groups by reducing the operative
space for the nation state. The withdrawal of the state vacates space for ethnic and
ascriptive groups to fulfil local needs of constituents. As such globalisation has
been associated with transformations in the prevailing political discourse with
emphasis on identity and regional issues.
In India, liberalisation of the economy and democratic assertion of identity
and ethno nationalism have shared a mutually reinforcing relation.  As Chhibber
(1999) points out the absence of strong associational heritage, electoral
competition over state has led to the politicisation of social cleavages in India. That
is why democratisation has proceeded along ethnic and caste lines in India, and
such democratic upsurge has undermined non-ascriptive differences such as class
and gender. This has had two main consequences for labour; firstly, the old
patronage structure has increasingly been replaced by new patronage politics based
on communal, ethnic and regional issues, and secondly, the discourse and agenda
of politics has also witnessed a progressive marginalisation of labour. Thus
increasing number of political parties did not necessarily provide labour any
increased scope to oppose neoliberal policy choice. Rather, democratisation in this
context led to the emergence of new issues of political discourse based on caste,
religion, region at the expense of issue like welfare state, liberalisation and labour.
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The developments in the selected sub-national states corroborate such an
understanding. For example, Ahmedabad and Mumbai were characterised by huge
textile industries which provided significant employment in the formal sector and
constituted the bedrock of organised labour movement in the two cities. However
by the end of 1980’s the textile mills gradually closed down and most workers have
to shift to the informal sector (Breman 2002). However the closure of mills in
Gujarat was rather peaceful compared to Maharashtra as many of the displaced
workers in Gujarat were accommodated politically through the discourse of
religion and communal identity. Sinha (2007) while commenting on the politics of
mill closure points out that many workers joined the ultra-rightist religious
organisation Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), its youth wing the Bajrang Dal or
other organisations dedicated to the militant promotion of Hindutva (hinduness).
Thus, opposition to closure was transformed into communal opposition through
the emergent discourse of religion and caste.
5.2 Fragmentation and transformation in broader polity: socio-economic groups
The impact of political fragmentation is not only confined to political
discourse as it has more tangible consequences in terms of group alignments to
political cleavages. As pointed out in chapters 5 and 7, socio-economic support
base of parties have significant consequences for the reform orientation of
government. Naturally, the consequences of political fragmentation on social
groups and their political alignment influence the extent of reform.
Historical evaluation of political economy of India reveals that the period
between 1970’s and 1980’s marked a profound transformation. The green
revolution and renewed investment in the public sector during this period led to
economic growth and the creation of a capitalist agrarian class which transformed
into industrial class. These classes i.e. the agriculture turned industrial capitalists
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along with the professional middle classes sought to augment their position by
seeking political and material patronage from regional governments and political
parties. In the case study, states of Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat were characterised
by such developments where regional agrarian turned industrial classes maintained
close interconnection with political parties and influenced the reform orientation
of parties.
Likewise, the professional middle classes also underwent significant
transformations and reorientation. Corbridge (2000) has pointed out that structural
changes in the Indian economy led to the emergence of a new middle class which
benefited from globalisation and the backward castes that challenged the
domination of rich peasants and became the centre of social mobilisation. In
welfare state literature, this transformation in the professional classes and growing
distance between the concerns of the middle class and that of organised labour has
been characterised as the break in the historic alliance between white collar and
blue collar workers (Anderson 2001).
This realignment of socio-economic interests was facilitated by the
reconfiguration of the party system through fragmentation and regionalisation. As
discussed in chapter 6 and 7 of the dissertation, the fragmentation in the party
system of Andhra Pradesh marked by the emergence of TDP or BJP in Gujarat
facilitated the political reorganisation of socio-economic interests. Observers of
party system at the sub-national level have pointed out the shifting caste alliance of
backward castes and kammas towards TDP in Andhra Pradesh (Suri 2004b), use of
religious idioms and identity in popular mobilisation in Gujarat (Shah 2002), and
instability of the social bases of parties leading to a new structure of caste
competition in Maharashtra (Palshikar 2004).
Importantly, the impact of fragmentation on the reorganisation of socio-
economic support is not automatic, and the process is affected by pre-existing
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social cleavages and nature of political parties. In other words, the emergence and
persistence of particular political cleavages is a product of both environmental
conditions and elite choices. In the study, the impact of fragmentation on the
support base of parties does not appear to be in any definite direction in terms of
making it more homogenous or heterogeneous across the states. Fragmentation in
West Bengal and Maharashtra do not appear to lead to clear political alignment
based on socio-economic cleavages. In contrast, fragmentation in Andhra Pradesh
and Gujarat facilitated the formation of relatively homogenous support base.
5.3 Fragmentation and instrumental imperative of parties
The positive correlation between increasing effective number of parties
and labour market flexibility can also be explained through instrumental imperative
of parties. There is an increasing body of literature that point out structural
influence of party system on party objectives. In the examination of public
expenditure Chhibber (1995) has found that in fragmented multiparty system,
intense electoral competition and smaller social base of parties ensure that parties
focus on their voting blocs for electoral prospects. Thus, increasing fragmentation
of the party system can potentially lead to the emergence of sectional interests in
terms of agenda and composition.
The analysis of party system across sub-national states reveal that political
mobilisation has increasingly relied on issues of identity and regional dynamics that
have facilitated the formation of relatively homogeneous and heterogeneous
support bases. In a party system marked by the mobilisation according to identity
issues, political parties tend to be dominated by specific groups and parties
increasingly relate to support base through the segmented identities of caste,
religion and region due to instrumental imperative of nurturing a stable support
base. Naturally such a development not only marginalises issues of labour but also
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has implications for reform orientation of governments. Such a development is
aided by globalisation as scholars have identified the growth of political parties
based on narrow and specific interests due to reactive cultural and ethnic assertions
under globalisation.
In India, identity based mobilisation and social heterogeneities have
ensured regional variations in cleavage based politics and support base of parties
(Sridharan 2002). In the context of this research, the TDP in Andhra Pradesh, Shiv
Sena in Maharashtra are examples of parties that have been able to arouse local
and regional identities and reap electoral dividends. Even the national political
parties have not been devoid of such regionalisation. As the findings reveal, even
national parties like Congress party and BJP have generated their own region
specific agendas and support base.
Hence it can be argued that under conditions of globalisation increasing
number of parties are likely to be characterised by parties with parochial and
regional agendas. Clearly political competition largely based on issues of identity
have significantly different outcome than one based on issues of class. In sum, as
party system becomes fragmented and increasingly regionalised, instrumental
imperative of parties tend to highlight certain identities at the expense of others.
As evidenced from the case study regional parties like TDP, Shiv Sena and even
national parties at the regional level tend to emphasise on ascriptive identities at
the expense of class or broader identities. Under conditions of regionalisation and
withdrawal of the state due to liberalisation political parties have to relate to the
people through narrow ascriptive identities like caste or region. Thus increasing
fragmentation of the party system leads to the emergence of narrow sectional
interests that marginalise broader interests.
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5.4 Fragmentation and Interest groups
Fragmentation in the party system also has an effect on interest groups,
particularly due to historical-institutional developments that have encouraged inter-
connection between parties and interest groups. Such a relation is most apparent in
the case of labour movement. According to Bhattacharjee (1996) ideological and
political rivalries that characterise the general politics significantly determine the
characteristics and behaviour of the labour movement in India. Naturally,
fragmentation in party system has implications for trade unions as they become
increasingly divided leading to emaciation of union strength.
As discussed in the chapter on trade unions, increasing fragmentation
contribute to what Rudolph (1987) terms as involuted pluralism where increase in
number of trade unions is associated with a decline in its strength. Interviews of
trade unionists across the four sub-national states corroborate that trade unionism
has been affected by both political fragmentations and disenchantment with
political trade unionism reflected through the emergence of independent unions.
Trade unions have also been affected by the altered political dynamics
under conditions of globalisation. As discussed, economic liberalisation has
significantly altered the process of political mobilisation from welfare populism to
ascriptive issues as the promise of economic incentives has been driven out by the
logic of market economy. Traditional organised groups such as trade unions which
were a stable source of political mobilisation have increasingly been marginalised
by emergent caste, linguistic, regional associations. Evidence from field work,
interviews of trade unionists and political activists suggest that political
competition consequent upon fragmentation significantly affected interest group
actions and relevance.  The situation is aptly summed by one left trade unionist
who pointed out that workers unite under the red flag to wage struggle against
capital but return home as Brahmins, Harijan, Dalits, and not as a worker.
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6. Conclusion
This chapter contextualises the arguments regarding interest groups and
political parties within the broader political system. The nature of party system
specifically extent of competition appear to have significant influence on the
political parties and interest groups. Thus, the findings reaffirm that role of
political actors needs to be analysed and understood in terms of the specific
context.
The particular case study presents us with a situation where increasing
democratisation i.e. mobilisation and representation facilitate the process economic
reforms contrary to the conventional arguments. In the sub national states,
experience of labour reforms reveal that during periods of increasing
fragmentation in party system, labour flexibility has not only increased but also
appears to have gathered pace. Such an outcome challenges the conventional
argument of increasing fragmentation impeding reforms in a democracy and
highlights the limitations of purely structuralist understanding of party
fragmentation and reforms. The features of party system share a relation of
complex interdependence and the relevance of fragmentation is contingent wider
dynamics such as ideological distance, impact on partisan linkage of social groups,
interest groups.
The brief discussion reveals the limitations of structuralist understanding of
party fragmentation due to non-incorporation of broader socio-political dynamics
such as the impact of fragmentation on social cleavages, operation of interest
groups and ideological polarity. As the case study reveals fragmentation in party
system accelerates labour market flexibility as the emergent political groups and
prevailing political agenda highlight identity issues at the expense of class and
labour. As the chapter on parties (Chapter 7) has argued, the peculiar intersection
between caste and class and the pre-existing caste configuration across the states
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has led to governments marked by homogenous support base consisting of
business castes. Naturally such a process has been facilitated by dominance of
ascriptive mobilisation in politics.
This does not imply the complete absence of rhetoric of class, or the
potential for comixing of class and caste concerns, but suggest that the process of
increasing democratisation has largely relied on the rhetoric of ethnicity both for
mobilisation as well as policy orientation. As De Souza (2006) has argued
democratic upsurge has not been translated effectively into the formal politics as
the emergence of new political actors has little scope for transformative politics.
The chapter thus goes beyond simple analysis of political transformation
and highlights the impact of such transformation on relevant political actors,
namely political parties and interest groups. Importantly party system is not an
exogenous variable to explain labour market flexibility rather it is endogenous to
the function of political actors. As discussed, the nature of party system appears to
influence labour market reforms through its impact on wider political discourse,
instrumental objective of parties and reconfiguration of political alignment of
socio-economic cleavages.
Although such an explanation provides a valuable theoretical framework to
analyse the relation between party system and reforms, the emphasis on historical-
structural variables should not undermine the importance of agency i.e. political
actors. Manor (2002) has pointed out the formation of an ethnic identity among
any social group is the product of actions taken by elites within the group and
favourable conditions which arise from the broader political and economic
environments. However once they crystallise they appear to take a life of own. In
other words, the emergence and persistence of particular ethnic cleavages is a
product of both environmental conditions and elite choices (Brass 1984).
257
Parties have also sought to reorient through regionalised identity and stable
linkage to social groups as identity issues dominate political mobilisation. As
Nayyar (1998) points out fragmentation in the party system in India has led to the
emergence of several regional parties and even the national parties have tended to
view their regional units as the focal points in inter-party competition. This
regionalisation is also reflected in the socio-economic support base of parties. In
the earlier era of consensual politics parties tried to appeal to cross sections of
society, irrespective of caste, religion, community or class. Such a tendency is
amplified by the virtual withdrawal of the state from the economy and inability of
governments to provide economic incentives to the voters due to pressures of the
market. In the absence of economic resources and need based agenda parties try to
associate with voters through ascriptive linkages. As such, there has been a
qualitative change in the way in which parties relate themselves to the people
leading to a significant reconfiguration of socio-economic support base and
electoral relevance of traditional interest groups.
Thus, the extent of competition and fragmentation of parties across the
states influences reforms due to transformative influence of the party system on
interest group dynamics, modes of political mobilisation and issues of political
discourse. The ideational and instrumental context of the party system influence
the process of economic reforms and in the context of India political
fragmentation and economic liberalisation in India appear to be mutually
reinforcing developments.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
1.  The political economy of reforms
This dissertation analyses and shows that political factors have a significant
impact in determining reforms under conditions of globalisation. The study of
political variables of economic reform is necessary for mainly two reasons. Firstly,
it highlights the relatively understudied role of political actors and processes in
contributing to policy transformation. Secondly, it points to the specific
configurations of domestic interests that contribute to definite reform outcomes.
Evidently such a research is based on the underlying assumption that structural
pressures for economic restructuring under conditions of globalisation can only
partially explain policy transformations and reforms have political logic behind
them.
In this dissertation, the exact role of political factors in reforms is explored
empirically through a case study of sub-national variations in labour market policy
and outcome. The dissertation explores labour market variations across similar
economic units to reveal the political-economy of reforms. The conclusions
derived from the specific case study of labour reform propose the larger argument
of political-economy of globalisation.
Based on the case study, it is argued that political factors have a significant
role in determining labour reforms across political units. Specifically, partisan
orientation of government and party competition emerge as significant variables
determining policy reform in transitional economies. Partisan orientation and party
competition condition the socio-economic support base of regimes, operation of
the party system, imperatives for parties and party-interest group relation that have
consequences for reform outcome.
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The research finding on the impact of support base highlights the political
character of reforms as political salience of economic interests appears to be a crucial
determinant of policy transformation. The outcome indicates that policy at some
level reflects conflicts and bargaining between relevant social groups which
corroborate the findings of scholars such as Rogowski (1987) and Frieden (1996).
Significantly, at the level of governance it seems that who governs matters for how
globalisation unfolds in a society. The role of class-interest in the adjustment
process appears to be substantial, and public policies under globalisation continue
to be nuanced if not shaped by distributive conflicts between contending socio-
economic groups.
The party system influences reforms at a broader level by providing or
constraining policy alternatives and electoral choices for social groups and interests
in society. The configuration of socio-economic groups, prevalent political agenda
and relative prominence of interest groups is determined within a wider political
environment that not only influences how individuals or groups locate themselves
in the economic structure but their opinion on reforms. Consequently, the capacity
of socio-economic interests to become politically salient remains structured by the
wider political dynamics.
Thus, broadly the dissertation identifies two sets of explanatory variables
namely; partisan orientation and political competition, that have an impact in determining
the extent of reforms. Such an outcome contributes to the literature on political
variables in explaining policy heterogeneity across societies (Garrett 1998a; Korpi
2003; Esping-Andersen 1996).
Further, the adoption of sub-national case study also provides insights
regarding the location of policymaking in a multi-level polity. The dynamics of
labour reform identify the sites of policy transformation at the sub-national level.
The finding corroborates recent literature on federalism which argues that regional
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states have emerged as key actors mediating the process of structural adjustment
(Sinha 2005; Sáez 2002).
2. Politics of labour market reform
The analytical point of departure for this research is the observed
divergences in labour market policies and outcome in four sub-national states of
India, namely Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal despite
similar economic (structural) and institutional framework (Gujarat and Maharashtra
as high growth, high per capita, high FDI and more industrialised while Andhra Pradesh and
West Bengal as medium growth, median per capita and moderately industrialised). The
variation in labour flexibility is not confined to labour policy (regulation) only but
also extends to labour market outcome (wage share, proportion of contractual
labour).
At a more specific level, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat reveal comparatively
flexible labour market than Maharashtra and West Bengal which cannot be
accounted through economic or institutional factors. Foreign direct investment, an
indicator of the degree of global integration does not corroborate the extent of
flexibility and nor does economic structure or institutional framework.
The dissertation points out that variation in labour flexibility is a function
of political undercurrents, namely, partisan orientation of governments, relative strength of
interest groups and party system dynamics. The research contends that in transitional
economies characterised by a legacy of state intervention in the economy and weak
organised interests, economic reforms is mediated and influenced by political
dynamics. Clearly labour policy and outcome appears to be as much a political as
an economic decision even under conditions of globalisation.
As the case study reveals, governments supported by relatively
homogenous support base with business representation tend to reform more than
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parties with heterogeneous support base. Literature on public policy suggests that
relative homogeneity in support base ensures clarity and focus in policies whereas
heterogeneous social base tends to create ambivalent and broader social policies.
Governments with wider social base formulate broader socio-economic policies
and maintain an extensive network of political patronage that is reflected in the
gradualist attitude towards reforms. Broadly regimes with relatively heterogeneous
socio-economic support base exemplified by the Congress party in Maharashtra
tend to reform gradually. Similarly given the predominant socio-economic base of
BJP and TDP originating in urban middle class and upper class-caste sections,
both the parties appear more reformists and labour flexibility is significantly higher
during their regime. In West Bengal the initial pro labour policy, in spite of
industrial stagnation was driven the support base of labour, professional bhadralok
community and agrarian sections.
The creation of such homogenous or heterogeneous support base for
parties appears to be a function of pre-existing caste cleavage and peculiar
correlation between caste and class in society. However, the process is not purely
determined by structural factors as there are political factors that drive ascriptive
mobilisation. Manor (2002) has pointed out that the formation of an ethnic
identity among any social group is by no means inevitable but rather the product
of actions taken by elites and favourable conditions which arise from the broader
environment. Thus, the composition of such support base is not static, and just as
the existing caste cleavage has implications for composition of support base, the
party system has a role in the configuration of support base through the
structuring of political competition. Hence, configurations of caste and its
correlation with class within identity based mobilisation have led to the
construction of homogenous support base.
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It is necessary to point out that the peculiar correlation between caste and
class is due to historical-social dynamics that characterise India. Traditionally the
high castes are found to be concentrated in the upper classes, particularly among
the landowning and industrial sections of society. In such a context political
mobilisation on the basis of caste identity leads to regional variations in the
support base of parties due to nature of pre-existing social cleavages and political
competition. As the case study reveals even the national parties in India like the
Congress party exhibit regional differences due to variations in socio-economic
dynamics. The effect of Congress regime in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra
seem to vary due to regional specificities, particularly composition of social castes
and classes.
Such a process is augmented by the party system which operates as an
endogenous variable influencing political discourse, instrumental imperative of
parties and political alignment of socio-economic cleavages. The nature of political
competition operating in a particular socio-economic situation can provide
opportunities for generating demands as well as constraining social demands
depending on ideological and political dynamics. As the case study suggests
predominance of ascriptive issues and identity based political parties marginalises
issues of class and labour. Conversely, the presence of left political parties seems to
increase the mobilisation of labour.
In the case of labour, increasing number of parties and democratisation
based on ascriptive identity has a negative effect. As pointed out, due to peculiar
intersection between caste and class, identity based mobilisation contributes to
relatively distinct socio-economic support base for parties. Identity based
mobilisation marginalises the socio-economic character of regimes and
competition largely based on issues of identity. That is why increasing
fragmentation in the party system is evident along with increasing labour market
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flexibility contrary to theoretical expectation. Such an outcome goes against the
established idea that an increasing number of parties prevent reforms.
Evidence from the sub-national states suggests increasing reliance of
parties on ascriptive mobilisation, such as TDP in Andhra Pradesh in the name of
telegugauravam or Telegu pride, and the BJP in Gujarat emphasising on a Hindu
identity. Importantly the role of Congress party in conceptualising voters through
caste identity in framing welfare policies can be considered a precursor to such
identity politics. Although pertinent and stimulating issues in the context of
political-economy of reform, this dissertation given its limited scope focuses on
the outcome rather than process. The study of particular mechanisms adopted by
parties that contribute to identity politics constitutes a vital and urgent area of
research.
The findings of the dissertation suggest that the role of political dynamics
is perhaps greater than that has been attributed in contemporary reforms literature.
Despite the uniformity of structural pressures on sub-national states for increasing
labour market flexibility, the unfolding of reforms i.e. the pace and orientation of
reform is significantly affected by political dynamics.  Any policy reform or
transformation towards neo-liberal consensus is a function of the interaction
between broader structural (economic) transformations and domestic political
dynamics specifically partisan orientation and nature of party system.
Contextualising the argument in broader terms it can be argued that, even
though global transformations in the economy and polity (liberalisation and
internationalisation) exert significant pressures on economies to adopt uniform
policies, such pressures can be negotiated by domestic constituents, and specific
policy outcome is determined by the prevalent political economy. Thus, the
research argues for ‘relative autonomy of politics’ under conditions of globalisation
which stands in contrast to both the globalist argument of structural determination
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that marginalise role of political factors, as well as, sceptic assertions about the
myth of globalisation. The argument finds resonance in Rudra (2008) who points
out that the negative impact of liberalisation on welfare spending in less developed
economies is not structural, but due to the weakness of democratic institutions and
collective action problem by labour. Given the sub-national comparative
framework and specific focus of this dissertation, it is not possible to comment on
the potential for political factor to alter or reject forces of globalisation completely.
The question remains crucial and central to analysis of globalisation.
In sum research findings contribute to the literature on reforms,
particularly the strain of literature characterised as political economy of reforms by
highlighting the role of political dynamics, specifically interest groups, partisan
orientation of governments and political competition in determining reform
outcome.
3. Determinants of reform: revisiting research hypotheses
Based on the case study, chapters’ five to eight of the dissertation discusses
and analyses the different political actors and dynamics that influence labour
policy. The following section attempts to summarise main findings of the
dissertation in terms of specific political agencies. The outcome presents the
variation in labour flexibility as a function of relative power of interest groups,
partisan orientation of government and prevailing party system.
3.1 Interest group: trade union
The research findings broadly confirm the established inverse relation
between strength of trade unions and extent of labour market reforms. However,
the case study also suggests that strength of trade union has decreased over time
with the shift in economic structure that has corresponded with significant
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restructuring of labour. Evident from the argument is the complex and non-linear
relation between unionism and labour reforms as trade union strength does not
necessarily lead to favourable outcomes. Analysis of the dimensions of trade
union strength reveals that the capacity of labour is significantly constrained by
government-union relation.
In terms of presence and worker mobilisation trade unions appear to be
strongest in West Bengal and weakest in Gujarat which corroborates with the
situation of labour flexibility in the states. In the states of Maharashtra and Andhra
Pradesh, however,  the power of trade unions do not corroborate to labour market
condition as unionisation appears to be stronger in the latter compared to the
former. The non-correspondence between unionisation and flexibility suggests that
the strength of trade union is not purely conditioned by membership, and wider
political dynamics, especially union-government linkage have a crucial role.
Historical-institutional development of state dominated industrial relation
and weakness of labour movement meant that linkages to government emerged as
a crucial determinant of trade union power. As such trade union strength although
impeding labour flexibility does not appear to explain sub-national variations due
to differences in government orientation to reform. At the level of partisan linkage,
the case study reveals greater representation of trade union in wider politics on one
hand increases the political visibility of labour and aids their spread, on the other
hand, forces trade unions to adopt wider view of economic growth and accept
increased flexibility.
Evidence of reforms reveals that Andhra Pradesh inspite of stronger
unionism has been at the forefront of public sector reforms (Mooij 2005); while
Maharashtra with a weaker trade union movement has been slow in disinvesting
public sector. The extent of disinvestment and privatisation has implications for
trade union strength and consequently labour flexibility. Thus, partisan orientation
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of government i.e. political-ideological dynamics between government-trade
unions emerge as influential intermediate variable in determining the impact of
trade unions on reforms.
3.2 Interest group: business
Like trade unions, business influence appears to be determined by wider
political dynamics specifically the nature of business- government linkage. The
pressure for flexibility emanates primarily from private business under conditions
of globalisation due to pressures for attracting investments and greater
competition. As such states with greater private sector should correspond with
greater labour market flexibility. However, the influence of business over labour
market flexibility does not appear to correspond to the extent of private-public
share of economy as evidenced in the case of Maharashtra or Andhra Pradesh.
The divergence in business influence across the states can be traced back to
the nature of party in government, specifically nature of business-party interaction.
As the case study reveals, divergences in business influence are largely due to
business representation in support base of party in government. States where
business classes and castes constitute a key support base for government are
characterised by greater reforms than states where business does not constitute
electorally relevant or dominant support base of regime.
However, the assertion of business interests within support base is
constrained by the composition of wider support base for parties. When the
support base of party is relatively homogenous in terms of socio-economic
composition with the presence of business groups the likelihood of flexibility is
greater.
The existence of an assertive and dominant business classes within Andhra
Pradesh and Gujarat has led to greater pro-business orientation. In contrast, a
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vibrant business class in Maharashtra despite material resources does not appear as
dominant in pursuing its agenda due to the existence of countervailing social forces
such as agrarian interests in the political system. In the context of West Bengal, not
only is business relatively weak, but historically the inability of business to emerge
as dominant support base for regime meant low business influence.
The role of partisan orientation of government is supported by existing
literature that emphasise the role of caste-class dynamics in the determination of
developmental policies of government (Srinivasulu 1999; Sinha 2005). As Sinha
(2005) has pointed out the historical dominance of regional business class ensured
the market dependent development strategy of Gujarat. In contrast, West Bengal
was marked by marginal influence of business due to domination of the
professional middle class in society and politics of the state due to historical
developments.  The dominance of radical and left politics in the state was reflected
in the continuous rule for 34 years by the Left Front- an alliance of left parties
dominated by the Communist Party of India (Marxist).
3.3 Partisan orientation: socio-economic support base
The analysis of relative variation in interest group influence due to nature
of linkage to government logically suggests the role of partisan orientation. The
relevance of partisan orientation may be traced back to institutional developments
since independence, particularly the adoption of state led strategy of economic
growth. As the state sought to mediate all social conflicts, including that of capital
and labour interest groups historically operated largely through the political system
especially government. As such, political parties and the broader political system
have a crucial role in determining the relative strength of organised interest groups
and distribution and redistribution of resources.
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The analysis of labour market variations across the sub-national states
suggests that partisan orientation of government is a crucial political factor in
reform. According to literature, orientation of government is determined by
ideological and instrumental imperative of parties i.e. the material interests of their
support base and ideological programme. For example, the extent of business
influence on public policy is supposed to be lower when left party and higher when
pro-business party are in power. The case study corroborates such an
understanding as the existence of left government in West Bengal significantly
impedes the extent of flexibility through the spread of trade unions and protection
of public sector which has implications for labour flexibility.
However, ideological differences as a causal explanation lose relevance in
the absence of any sharp policy divergence between leading non-left parties on
issues of economic reforms. Hence, any perceived difference is due to instrumental
interest of parties i.e. support base. Empirical evidence also suggests variation in
flexibility across states dominated by parties such as Congress and BJP who have a
similar position on economic reforms. Hence, partisan orientation of government
due to differences in support base emerges as a crucial explanatory variable for
labour market reforms. The case study reveals that labour reform is greater in
states where business classes or castes constitute a significant support base for
party in power. However, the influence of business groups within the party in
contingent upon the broader socio-economic support base for the party in power.
Consequently, governments with significant business representation within a
relatively homogenous socio-economic support base can implement greater
reforms. In contrast, governments backed by support base with marginal or no
business presence, as in West Bengal appear to be least reformist. Parties in
government with significant business support, but relatively wider heterogeneous
socio-economic support base as in Maharashtra appear to reform gradually.
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The differences in the pace and orientation of government to reforms is
attributed to two interconnected factors; firstly a homogenous support base allows
parties to formulate coherent and focused policies due to relatively fewer
contradictory pressures from the support base, and secondly parties with narrow
and homogenous support base are more likely to resist interest group pressures not
amenable to their respective support base. Conversely if, the support base is wide
and heterogeneous, governments in spite of business representation often find it
difficult to pursue reforms due to the distributive and redistributive pressures
emanating from support base.
In this context, it is essential to clarify and elaborate the suggested
argument especially with regard to homogenous or heterogeneous support. The
nature of socio-economic support base is considered homogeneous if the main
constituent groups in support base are similar in terms of social and economic
position and vice versa for heterogeneous. To put simply, homogeneity or
heterogeneity is determined by the similarity or dissimilarity of groups that
constitute core support base of parties in terms of social and economic position
and expectation from public policies (Korpi 2003). Such a socio-economic
qualification of support base is possible through a caste based analysis due to the
peculiar interrelation between caste and class in India. Caste as a hereditary,
hierarchical and endogamous social stratification emanating from socio-religious
functions also has correlation to class understood as groups with relatively similar
situations in the economy that define similarities in their opportunities and
constraints.
In this context, an influential theoretical work that reinforces the argument
made in the dissertation is ‘United Colours of Congress: Social profile of Congress
Voters’ by Heath (1999). Heath and Yadav determine the social basis of Congress
party support in the 1990s through both castes as well as class configurations. They
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point out that in the case of Congress party- BJP contest, the support base of BJP
has tended to be more concentrated among upper castes, middle and upper classes
and weakest among Muslims and underprivileged. As such the dominant support
base of BJP is more homogeneous compared to Congress which was supported
dominantly by underprivileged, minorities, lower classes along with sections of
upper caste and class. Similarly, in Maharashtra they found that in general Congress
voters were less well off than BJP-Shiv Sena voters although the difference was
much less than direct Congress-BJP contest.
In most transitional economies, due to various historical reasons political
mobilisation is often driven by identity issues and in India caste has been a
dominant socio-political cleavage that drives politics. In the context of the
dissertation consideration of caste support base provides an indication of the
relative composition of support base. A support base is considered socio-
economically heterogeneous if the dominant castes in the support base are
relatively dispersed along caste hierarchy and homogenous if the variation in low.
The analysis of support base is in terms of caste admittedly leaves out many more
prominent social cleavages that have a marked influence on political configuration
such as religion and language. However, the choice of such a methodology can be
explained through research exigencies. Firstly the literature on political party
support in India derives largely from a caste based understanding as revealed from
extensive secondary research.  Secondly in the absence of class data on support
base and broad correspondence between caste and class the former can be used as
a proxy variable.
As pointed out, the creation of homogenous or heterogeneous socio-
economic support base for parties due to pre-existing caste cleavage and peculiar
correspondence between caste and class. As identity politics or caste cleavage
provide the basis of political mobilisation, depending on pre-existing caste-class
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configuration and political competition both homogenous as well as heterogeneous
electoral support bases develop across states and regimes.  In states where business
castes constitute a significant part of a relatively homogeneous socio-economic
support base such as BJP in Gujarat and TDP and Congress in Andhra Pradesh,
the governments undertake greater reforms and are less amenable to trade union
influence. In contrast states where the stable support base for party in power is
relatively wide or heterogeneous, despite business representation, governments
appear to reform gradually.
The emergence of a homogeneous or heterogeneous support base is not
merely determined by structural presence of caste cleavages as political parties, and
party system has a decisive role in the process. The extant literature on parties and
party system in India reveal a crucial role for political parties in ascriptive
mobilisation. For example, Shah (2007) has argued that with the rise of BJP in
Gujarat, the demands of the disaffected sections of society and social tensions
have been increasingly coalesced into a majority-minority communal discourse.
Similarly emphasis on ascriptive identity by political parties can also be identified in
other states, such as Maratha- Bihari conflict or majority- minority discourse of
Shiv Sena, Telegu pride of TDP, caste conflict regarding state recognition between
madas and maligas or telengana state movement.
Although the focus of this research limits interrogation of the specific
processes and relation that parties adopt for mobilisation, the issue constitutes a
serious agenda for future research. This research specifically focuses on the impact
of identity based mobilisation on reforms at the level of party system. Importantly
the emphasis on partisan politics based on the support base of regimes suggests
the continued relevance of class related socio-economic interests under conditions
of globalisation.
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The importance of socio-economic groups in reforms has been
emphasised by Corbridge (2000) who argues that economic reforms in India was
the revolt of upper- class-class minority against a pro poor state. The argument
highlights the emergence of a new middle class who are the beneficiaries of
globalisation and the simultaneous emergence of backward castes that challenged
the domination of rich peasants and became the centre of social mobilisation. This
class has increasingly sought to reorient itself with the market and global
consumption patterns. In welfare state literature, this transformation in the
professional classes and growing distance between the middle class and organised
labour has been characterised as the break in the historic alliance between white
collar and blue collar workers (Anderson 2001). The assertion regarding partisan
orientation in determining reforms is also substantiated by welfare state literature
and opposition to reforms literature that emphasise the role of social coalitions in
bringing about or impeding reforms (Korpi 2003).
3.4 Party system: fragmentation and competition
The argument of partisan orientation for labour market variation needs to
be qualified through the operation of the party system. The nature of political
competition has significance for the configuration of socio-economic groups as
well as prevalent political discourse in society. The party system also acts as an
intermediate variable that influence the behaviour of interest group and political
parties. Broader political system i.e. nature and extent of political competition
provide the framework of choices for policy makers and determine the conditions
of interaction between political actors.
The conclusions derived from the research suggest that the impact of
political fragmentation on reform depends on the qualitative nature of the process
i.e. the issues that drive fragmentation. In the sub national states, experience of
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labour reforms reveal that during periods of increasing fragmentation, labour
flexibility has not only increased but appears to have gathered pace. Such an
outcome is contrary to conventional argument of negative relation between
fragmentation and reform.
The increase in the effective number of parties or fragmentation facilitates
labour market reforms through certain distinct yet interrelated factors. Firstly, in a
transitional economy marked by identity politics, the emergent political parties are
often based on social cleavages such as caste and communitarian identities that
may marginalises the issue of labour. Such an outcome although not automatic or
inevitable is largely the result of broader political-economic environment and
partisan mobilisation. As Chhibber (1999) points out in India in the absence
associational way of life, electoral competition over state has led to the
politicisation of social cleavages. As such, democratisation appears to have
proceeded along ethnic and caste lines in India, and the democratic upsurge has
undermined non-ascriptive differences such as class and gender. Interviews with
left political activists and labour leader reveal that caste identity more often than
not overrides class identity of workers during elections. Although it does not imply
the complete absence of rhetoric of class, or the potential for comixing of class
and caste concerns, the process of democratisation has largely relied on the
rhetoric of ethnicity both for mobilisation and policy direction. De Souza (2006)
has argued that democratic upsurge has not been translated effectively into formal
politics, and the emergence of new political actors has little scope for
transformative politics.
Political fragmentation also contributes to reforms by enabling the
realignment of caste-class configurations within broader society. Such a process
provides opportunities for reconfiguration of support base and under conditions
of business presence within homogeneous support base can facilitate reforms. As
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the chapter on parties (Chapter 7) has argued the Congress party in the selected
states represented a heterogeneous catch all party with wide support base till
around 1970’s. However given specific configurations of caste in Gujarat and
Andhra Pradesh, fragmentation in party system (emergence of BJP and TDP)
translated into realignment of socio-economic groups that had implications for
partisan orientation of governments and consequently reforms.
Such a realignment of socio-economic groups in society is also contributed
by instrumental imperatives of parties. In a party system marked by the
mobilisation according to identity issues, political parties tend to be dominated by
specific groups and parties increasingly relate to support base through the
segmented identities of caste, religion and region due to instrumental imperative of
nurturing a stable support base. As Nayyar (1998) argues in the earlier era of
consensual politics parties tried to appeal to cross sections of society, irrespective
of caste, religion, community or class. The tendency is amplified by the virtual
withdrawal of the state from the economy and inability of governments to provide
economic incentives to the voters due to pressures of the market. In the absence
of economic resources and need based agenda, parties try to associate with voters
through ascriptive linkages. Consequently, there is a qualitative change in the way
parties relate to the people leading to significant reconfiguration of socio-economic
support base and electoral irrelevance of traditional interest groups such as trade
unions.
Thus, the extent of competition and fragmentation in the party system
influences reforms across the states due to its transformative influence on interest
group dynamics, modes of political mobilisation and issues of political
competition. Although the party system is not an exogenous variable affecting
reforms, political fragmentation and economic liberalisation in India appear to be
mutually reinforcing development.
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4. Implications of research outcome
This finding of the dissertation provide a political explanation for labour
market variation and suggests that the dynamics between interest groups and
government, socio-economic support base of parties and the prevailing party
system have implications for reforms. Such an argument contrasts the structuralist
understanding of Garrett (2000) that cross-national variations in market integration
are the product of basic economic characteristics (such as country size and level of
development) than political factors (such as regime type or the left-right balance of
power).
The research outcome is broadly in consonance with the existing literature
on political economy of reforms that seek to explain the scope and contents of
reforms through political variables. The argument of identity politics marginalising
issues of labour both at the level of discourse and partisan linkages of labour
movement is somewhat similar to Elite Mass dichotomy argument of Varshney
(1999) that argues reforms in India were possible due to displacement of reforms
issues from mass issues by identity politics. However the findings of the
dissertation diverge from Varshney in so far as the contention that economic
reforms have progressed only in areas of elite concern such as trade and financial
reforms and not in areas with potentially negative or highly uncertain implications
for mass politics. Contrary to lack of reforms in the labour market the findings
suggests significant increase in flexibility despite protective legislations. As such the
reform by stealth argument of Jenkins (1999) appears to be more appropriate in
the context of politically sensitive labour reforms.
The discussion on parties and party system suggests that configurations of
support for government made possible by pre-existing caste cleavages, and certain
modes of mobilisation have consequences for reforms. According to Chhibber
(2001) the configurations of support base according to identity i.e. caste cleavage,
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is structurally determined. He points out that party strategy and electoral
competition are significantly influenced by the social cleavages around which
parties evolve. The research challenges such a structuralist understanding of
support base purely through pre-existing social cleavages. The research outcome,
while accepting the role of the wider environment, highlights the role of political
parties in reinforcing or diminishing specific configurations of social support.
Lipset (1967) one of the foremost proponents of the cleavage theory, points out
parties may be able to evolve new alignments of support independent of pre-
existing differences. The case study reveals the prominent role of political parties
in constructing support base, such as the BJP in Gujarat creating new
configurations of support based on religious identity, and the TDP reorienting its
position on reforms reflected through the displacement of NTR by Chandrababu
Naidu.
In sum, the political determinants of labour market flexibility present a
multi causal multi variable outcome. Primarily it suggests that support base of
regimes and party system dynamics has implications for reform. Parties with
relatively homogeneous support base with business representation tend to reform
more than parties with heterogeneous support base. Reforms are lowest under
parties without any significant representation of business and parties. Importantly
the process of economic reform is aided by increasing fragmentation in party
system on the basis of identity issues. The increasing currency of cultural and
ethnic identities issues not only mute issues of class but significantly help in the
composition of partisan support on the basis of ascriptive identity. Such a process
is aided by the peculiar correlation between caste and class in India. The research
outcome suggests that analysis of fragmentation must consider the number of
parties, the distance between parties over particular policy, and the political
discourse associated with the process of fragmentation.
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Significantly, the research outcome suggests continued relevance of
political agency especially trade unions in affecting policies regarding labour market
reforms. Trade unions by their raison d’etre seek to protect and improve wages,
work conditions and social benefits for workers and act as impediments to labour
market reforms. The changed global production network has undermined the
capacity of organised labour through mobility of capital in a networked and multi-
scalar form of capitalism (Gillan 2010). The emaciation of trade unions as an
interest group can be theoretically explained through economic and political
context of trade unions. Economic changes particularly post-fordist model of
production has meant a decline of traditional labour employed in a factory with
statutory rights. Most new employment has become highly flexible and segmented,
leading to the creation of new labour or ‘precariat’ who remain largely outside the
ambit of unions. Moreover, as pointed out in literature the impact of globalisation
has varied across industries and sectors, particularly between economic sectors
sheltered from international competition and the economic sectors exposed to
growing pressures for competitiveness. Such difference creates growing intra-
labour divisions posing problems for trade unions.
The historic weakness of trade unions in India due to limited penetration
and state dominated industrial relations framework led to increased reliance on
government. Politically the ideational shift towards market led development and
structural pressures on government have led to widening gaps between political
parties and trade unions. Differences in ideational orientation, exogenous pressures
from international organisations and markets have contributed to such widening
gap (Häusermann 2007). In such a situation, the trade union movement can hope
to influence reforms by potentially focusing beyond the factory and becoming
electorally relevant. Globalisation requires going beyond both the factory as the
site of production and industrial worker as the vanguard of labour.
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5. Bringing back the political: the relevance of political dynamics
The analysis of political variables in determining labour market reforms
contributes towards the wider debate on the relation between politics and
economic policy under conditions of globalisation.
At a broader level, the research findings suggest that, in transitional
economies characterised by a legacy of state intervention and weak organised
interests, economic reforms is mediated and influenced through political dynamics,
particularly political parties and party system. The role of political party is
determined by partisan orientation of support base and prevailing political
competition. It is necessary to mention that such a process is conditioned by
broader political and structural conditions such as political framework, nature of
political cleavages, historical institutional developments which are not discussed in
the dissertation.
The implication of such an outcome is politically relevant due to two
interrelated factors. Firstly analysing the argument of policy convergence in the
light of broader political experience, it becomes apparent that although external
pressures may be significant, the outcome of reforms is always contingent on
domestic political dynamics. The research findings also corroborate that policy
change towards neo liberal consensus has political, specifically class-orientation. To
put simply, contemporary globalisation is not a class neutral process and has
specific consequences for different socio-economic categories of people. The data
on wage share (share of labour) and contractual employment (atypical/temporary)
reveal a marked decline in the position of labour vis-à-vis employers. Thus, the
dissertation corroborates the power resources perspective that argues distributive
conflicts between leading social interests groups reflected through the political
process as an important determinant of socio-economic policies (Korpi 2003).
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The outcome also contradicts the spatial theories of parties such as median
voter theory. According to the median voter choice argument most voters are
massed in the median region, and as such parties adopt largely median policies to
appeal to largest constituency of voters.  Even though, the dissertation cannot
comment on the broader spectrum of public policies, in terms of labour policy
such an argument does not appear to hold.  Rather as the case study reveals
differences in labour market policy and outcome is a function of nature of party in
power. Partisan politics appears to be relevant in shaping the pace and orientation
of labour policy
6. Globalisation and public policy
The research outcome emphasising on the political determinants of reform
and suggesting relative autonomy of political in determining labour reforms raises
pertinent questions regarding public policy under conditions of globalisation. As
pointed out in the introductory section, any discussion on labour policy is
essentially a discussion on public policy under conditions of globalisation.
The study of labour reforms across sub-national states reveals that labour
reforms are the result of a more general shift in economic policy paradigm. The
growing internationalisation of production and consumption creates structural
pressures on states to adopt neoliberal policies to maintain international
competitiveness regardless of their partisan compositions and national differences.
As Rudra (2008) points out globalisation discourages governments from raising
revenue through taxes due to "footloose capital," and instead encourages reduction
in welfare spending as well as taxes to improve export competitiveness and attract
international investment. The global transformations are accompanied by changes
in economic arrangement within domestic economies such as structural transition
from an industrial to a service economy, shifting patterns of demand and de-
280
industrialisation. The increasing liberalisation of the economy under conditions of
globalisation is associated with increased space for market forces in the
determination of economic outcomes which is argued to weaken the role of
politics in influencing economic outcomes. Such development has raised questions
regarding the limits of political control over economic processes.
Given the limited scope and specific objective of this dissertation, it is not
possible to comment decisively on political control over the market at a macro
level.  In order to evaluate the role of domestic politics in shaping economic
reforms under conditions of globalisation a large cross national comparison
between like-cases such as Brazil and India is required. However, the dissertation
does reveal that even when economic pressures necessitate some adjustment, the
choice of policies and scope of reforms is determined by political dynamics. At a
theoretical level, such an argument indicates a greater role for political factors in
the determination of policies than conventionally regarded in globalisation
literature. It points to the potential space for domestic constituents to influence
policies and suggests that reforms emerge through the interrelation between
economic considerations and political imperatives.
As the case study reveals, labour market flexibility has proceeded in
different states not only at varying pace but was also initiated at different times.
For example, increasing flexibility in labour market can be noticed in the state of
Gujarat much prior to reforms in 1991 while, in West Bengal, it is evident nearly
one and a half decade later only after liberalisation. This variation is explained, not
by global structural transformation but partisan orientation and political
configuration. Thus, contrary to arguments of increasing irrelevance traditional
political factors such as social groups and political parties under conditions of
globalisation, this research argues for continued relevance of political actors and
processes.
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Structural transformations leading to shift from industry to service sector
has significance for the labour market as the service economy provides ample
labour demand for highly skilled and unskilled work, but fewer job opportunities
for low level skills (Wood 1994). Also, de-industrialisation of traditional sectors
causes high rates of unemployment and labour-shedding strategies reduce the
labour market participation rate. However, the response of government to such
developments can vary from passive labour market support (unemployment
benefit) to active labour market policies (skill development) which remain
inherently a political choice.
As noted in this and other comparative studies, although convergence
dynamic towards micro reforms can be noted, the extent and intensity of change
has varied due to political economic reasons. Changed policy paradigms are filtered
differently through distinct traditions of welfare capitalism, power resources,
institutional lock-in effects and configurations of national political systems.
Consequently, we can say that while there has been a general trend toward
neoliberal policy convergence, it cannot be argued that increasing economic
linkages or globalisation has been the only cause behind labour market flexibility.
The role of political agency, democratic organisations and their derivative
institutions is found to affect variations in extent of labour market reform even
under conditions of globalisation.
The recognition of political-economic factors in the determination of
reforms suggests that globalisation processes are more complex than the
dichotomy of divergence and convergence and political-institutional agency have a
profound influence on the economy (Christopherson 2002). The argument
presented occupies the middle ground between literature that expound the
supremacy of global economic transformations (Strange 1996) and one that doubts
the effect of globalisation on state capacity (Garrett 1998a). As such the
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dissertation provides a sophisticated model of political economy of labour policy
that reinstates the importance of political variables i.e. partisan orientation, interest
groups and party competition in determining reforms. Domestic political dynamics
and configurations have a powerful influence on policy which is neglected by the
dominant structural interpretation and need to be incorporated in any meaningful
analysis of politics of reform.
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Appendix
Chapter 4
Comparative position of states in terms of population, literacy, work force
State Year Populati
on
Literacy
rate
Urbani
sation
Percentage
of workers
Main
worker
Non
Worker
Andhra
Pradesh
2001 76210 60.47 27.3 45.74 38.05 54.12
Andhra
Pradesh
1991 66508 44.1 26.89 45.05 42.77 54.95
Andhra
Pradesh
1981 53550 23.32 45.76
Gujarat 2001 50671 69.14 37.36 40.19 32.14 55.29
Gujarat 1991 41310 61.3 34.49 40.23 34.12 59.77
Gujarat 1981 34086 31.1 37.27
Maharash
tra
2001 96879 76.88 42.43 43.39 36.81 56.46
Maharash
tra
1991 78937 64.9 38.69 42.96 39.28 57.02
Maharash
tra
1981 62784 35.03 42.56
West
Bengal
1981 54581 26.47 30.17
West
Bengal
2001 80176 68.64 27.97 36.79 28.76 63.25
West
Bengal
1991 68078 57.7 27.48 32.19 30.23 67.81
Source: Statistical Abstract (Various Issues), Ministry of Statistics and Planning,
Government of India
The table provides a comparative data on literacy rate, urbanisation and
workforce which reveals similarity between West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh as
well as Gujarat and Maharashtra. Interestingly the percentage of workers is lower
in West Bengal compared to other states.
The similarity between the sub-national states is most evident in terms of
economic indicators. The table on growth rate of economy, contribution of
industry to state domestic product and per capita state domestic product reveals
remarkable similarity between Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal and Gujarat and
Maharashtra.
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Comparative table on selected economic indicators
Year State Growth Rate Industry Contribution Per Capita SDP
1980-1985 Andhra Pradesh 4.7 13.01 5082.8
1980-1985 Gujarat 6.9 23.93 7099.4
1980-1985 Maharashtra 3.5 27.53 7287.6
1980-1985 West Bengal 4 21.78 5002.6
1985-1990 Andhra Pradesh 8.4 14.99 5773.4
1985-1990 Gujarat 6.1 29.62 7872
1985-1990 Maharashtra 8.6 29.41 8497
1985-1990 West Bengal 4.3 19.92 5619.2
1990-1995 Andhra Pradesh 4.9 19.11 7190.8
1990-1995 Gujarat 8.5 32.03 9665.4
1990-1995 Maharashtra 6.5 29.34 11121
1990-1995 West Bengal 6 18.03 6516.4
1995-2000 Andhra Pradesh 5.5 17.36 8673
1995-2000 Gujarat 5.1 30.7 12981.1
1995-2000 Maharashtra 6.8 27.19 14013.2
1995-2000 West Bengal 7.3 17.9 8382.8
2000-2005 Andhra Pradesh 6.7 15.91 11163.6
2000-2005 Gujarat 8.3 30.84 14636.8
2000-2005 Maharashtra 3.8 20.96 15856.4
2000-2005 West Bengal 7 16.27 11008.4
Source: Statistical Abstract (Various Issues), Ministry of Statistics and Planning,
Government of India
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Index of Labour Law Amendments at the sub-national level
State Year Amendment and codes Overall Code Besley and
Burgess
Maharashtra 2006
2003
2006
1981
2006
1974
2006
1972
1972
1972
1981
1981
1982
1972
1981
Expansion of definition of
Contract Labour
Contract Labour in SEZ
cannot be scrutinised under
central act
Expanding the definition of
Factory is expanded
Expands the definition of Lay
Off- compensation due to lay
off
Enhanced the ambit of
workman by increasing the
salary to 6500
Procedural Labour Court-
Industrial Tribunal
Expanding the list of
exceptions when notice of
termination is not required
Qualifies the term workman
and recognised union
Recognised Union can sign
agreements on behalf of all
workmen
New Unions can terminate old
settlements within 2 months
100% wage in case of lay off
due to contravention of
Electricity Act
Govt. can update Chapter VB
to extend rules in lay off,
retrenchment and closure
Application for closure must
be made 90 days prior and no
communication within 60 days
ensures automatic permission
Only recognised trade unions
can represent workers in case
of industrial disputes
Expansion of ID Act to firms
Pro Employer
Pro Employer
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Neutral
Pro Employer
Pro  Labour
Pro Labour-Pro
employer
Pro-Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Employer
Anti- Labour
Pro-Labour
Pro Labour
Neutral
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro- Labour
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1983
employing more than 100
workers
Right to appeal decision of
Industrial Tribunal
Pro-Labour Pro-Labour
Andhra
Pradesh
2003
2003
1968
1949
2008
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1982
1987
1987
Expanding the scope of
Contract Act  although
prohibiting contract labour in
core Activity
Abolition of State Advisory
Board in determining Contract
Labour, Abolition of
rulemaking power for State
Labour Board
Expands to prohibit  strikes
and lockouts in hospitals and
dispensaries
State Schedule to expand the
industries under IDA-creation
of tribunal
Definition as per central act-
Individual Dispute can be
directly addressed to court
Government has special
power to contain disputes
Payment of wages and due
prior to closure
Workers in muster roll of a
reopened unit receive
precedence
Where a workman is reinstated
by award, reinstatement
considered from day of award
Voluntary Agreement at par
with conciliation
Power to recover dues
extended to chief judicial
magistrates
Facilitates settlement of
industrial disputes in labour
courts
Penalty for not complying
with govt. Order for
prohibiting disputes
Individual worker can move
Pro Employer
Pro Employer
Pro Employer
Pro State
Neutral
Pro Labour
Pro Employer
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Neutral
Pro Labour
Pro- Labour
Pro-Employer
Pro Labour
Pro employer
Pro-Employer
Pro Labour
Pro-Employer
Pro-Labour
Pro Labour
Pro-Labour
Pro Labour
Pro-Labour
Pro Employer
Pro Labour
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1987
the court
Lengthens the notice period
for change of work conditions
Pro Labour Pro Labour
West Bengal 1958
1959
2007
1974
1974
1980
1980
1989
1989
1980
1987
1980
1989
1980
1989
1980
Qualification of Presiding
Officer of Industrial Tribunal
Tenure of Presiding officer
IDA Act procedural change-
specifying conciliation officers
Amending the definition of lay
off two limit 2 hours.
Prohibits lay off in the same
day.
Defining Public Utility to
prohibit strikes and lock out
Definition of retrenchment
expanded and ill health
removed from clause
Expands definition of
workman to include sales
workers
Termination of individual
worker to be deemed
industrial dispute
Enhancing definition of
dispute to include refuses
employment
Formation of works
committee in IDA
Notice period for change of
work condition increased
Increasing the time frame for
conciliation
Voluntary Arbitration
Empowered labour courts to
issue decree
Facilitates judicial settlement
of labour dispute. Day to Day
hearing in court
Government may stop or
retain the enforceability of
award
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Pro Labour
Pro Employer
Pro-Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Neutral
Pro Labour
Pro-State
Pro-Employer
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro State
Neutral
Neutral
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro-Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Employer
Pro Labour
Pro- Labour
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1980
1980
1989
1980
1980
1980
1989
1989
2007
1980
1989
1980
1990
1986
1989
Expunged the continuous 45
lay off qualification for
retrenchment. Limit on lay off
removed
Laid off worker to report once
a week if laid off more than 7
days
Payment of wages and due
prior to closure
Workers in muster roll of a
reopened unit receive
precedence
Where a workman is reinstated
by award, reinstatement
considered from day of award
Expanding the scope of
chapter VB from 300 to 50
workers
Computation of compensation
specified and Government
may issue direction as required
Closure must ensure due
payment of wages
Penalty for breach of award
increased
Power to recover dues
extended to chief judicial
magistrate
Section 38 procedural change
Period of 60 days increased to
90 days in case of permission
for lay off
Qualification of Labour Judge
Greater power of labour
courts in Industrial Disputes
Right of individual to
approach Labour court after
conciliation
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro-Labour
Pro-Labour
Pro-Labour
Pro Labour
Neutral
Pro- Labour
Neutral
Pro-Labour
Pro-Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro Labour
Pro- Labour
Pro-Labour
Neutral
Pro-Labour
Neutral
Pro-Labour
Pro-Labour
Gujarat 1962
1977
Qualification of presiding
officer of Industrial tribunal
Qualification of Labour Court
judge and Presiding Office of
Tribunal
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
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1984
2004
2004
2004
2004
1972
1977
2004
1972
Procedural change-defining
closure
Termination is put outside the
scope of IDA
Procedural -Defining Lay Off
Constricting the definition of
retrenchment  to exclude SEZ
Defining termination as in
principal act
Work Committee and Joint
Management
Procedural Labour court
Unfair labour practices
applicable in SEZ
Fine for non-application of
joint management council
Neutral
Pro Employer
Neutral
Pro Employer
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Pro Labour
Pro Labour Pro- Worker
The data is derived from P.L. Malik (2009). Handbook of Labour and
Industrial Law. New Delhi: Eastern Book House. The computation and coding of
labour law amendments is based on Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act 1970, Factories Act 1948 and Industrial Disputes Act 1947.
Although Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act
1952, Employees State Insurance Act 1948, Trade Union Act 1926 was considered,
no sub-national amendment was found.
The classification results are similar to that of Besley and Burgess (2004)
except for few cases where the classification should be pro-state rather than pro-
employer or labour. A typical example would be the 1989 ID Act amendment in
West Bengal which empowers the Government to stop or retain the enforceability
of award in order to prohibit disputes. While Besley is not incorrect to classify it in
the particular context of West Bengal as Pro-Labour amendment, the most
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appropriate classification should be Pro-State as the amendment empowers the
State.
Moreover the sub-national amendment is much wider in scope which is
particularly relevant as contractual worker and trade unionism have emerged as
important indicators of labour market under conditions of globalisation. The most
significant labour law amendments in recent past have been regarding the
employment of contractual labour.
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Chapter 9
This is a modest attempt to present the arguments of this dissertation
through quantitative data.  The mathematical representation attempts to
supplement theory with quantitative data. Since the case study is observed over
time as well as space the econometric analysis is based on panel data regressions.
Panel data allows control for variables that cannot be observed or measured like
cultural factors or difference in business practices; or variables that change over
time but not across entities. In short it provides for state specific heterogeneity.
The advantage of panel data regression also lies in its ability to generate better
estimates of long run relationship considering both fixed effect estimators as well
as random effect estimators.
Random effects generalized least squares regression is used to estimate the
relative importance of the party system and other factors hypothesized to influence
economic policy changes. Random effects models assume that, in addition to the
usual error term, there is additional, independent error terms specific to the cross-
sectional and temporal variation.
As argued in the dissertation the significant sub-national variations in
labour market flexibility despite similarity in economic and institutional framework
is outcome of political economic factors especially partisan orientation of
government, extent of trade unionism, party system fragmentation. Thus the
supposed regression model would symbolize the following relation:
Labour flexibility= trade union strength + business strength + political
configuration + state specific macroeconomic factors.
The particular regression takes the form= + , + , + , + , + , + , + 
Where
i=state; t= time
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Y= Wage_ NVA (wage as a share of net value added)
= CONTPROP (number of contract workers as proportion of total workers)
= PRIVEMP (proportion of private sector employment among factory workers)
= STRIKEPART (number of striking workers as a proportion of total workers).
= PUBDISP (number of disputes in public sector as proportion of total
dispute)
= ENPVT (effective number of parties according to vote share)=CAPLAB (capital labour ratio in organized industry)
= Error factor
The results of the regression analysis confirm the arguments presented in
the dissertation as wage share (Wage_ NVA- the dependent variable indicating
wage flexibility) is positively influenced by the collective mobilisation by workers
(STRIKEPART). The presence or size of private sector (PRIVEMP) does not
emerge as a statistically significant factor indicating that the strength of business
over policies is more a result of political economic dynamics. The argument about
fragmentation having a positive effect on labour market flexibility is confirmed by
the statistical test. Finally macro-economic factors like capital labour ratio
(CAPLAB) and proportion of contractual workers (CONTPROP) has a negative
impact on the wage share. Interestingly the extent of contractual workers is in itself
a measure of labour flexibility.
Overall the result indicates that extent of labour flexibility is an outcome of
interaction between economic and political variables. The relative strength of
economic interest groups, political competition and overall economic structure
combine to determine the extent of flexibility. Importantly for us, the results
indicate a significant role for political actors and partisan dynamics.
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As the hausman test reveals that probability is less than Chi2, we accept the fixed
effect model.
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
= 37.97
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
CAPLAB -.0050346 -.0042159 -.0008187 .
ENPVT -.0165401 -.0294253 .0128853 .0060577
PUBDISP .0555858 -.060977 .1165628 .0238457
STRIKEPART .133199 .1148156 .0183834 .
PRIVEMP .0249551 -.6269746 .6519297 .1792145
CONTPROP -.1719635 -.1388026 -.0331609 .0302347
fe re Difference S.E.
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
Coefficients
. hausman fe re
. estimates store re
rho 0 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e .0414178
sigma_u 0
_cons .9583559 .0507392 18.89 0.000 .8589089 1.057803
CAPLAB -.0042159 .0009739 -4.33 0.000 -.0061247 -.0023072
ENPVT -.0294253 .0047879 -6.15 0.000 -.0388094 -.0200413
PUBDISP -.060977 .024372 -2.50 0.012 -.1087453 -.0132086
STRIKEPART .1148156 .0361576 3.18 0.001 .0439481 .1856832
PRIVEMP -.6269746 .0652811 -9.60 0.000 -.7549232 -.499026
CONTPROP -.1388026 .0306997 -4.52 0.000 -.1989729 -.0786322
Wage_NVA Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Wald chi2(6) = 417.29
overall = 0.8258 max = 25
between = 0.9857 avg = 23.8
R-sq: within = 0.5250 Obs per group: min = 21
Group variable: State Number of groups = 4
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 95
. xtreg Wage_NVA CONTPROP PRIVEMP STRIKEPART PUBDISP ENPVT CAPLAB, re
. estimates store fe
F test that all u_i=0: F(3, 85) = 10.94 Prob > F = 0.0000
rho .77576224 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e .0414178
sigma_u .07703657
_cons .3708828 .1565459 2.37 0.020 .0596275 .682138
CAPLAB -.0050346 .0008599 -5.85 0.000 -.0067443 -.0033249
ENPVT -.0165401 .0077214 -2.14 0.035 -.0318922 -.0011879
PUBDISP .0555858 .0340971 1.63 0.107 -.0122084 .1233801
STRIKEPART .133199 .0318572 4.18 0.000 .0698583 .1965398
PRIVEMP .0249551 .190734 0.13 0.896 -.3542752 .4041855
CONTPROP -.1719635 .0430884 -3.99 0.000 -.2576347 -.0862922
Wage_NVA Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.3724 Prob > F = 0.0000
F(6,85) = 22.81
overall = 0.5545 max = 25
between = 0.7597 avg = 23.8
R-sq: within = 0.6169 Obs per group: min = 21
Group variable: State Number of groups = 4
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 95
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